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Academics and ombudsman claim that a key role for ombudsman is to 
contribute to the improvement of the system over which they have oversight. 
However, there is limited research to support this claim and, much of what 
exists, is equivocal. This research examines the thesis that health 
ombudsman make a significant contribution to the improvement of the 
healthcare system as a result of the roles and activities that they undertake 
together with the way that they work with bodies in jurisdiction. In conducting 
this research, an international comparative case study was undertaken, using 
the Office of the Health Ombudsman, Queensland (OHOQ) and the Scottish 
Public Services Ombudsman (SPSO) as cases. In addition, three Scottish 
health boards participated in the research. The OHOQ was found not to be 
an ombudsman but to be a health complaint entity which principally focused 
on the prosecution of health professionals that it considers have conducted 
serious professional misconduct. The SPSO is an ombudsman, which 
principally tries to contribute to system improvement through compliance 
from health boards with recommendations arising from upheld complaints. In 
its approach to complaint investigations, the SPSO adopts the positions of an 
accountability institutional logic and coercive model of administrative control. 
These positions adversely affect the relationship between the SPSO and 
health boards with health board participants complaining about the nature of 
the communication between themselves and the SPSO, the quality of the 
clinical advice relied upon by the SPSO in reaching its decisions, and the 
inability to challenge either the advice or the decision. Consequently, in many 
cases, compliance with SPSO recommendations was due to a fear of 
sanction rather than commitment. In implementing recommendations, health 
boards use a dominant informational mode of organisational learning. 
Together, these factors explain why learning is unsustained leading to 
repeated complaints about the same issue. 
 
Keywords: ombudsman, health complaints, institutional logics, administrative 









While this thesis is my own work, it would not have been possible without the 
support and encouragement from many other persons and organisations. 
Firstly, I would like to thank Dr Margaret Smith and Professor Marion Ellison 
who both stepped in at short notice to become my supervisory team. Their 
support, advice and assistance are greatly appreciated. I would also like to 
thank Carol Brennan and Dr Chris Gill, my original supervisory team, who 
provided me with this opportunity and supported me in my early endeavours. 
I would also like to thank Queen Margaret University’s Centre for Consumer 
Dispute Resolution and its School of Arts, Social Sciences and Management. 
I would also like to thank the participants from the OHOQ, the SPSO and the 
participating Scottish health boards for giving of their time and for speaking 
freely with me. 
 
But, undertaking this research requires support outwith academia. In that 
regard I would like to thank my family for their encouragement. I would like to 
particularly thank both Lei-Mei Bau, without whose encouragement I may 

















Abstract ........................................................................................................... ii 
Acknowledgements ........................................................................................ iii 
List of Tables................................................................................................... x 
List of Figures ................................................................................................ xi 
List of abbreviations ...................................................................................... xii 
 
Chapter 1 Introduction ................................................................................... 1 
1.1 Situating the research .......................................................................... 1 
1.2 Motivation behind the research ............................................................ 4 
1.3 Aim and scope of the study .................................................................. 5 
1.4 Significance of the study....................................................................... 7 
1.5 Overview of the thesis .......................................................................... 7 
 
Chapter 2 Literature Review ........................................................................ 10 
2.1 Introduction ......................................................................................... 10 
2.2 Health complaints ............................................................................... 11 
2.3 Complainants ..................................................................................... 12 
2.4 The attitudes of health professionals towards complaints .................. 15 
2.5 Learning from complaints ................................................................... 19 
2.6 Administrative justice .......................................................................... 22 
2.7 Conceptual models of administrative justice....................................... 26 
2.8 The development of the ombudsman institution ................................. 30 
2.9 Ombudsman and system improvement .............................................. 36 
2.10 Health complaints and the ombudsman ........................................... 40 
v 
 
2.11 Research on ombudsman ................................................................ 47 
2.12 Conclusion ........................................................................................ 53 
 
Chapter 3 Theoretical considerations .......................................................... 55 
3.1 Introduction ......................................................................................... 55 
3.2 Organisational learning....................................................................... 56 
3.2.1 Accountability ............................................................................... 57 
3.2.2 Feedback ..................................................................................... 62 
3.2.3 Learning ....................................................................................... 63 
3.3 Institutional logics ............................................................................... 71 
3.3.1 Institutional logics and healthcare ................................................ 77 
3.4 Conclusion .......................................................................................... 80 
 
Chapter 4 Methodology ................................................................................ 81 
4.1 Introduction ......................................................................................... 81 
4.2 Research aims, objectives and questions .......................................... 81 
4.3 Developing a philosophical stance ..................................................... 83 
4.4 Research paradigms .......................................................................... 84 
4.5 Positionality ........................................................................................ 89 
4.6 Reflexivity ........................................................................................... 90 
4.7 Methodology ....................................................................................... 92 
4.7.1 Case Selection ............................................................................. 96 
4.7.2 Sampling Bodies in Jurisdiction ................................................. 101 
4.7.3 Data collection methods ............................................................. 105 
4.7.4 Interview participant selection .................................................... 109 
4.7.5 Data analysis ............................................................................. 111 
vi 
 
4.8 Quality, Reliability and Validity ......................................................... 113 
4.9 Ethical considerations....................................................................... 115 
4.10 Situating the research .................................................................... 117 
4.10.1 Australian and Scottish healthcare systems ............................ 118 
4.11 Conclusion ...................................................................................... 130 
 
Chapter 5 Research Findings – The Office of the Health Ombudsman, 
Queensland, and the Scottish Public Services Ombudsman ..................... 131 
5.1 Introduction ....................................................................................... 131 
5.2 Office of the Health Ombudsman, Queensland ................................ 131 
5.3 Complaint numbers .......................................................................... 134 
5.4 Results ............................................................................................. 136 
5.4.1 Objectives of the OHOQ ............................................................ 136 
5.4.2 Complaint handling process ....................................................... 137 
5.4.3 System improvement ................................................................. 150 
5.4.4 Other activities undertaken by the OHOQ .................................. 153 
5.5 The Scottish Public Services Ombudsman....................................... 154 
5.6 Complaint numbers .......................................................................... 155 
5.7 The objectives of the SPSO ............................................................. 157 
5.8 Results ............................................................................................. 158 
5.8.1 Complaint handling process ....................................................... 159 
5.8.2 Investigation reports and decision summaries ........................... 160 
5.8.3 Recommendations ..................................................................... 160 
5.9 System improvement ........................................................................ 162 
5.10 The Complaints Standards Authority .............................................. 168 
5.11 Other activities undertaken by the SPSO ....................................... 170 
vii 
 
5.12 Working with partners ..................................................................... 172 
5.13 Conclusion ...................................................................................... 173 
 
Chapter 6 Results – Scottish health boards ............................................... 174 
6.1 Introduction ....................................................................................... 174 
6.2 Awareness and perceptions of the roles of the SPSO ...................... 175 
6.3 Participants’ views on SPSO investigations ..................................... 177 
6.3.1 Interactions ................................................................................ 177 
6.3.2 Challenging the ombudsman ..................................................... 179 
6.3.3 Clinical Advice ........................................................................... 182 
6.3.4 How bodies handle SPSO investigation reports and decision letters
 ............................................................................................................ 185 
6.3.5 Recommendations ..................................................................... 190 
6.3.6 Learning ..................................................................................... 194 
6.3.7 Prioritising recommendations ..................................................... 202 
6.3.8 Obstacles to change .................................................................. 203 
6.3.9 Analysis of reported cases ......................................................... 204 
6.4 Conclusion ........................................................................................ 206 
 
Chapter 7 Discussion on research findings ................................................ 207 
7.1 Introduction ....................................................................................... 207 
7.1.1 The OHOQ ................................................................................. 209 
7.1.2 SPSO ......................................................................................... 211 
7.2 Research Question One: What approaches do health ombudsman take 
to administrative justice? ........................................................................ 212 
7.2.1 OHOQ and administrative justice ............................................... 213 
viii 
 
7.2.2 SPSO and administrative justice ................................................ 215 
7.3 Research Question Two: What approaches do the OHOQ and the 
SPSO, with their differing statutory functions, use as they seek to secure 
system improvement? ............................................................................ 217 
7.4 Approaches used by the OHOQ to improve the healthcare system . 219 
7.4.1 Prosecuting health professionals ............................................... 219 
7.4.2 Systemic investigations .............................................................. 222 
7.4.3 Local resolution .......................................................................... 223 
7.4.4 Conciliation ................................................................................ 224 
7.5 SPSO and system improvement ...................................................... 225 
7.5.1 Using recommendations from upheld complaints to improve the 
system ................................................................................................ 227 
7.6 Research Question 3: How do those in the healthcare system receive 
and respond to these approaches? ........................................................ 233 
7.6.1 Participants awareness of the SPSO ......................................... 233 
7.6.2 The conceptual model ................................................................ 234 
7.6.3 Using the conceptual model ....................................................... 240 
7.6.4 Determining the dominant institutional logic within the SPSO .... 241 
7.6.5 Hertogh’s models of control and the relationship between the 
SPSO and health boards .................................................................... 244 
7.6.6 Motivational postures ................................................................. 256 
7.6.7 Types of change that result from SPSO recommendations ....... 260 
7.6.8 Organisational learning .............................................................. 261 
7.6.9 Barriers to change ..................................................................... 265 





Chapter 8 Conclusion ................................................................................ 268 
8.1 OHOQ .............................................................................................. 268 
8.2 SPSO ............................................................................................... 270 
8.3 Strengths and limitations of the research ......................................... 273 




Appendix 1 – Positionality statement of the researcher ............................. 296 
Appendix 2 – Research memoire ............................................................... 298 
The insider-researcher ........................................................................... 298 
Issues relating to research design .......................................................... 301 
Determining the case ............................................................................. 301 
Identifying the research questions .......................................................... 303 
Data collection ........................................................................................ 306 












List of Tables 
 
Table 1 Desired outcomes sought by complainants (Bismark et al. 2011) ... 14 
Table 2 Desired outcomes sought by complainants (Friele et al. 2013) ....... 14 
Table 3 Models of administrative control (Hertogh 2001) ............................. 50 
Table 4 Health ombudsman and the number of investigations (2014/15) .... 99 
Table 5 Number of complaints received by the SPSO relating to each 
individual health board (2016/17) ............................................................... 104 
Table 6 Number of complaints received by the OHOQ relating to each 
individual .................................................................................................... 105 
Table 7 Average length of interview by participating organisation ............. 112 
Table 8 Case study actions for ensuring the case study validity and reliability 
(Merriam 1988) .......................................................................................... 115 
Table 9 Number of complaints by type of organisation (OHOQ 2019, pp.89-
90) .............................................................................................................. 135 
Table 10 Number of complaints by practitioner type (OHOQ 2019, p.88) .. 135 
Table 11 Number of issues raised within complaints, by type (OHOQ 2019, 
p.97) ........................................................................................................... 136 
Table 12 Number of complaints received by the SPSO by health sector 
(SPSO 2019f)............................................................................................. 156 
Table 13 Subject of health complaint received by the SPSO (SPSO 2019b, 
p.4) ............................................................................................................. 156 
Table 14 Number of closures at the different stages of the complaints 
process (SPSO 2019f) ............................................................................... 157 
Table 15 Demographics of participants from Scottish health boards ......... 175 
Table 16 Awareness by participants of SPSO's non complaint activities ... 175 
Table 17 Number of participants identifying different SPSO non complaint 
activities ..................................................................................................... 176 
Table 18 Number of participants who identified differing SPSO roles ........ 177 
Table 19 Comparison of activities undertaken by the OHOQ and the SPSO




List of Figures 
 
Figure 1 Pyramid of ombudsman regulatory mechanisms (Healy and Walton 
2016, p.501) ................................................................................................. 42 
Figure 2 Queensland's coregulatory health system (OHOQ 2019, p.59) ... 122 
Figure 3 OHOQ complaints management process (OHOQ 2019, p.18) .... 132 
Figure 4 Example recommendations from investigation report (SPSO 2020l)
 ................................................................................................................... 168 
Figure 5 Basic diagram demonstrating how ombudsman contribute to system 
improvement .............................................................................................. 235 
Figure 6 Revised diagram incorporating the work of Stuhmcke (2006) ...... 236 
Figure 7 Relationship between phases and barriers (Hertogh 2001) ......... 236 
Figure 8 Revised model incorporating the work of Hertogh (2001) ............ 237 
Figure 9 Revised diagram incorporating the work of Braithwaite (2014) .... 237 
Figure 10 Revised model of how ombudsman outputs can lead to service 
improvements ............................................................................................ 238 
Figure 11 Revised model highlighting the possible institutional logics 
dominant within health ombudsmanry ........................................................ 239 
Figure 12 Relationship between the differing elements in the conceptual 















Long form name 
ABA American Bar Association 
ACHS Australian Council for Healthcare Standards 
AHPRA Australian Health Practitioner Regulation Agency 
ANZOA Australian and New Zealand Ombudsman Association 
CHP Complaint Handling Procedures 
CMO Chief Medical Officer 
CSA Complain Standards Authority 
DG Director General 
DOP Director of Prosecutions (at the OHOQ) 
HCE Health Complaint Entity 
HHS Hospital and Health Services in Queensland 
HIS Health Improvement Scotland 
IOI International Ombudsman Institute 
NHS National Health Service 
NSW HCCC New South Wales Health Care Complaints Commission 
OHOQ Office of the Health Ombudsman, Queensland 
QCAT Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal 
QHQCC Queensland Health Quality and Complaints Commission 
SPSO Scottish Public Services Ombudsman 
1 
 
Chapter 1 Introduction 
 
The purpose of this introductory chapter is five-fold. It starts by situating the 
overall thesis within the administrative justice tradition before detailing the 
motivation that underlay the research. Following this, the chapter explains the 
aims and scope of the research before providing an outline of the research 
study’s significance and contribution to knowledge and theory in this area. 
There, lastly, follows an overview of the structure of the thesis. In this thesis, 
the term ‘ombudsman’ is used to denote both the singular and plural version 
of the term. This is intended to retain the term’s Swedish origins yet remove 
the gendered connotation associated with the suffix ‘man’. 
 
1.1 Situating the research 
 
The socio-legal tradition considers the place of law within wider society and 
examines how legal institutions operate within the real world. A significant 
part of socio-legal thought concerns itself with administrative justice and 
concerns itself with ensuring that people receive from public bodies that to 
which they are entitled. Where this has not occurred, the administrative 
justice system enables individuals to raise a grievance and receive redress 
where appropriate (see Gamble and Thomas 2010 and Buck et al. 2011). 
Administrative justice, therefore, concerns itself with at least two things: the 
correctness of the initial decision by public bodies and the availability of 
secondary redress mechanisms (see Buck et al. (2011), Thomas and 
Tomlinson (2016) and Harris and Partington (1999)). One issue that arises 
from this is the effectiveness of these redress mechanisms to correct wrongs 




There are three broad groups of redress mechanisms relating to the 
consideration of citizen grievances against public bodies: courts, tribunals, 
and public sector ombudsman. It was the failings of legal processes to 
protect the rights of individuals that led to the establishment of ombudsman 
(Buck et al. 2011, p.29), with Seneviratne (2002, p.2) arguing that the basic 
premise underpinning the establishment of ombudsman was that individuals 
should be able to make a complaint about their government or its agencies 
and that such complaints should be independently investigated. This includes 
individuals who receive public healthcare.  
 
However, until recently, health professionals were largely responsible for 
their own professional regulation, including the determination of the 
appropriate standard of care (Beaupert et al. 2014), but, now, many countries 
have started to move away from self-regulation towards a system of greater 
external oversight and accountability, with the intention of exerting greater 
influence over health professionals (Carney et al. 2016). This extends to the 
consideration of healthcare complaints as, ‘… a complaint will achieve most 
effect in increasing accountability if it is backed by the authority of some 
external agency, independent of the provider’ (Pollock and Kerrison 2001, 
p.118).  
 
The reason for this move to an increasing role for independent scrutiny has 
been due to a number of factors, but, importantly, include a number of high-
profile healthcare scandals (Beaupert et al. 2014). Both Smith-Merry et al. 
(2016) and Healy and Walton (2016) suggest that the impetus that lay behind 
the establishment of health care complaint commissions in Australia1 had 
several factors: general levels of dissatisfaction concerning the handling of 
health complaints by hospitals and professionals, a lack of alternative means 
of securing redress other than through hospitals, a desire for greater 
                                            




accountability from hospitals and professionals, and, a desire for a less 
onerous alternative to medical negligence claims. The functions of these 
commissions were to resolve complaints and to act as a public watchdog 
(Smith-Merry et al. 2016). These motivations are similar to the reasons 
behind the establishment of health ombudsman in the United Kingdom 
(Gregory and Giddings 2002). 
 
British health ombudsman and Australian health care complaint commissions 
are second-tier bodies, that is, appellate bodies for complaints. They are 
established on a statutory basis to consider complaints against healthcare 
organisations and health professionals and are funded through taxation. Most 
of these complaint bodies are restricted to responding to complaints brought 
to them and usually have very limited powers to secure compliance with their 
recommendations, or to undertake systemic investigations (Healy and Walton 
2016). Their purpose is to act as the pinnacle of the complaints system and, 
thus, provide final decisions on health complaints. Compared with courts and 
tribunals, public ombudsman operate in a less legalistic and formal manner, 
with the emphasis less on adversarial approaches and more on inquisitorial 
investigations.  
 
There is an argument, made by academics and ombudsman, that 
ombudsman make a contribution to system improvement (see Seneviratne 
(2002), Kirkham (2012) and Healy and Walton (2016) for academic views on 
this topic and Neave (2014), O’Reilly (2015) and Abraham (2012) for views 
from ombudsman).  Indeed, contributing towards system improvement is 
seen to be a core function of ombudsman schemes, with some health 
ombudsman having this as a strategic objective while, for other health 




In theory, ombudsman are well placed to identify failings and should be able 
to provide bodies with guidance on how to prevent similar failings occurring in 
the future. It has been suggested that ombudsman attempt to do this through 
the use of a variety of activities (see Buck et al. (2011) and Stuhmcke 
(2010a)). In this regard, the role of courts and tribunals in the securing of 
administrative justice through judicial review and appeal hearings is well 
known but there has been limited empirical research undertaken on public 
ombudsman which examines their role and the impact of their decisions on 
public bodies. Buck et al. (2011, p.55) complain that academics and lawyers 
often consider administrative justice to consist solely of the workings and 
decisions of courts and tribunals, with ombudsman marginalised to 
‘superficial treatment’ on the part of academics. Healy and Walton (2016, 
p.493) claim that health ombudsman justify particular attention as their core 
responsibility is to consider complaints from the public, noting that the 
healthcare sector has been slow to respond to, and learn from, complaints. 
Research findings on ombudsman, such as they are, have been equivocal, at 
best, suggesting that public ombudsman exert limited influence on decisions 
made by bodies under their jurisdiction.  There is no research on the impact 
of the work of health ombudsman.  
 
1.2 Motivation behind the research 
 
This thesis builds upon a previous pilot study, undertaken by the researcher, 
on the Parliamentary and Health Service Ombudsman’s (PHSO) role in the 
regulation of healthcare. Health scandals in England, such as the Mid-
Staffordshire and the Morecambe Bay public inquiries, highlighted the failure 
of healthcare organisations to take complaints about the delivery of 
healthcare seriously, resulting in significant harm to patients as opportunities 
to improve the system were missed (Francis 2013, Kirkup 2015). In the 
former inquiry, the PHSO was seen as peripheral, while, in the latter inquiry, 
the PHSO was subject to significant criticism for failings in its handling of 
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complaints made against Morecambe Bay NHS Foundation Trust. This 
research concluded that the PHSO’s strategic aim of contributing to the 
improvement of the healthcare system was more aspiration than reality 
(McBurnie, 2013). 
 
This, together with the assertion that health ombudsman contribute to the 
improvement of the healthcare system yet where there is no empirical 
evidence to support this assertion and significant anecdotal evidence which 
suggests otherwise provide the motivation for undertaking this research.  
 
1.3 Aim and scope of the study 
 
The underpinning thesis that this research examines is that health 
ombudsman make an important contribution to the improvement of the 
healthcare system as a result of the roles and activities that they undertake 
together with the way that they work with bodies in jurisdiction. The overall 
aim of the research is to describe the approaches used by health 
ombudsman that are intended to contribute to the improvement of the 
healthcare system and to understand how these approaches are received, 
and acted upon, by that system. The health ombudsman’s role as system 
improver includes any, and all, of their actions intended to contribute to the 
improvement of the healthcare system. This overall aim was supported by 
more detailed research objectives: 
1) To describe the approaches used by health ombudsman to 
administrative justice. 
2) To describe the differing approaches utilised by health ombudsman with 




3) To describe the response of bodies in jurisdiction to the approaches 
utilised by health ombudsman. 
 
To meet these objectives, the following research questions were identified: 
1) What approaches do the OHOQ and the SPSO take to administrative        
justice? 
2) What approaches do the OHOQ and the SPSO, with their differing 
statutory functions, use as they seek to secure system improvement? 
3) How do those in the healthcare system receive and respond to these 
approaches? 
 
In undertaking this research, the initial proposal was to undertake 
comparisons of the contribution of two health ombudsman with differing 
statutory responsibilities to the improvement of the healthcare system in 
which they are part of the regulatory network and, also, to review the 
attitudes and responses of bodies in both jurisdictions to their health 
ombudsman. Unfortunately, the researcher was unable to gain the 
agreement of Queensland Hospital and Health Services (bodies within the 
jurisdiction of the OHOQ) to participate. As a result, the research has 
resulted in two interconnected research elements. Firstly, there is a 
comparison of the system improvement activities between the SPSO and the 
OHOQ which have significantly different statutory roles and responsibilities 
within their own regulatory network. Secondly, there is a study of the 
responses by Scottish health boards to the approaches used by the SPSO 
when discharging its responsibilities and the impact of these approaches on 





1.4 Significance of the study 
 
As indicated above, this is novel research. There is little empirical research 
on ombudsman in general, and very little at all on health ombudsman. This 
research attempts to provide evidence to address some of the gaps that 
currently exist in the academic research base. As ombudsman schemes 
develop, it is not uncommon for the schemes to take on new responsibilities. 
How these additional responsibilities interact with core ombudsman functions 
is unknown. A novel approach used in this research is an international 
comparative case study investigating ombudsman offices with differing 
statutory responsibilities. This comparative approach will allow for greater 
insight to be obtained on the interplay between ombudsman responsibilities 
and activities than a focus on a single ombudsman scheme.  
 
This research, therefore, intends to increase knowledge about the 
contribution made by health ombudsman to the improvement of the 
healthcare system, including the identification of the methods used by health 
ombudsman to achieve this contribution and to understand how bodies in 
jurisdiction respond to these ombudsman activities. This research should 
also have practical benefit to health ombudsman. Through the identification 
of different activities used by health ombudsman in their attempts to secure 
system improvement, and, an understanding of how the system responds to 
these activities, health ombudsman will be able to refine their approaches in 
order to maximise their impact. 
 
1.5 Overview of the thesis 
 
The structure of this thesis is as follows. Chapter 1 is the introductory chapter 
and provides the background and motivation to the research as well as 
providing an overview of the thesis. In Chapter 2 there is a review of the 
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literature relating to both health complaints and to administrative justice. 
Complaints are the primary activity of health ombudsman, the resolution of 
which engenders the legitimacy of health ombudsman. The chapter, 
therefore, considers the literature concerning complaints from the perspective 
of the complainant and those complained against, as well as the ability of 
complaints to secure system improvement. The chapter then considers the 
literature relating to the administrative justice system and the ombudsman’s 
place within that system, before considering the ombudsman’s contribution to 
complaint resolution and system improvement. In Chapter 3 there is the 
exposition of theoretical constructs relating to both organisational learning 
and to institutional logics and which, together, provides the conceptual and 
theoretical framework for the research. If organisations are to make 
improvements following an ombudsman report or other ombudsman output, 
then, in response to that output, organisational learning has to take place. 
This strand of the chapter considers current academic thought on 
organisational learning. The second strand of this chapter concerns the 
metatheory of institutional logics. Institutional logics create a belief system 
within an organisation that guides the thoughts and actions of individuals 
within the organisation. Multiple institutional logics can exist within an 
organisation and whichever institutional logic becomes dominant will shape 
the behaviours of the organisation. This strand continues by considering 
institutional logics as they apply to alternative dispute resolution and to the 
regulation of healthcare. Chapter 4 outlines the research methodology and 
research methods used in the research. The chapter also provides contextual 
information relating to the two case studies used in this research: the Scottish 
Public Services Ombudsman (SPSO) and the Office of the Health 
Ombudsman Queensland (OHOQ). Chapters 5 and 6 presents the research 
results, beginning in Chapter 5 with the results of the research into both 
health ombudsman offices while Chapter 6 provides the results from the 
research into Scottish health boards. In Chapter 7 there is the discussion 
involving the results of the research linking it back into previous academic 
research and theoretical constructs considered earlier in this thesis. The 
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thesis ends with Chapter 8 in which the conclusions from the research are 
drawn, the strengths and limitations of the research are identified and 



























A major function of health ombudsman is to act as a second-tier health 
complaint handler, that is, to consider complaints made against healthcare 
organisations and/or health professionals but which the healthcare 
organisation or health professional concerned have not been able to resolve. 
Part of the thesis that this research examines, and which was detailed in the 
introduction, is that health ombudsman are able to make an important 
contribution to the improvement of the healthcare system as a result of the 
roles and activities that they undertake. This chapter contains a review of the 
literature which supports this part of the thesis by considering the literature 
relating to both complaints and to the ombudsman institution.   
 
Complaints are the primary activity of health ombudsman and the 
investigation of which provides health ombudsman with their legitimacy. 
Health complaints are also central to a health ombudsman’s system 
improvement activities. This, first, strand of the literature review starts with a 
brief introduction to complaints, introducing ideas that will be considered later 
in the chapter. The chapter then considers health complaints from, firstly, the 
perspective of the complainant, and then, secondly, from the perspective of 
those who have received a complaint. The chapter continues by considering 
the ability of health organisations and professionals to learn from complaints. 
 
The second strand of this literature review relates to the ombudsman 
institution and its place within the administrative justice system. This strand 
commences with an introduction to the concept of administrative justice 
together with the description of some of the administrative justice models 
developed by academics before considering the place of the ombudsman 
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institution within the administrative justice system. The chapter then 
continues by considering the role of the ombudsman in system improvement 
and in the handling of complaints, before concluding with a brief review of 
relevant research on ombudsman.  
 
2.2 Health complaints 
 
The number of complaints received by both public and private organisations 
has been increasing, due in part to rising expectations on the part of 
consumers and also as a result of changes made by organisations to make it 
easier for the public to complain (Simmons and Brennan 2013, p.7; Allsop 
and Jones 2007, p.233). Simmons and Brennan (2013, p.19) further suggest 
that this is particularly the case for public services which, they claim, reflects 
the affection that the public have for public services.  
 
Some authors suggest that the number of healthcare complaints submitted 
represent only a fraction of those people who have suffered an adverse event 
(Walton et al. 2014, Bismark et al. 2006), or who are dissatisfied with the 
care received (Allsop and Jones 2007, Parliamentary and Health Service 
Ombudsman 2013, Jones et al. 2006). However, the claimed ranges of 
unsubmitted potential complaints vary widely, from a low of 0.5% of potential 
complaints (Bismark et al. 2006) to ‘fewer than half’ (Healthwatch 2014), 
although most reports tend towards the lower end (Walton et al. 2014, 
Bismark et al. 2006, Allsop and Jones 2007, Parliamentary and Health 
Service Ombudsman 2013, Jones et al. 2006). The most common reasons 
for not pursuing a complaint was the belief that it would be futile and that 
nothing would change, a lack of knowledge about the complaints process, a 
concern about the impact on their future care and a feeling that they would 




It has been suggested that ‘complaints are best understood as sentinel 
events, and complainants as representatives of much larger groups of 
harmed or dissatisfied patients’ (Bismark et al. 2013, p. 6). However, another 
study, by Kroening et al. (2015), suggests that complaints are not effective 
predictors of serious patient safety incidents, creating a challenge for 
hospitals to identify which complaints reflect a serious concern about which 
they should act, although the authors also write that where a serious adverse 
event had occurred, retrospectively, it could be found that the department 
had received complaints about that subject. It would appear that it is difficult 
to use individual complaints to predict serious safety issues, although 





When individuals are unhappy about a service or product, they have a range 
of possible responses available to them which can be categorised as exit, 
breaking the relationship between individual and product or service, voice, a 
verbal response aimed at achieving change from the ‘offending’ company or 
person, and, loyalty, where the individual hopes that things will improve 
without action on their part (Sharma et al. 2010, pp.164-165). Where there is 
little competition in any given market, many people may be motivated to 
complain by a perceived sense of public benefit rather than individual benefit 
(Crie 2003). The reasons that people may complain are complex and can 
range from ‘… expressing dissatisfaction, to seeking an explanation, holding 
service providers to account, wanting an apology, seeking redress or 
pursuing compensation’ (Allsop and Jones 2007, p.233, George et al. 2007, 
p.22). In situations where individuals believe that they are more involved with 
a product or service the more likely will it be that they complain (Lau and Ng 
2001). It can be difficult to assess the performance of a service when it is 
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difficult to see, ambiguous in nature or is complex (Friele et al. 2015) as is 
the case with healthcare. 
 
Friele et al. (2015, p.529) suggest that the public has high expectations 
concerning the management of health complaints and that these high 
expectations explain, in part, low satisfaction with the response to their 
complaints. Ensuring that all complaints received by organisations are 
handled effectively, and that an individual’s right to any arising redress is 
upheld, are core features of good governance, and are important in ensuring 
the effective provision of services (Brewer 2007, p.549). With regard to 
healthcare, control over the complaints process by health bodies, deferential 
attitudes towards doctors, and limited complaint processes originally acted as 
barriers to patient complaints but changes in the complaints system, 
particularly in the NHS, has led to a more consumerist model (Allsop and 
Jones 2007, p. 233). 
 
Bismark and Dauer (2006) suggest that people who raise a health complaint 
are not troublemakers but people who believe that they have suffered harm 
and want to ensure that any preventable harm does not befall other persons. 
Dissatisfaction from those complained against about the reasonableness of 
complaints is considered at ‘odds with reality’ after a study found that nearly 
two-thirds of complainants had suffered harmful events, of which ‘79% were 
preventable and 60% involved permanent injury or harm’ (Bismark et al. 
2006, p.20).  
 
Various academics have tried to identify the outcomes sought by 
complainants from complaining and suggest that outcomes sought include 
the receipt of an explanation, the prevention of recurrence, and to hold 
people to account (Kent 2007, Jangland et al. 2009, p.202, and Cowan and 
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Anthony 2008, p.166). Research by Bismark et al. (2011) found the following 
desired outcomes sought by healthcare complainants, see Table 1: 
Desired Outcome % 
complainants 
Restoration which is a desire to be put 
back into the position the complainant 
would be if the error had not occurred. 
87 
Communication – this includes an 
apology and explanation. 
57 
Correction – improvements to ensure an 
error is not repeated. 
46 
Sanction – disciplinary action taken 
against a health professional. 
17 
Table 1 Desired outcomes sought by complainants (Bismark et al. 2011) 
 
Friele et al. (2013, p.293), in their research, found broadly similar desired 
outcomes from healthcare complainants, see Table 2: 






Table 2 Desired outcomes sought by complainants (Friele et al. 2013) 
 
However, while healthcare complainants had clear expectations about their 
desired outcomes it is not clear that they are achieved. Bismark et al. (2011) 
found that only one in three persons who sought restoration achieved it, only 
one in five persons who sought system improvement were reassured that 
such improvements had taken place, while fewer than one in ten seeking 
some form of sanction saw this occur. The authors go on to claim that their 
findings are replicated in other countries (Bismark et al. 2011, p.807). Friele 
et al. (2013, p.294) claimed that only half of complainants were satisfied with 
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the outcome of their complaint. They stated that good complaint handling is 
not a guarantee of satisfaction. While good complaint handling is important, 
complainants are seeking more than that, they want action to be taken, 
things to change, for them to feel validated and for individuals to be 
punished.  
 
2.4 The attitudes of health professionals towards complaints 
 
One theory that may assist in understanding why people and organisations 
behave as they do when the subject of a complaint is that of defensive 
organizational behaviour (Homburg and Furst 2007). This model suggests 
that individuals try to avoid criticism which may affect their self-esteem 
through a range of defence mechanisms, which include isolation, denial, 
projection, rationalisation of the events, and repression of the events. 
Individuals within organisations bring these defence mechanisms with them 
and when faced with ‘an issue that contains significant embarrassment or 
threat, they act in ways that bypass … the embarrassment or threat’ (Argyris 
1990, p.25). In doing so, employees will adopt a position, which protects their 
self-esteem which they may do through attempts to block or distort 
information (Argyris 1990). At an organisational level this may result in three 
types of defensive behaviour: reduced efforts to receive complaints, either by 
not signposting how to make a complaint or hostility towards complainants, 
reduced effort in ensuring that complaints are effectively transmitted to those 
parts of an organisation that needs to be aware of them, and reduced efforts 
to learn from complaints, through the poor handling of complaints, limited 
analysis of complaints information, and an inadequate use of complaints data 
to inform policies and practices (Homburg and Furst 2007). The 
consequence of such organisational mechanisms is reduced consumer and 
complainant satisfaction and complaint-based service improvements 




Clinicians do not always respond positively when the subject of a complaint 
(Zengin et al. 2014), with many doctors questioning the legitimacy of 
complaints received (Cunningham 2004). Many clinicians perceive 
complaints to be personal attacks which should be resolved by some other 
person (Douglas and Harrison 1996). Such attitudes by professionals are 
described as a matter of concern ‘representing ‘a fundamental breach of 
patient-centred care’ (Gallagher and Levinson 2017, p.521). 
 
These attitudes may, at least in part, be explained by the reaction of 
clinicians to the receipt of a complaint. Claiming that the effects of a 
complaint upon an individual can be ‘enormous’, Siyambalapitiya et al. (2007, 
p.108) state that clinicians may exhibit a ‘sense of indignation towards the 
patients, frustration, doubts about their competence and fear of litigation’. 
Cunningham (2004, p.1) suggests that clinicians exhibit both short- and long-
term emotional responses which arise as a result of receiving a complaint. 
Short-term emotional responses include ‘anger, depression, shame, guilt and 
reduced enjoyment of the practice of medicine’ and, while long-term these 
responses are reduced, clinicians retained a degree of anger along with 
decreased trust and goodwill towards patients. In a qualitative study of health 
professionals in England in which clinician participants attempted to interpret 
patients’ complaints, Adams et al. (2017) found that the clinician participants 
interpreted the complaints in ways that marginalised the issue(s) central to 
the complaint. Complainants were held to be ‘inexpert, distressed or 
advantage-seeking’ with clinicians unlikely to say that complaints were 
grounds for system improvement, contrary to what complainants’ state is one 
of the key objectives when making a complaint (Adams et al. 2017, p.603). 
Adams et al. (2017) found that interpretations of complaints by clinician 
participants included a sense of mistrust by the patient or family, as 
disregarding staff and services, evidence of misjudgement on the 




Jain and Ogden (1999) conducted research with British general medical 
practitioners and, as a result, describe a three-stage response to the receipt 
of a complaint. The first stage, or initial impact, provoked indignation, shock 
and/or panic. There then followed a second, conflict, stage where the 
clinician was involved in conflict with not only with colleagues and family, but 
also with their own sense of professional identity. This conflict stage was 
associated with the psychological issues of stress, depression and suicidal 
ideation. The authors claimed that in the third, and final stage of resolution, 
the general medical practitioners either practised medicine more defensively 
or left medicine altogether.   
 
Receiving a complaint is associated with high levels of psychiatric morbidity. 
Bourne et al. (2015) found that compared to the baseline, twice as many 
doctors reported suffering from moderate/severe depression and/or anxiety 
following the receipt of a complaint. Reported levels of severe/moderate 
depression and/or anxiety were higher if the complaint was being 
investigated by the regulatory body. (See also Nash et al. 2004, Ullström et 
al. 2013, Nash et al. 2006 and Walton 2003). Being subject to a complaint 
can have such devastating consequences to an individual clinician that, over 
an eight-year period, 28 doctors committed suicide while subject to fitness to 
practice investigations by the General Medical Council (Casey and Choong 
2016). The feelings experienced by doctors have been compared to post-
traumatic stress disorder at which point doctors become what is referred to 
as a ‘second victim’ (Bourne et al. 2015). It is claimed that the second-victim 
phenomenon is akin to that experienced by the complainant, or ‘first victim’ 
(Ullström et al. 2013). 
 
The consequences of such psychiatric stress and morbidity appears to have 
an impact on the conduct and practise of medicine by those affected. Far 
from being a trigger to improve clinical practice it appears that such an 
experience can actually negatively impact clinical practice where doctors 
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display a set of behaviours known collectively as defensive medicine. ‘While 
the complaints process is intended to improve healthcare, some doctors 
appear to practise defensive medicine after receiving a complaint’ 
(Cunningham and Wilson 2011, p.449, see also Siyambalapitiya et al. 2007). 
Bourne et al. (2015) report that over 80% of doctors who had received a 
complaint reported ‘hedging’ in their clinical practice, which is when a doctor 
is overcautious leading to overtreatment or over-referral, or ‘avoidance’, 
which occurs when doctors avoid practices or patients they view as 
complicated or difficult. Defensive medicine is aimed at minimising the risk to 
a doctor and Cunningham and Wilson (2011, p.449) claim that there is 
evidence that such practice is ‘low quality in terms of decision-making, cost 
and patient outcomes’. Nash et al. (2004, p.280) claim that 98% of general 
medical practitioners claimed to have made a ‘defensive change’ to protect 
themselves against a possible complaint. Nash et al. (2006) are not as 
negative claiming that complaints can lead to positive changes in clinical 
practice as well as negative changes. The positive changes include better 
record keeping and better communication with patients, as well as improved 
screening, audit and general patient satisfaction behaviours. Cunningham 
(2004) states that while ‘complaints should lead to improved medical practice 
– this assumption has never been tested’. 
 
One issue which may worsen the experience for clinicians is the complaints 
process. Nash et al. (2015) claim that doctors want the complaints process to 
be transparent and for the complaints process to be overseen by competent 
staff. In a study by Ullström et al. (2013) it was found that doctors who had 
received a complaint felt that the organisational support that they received 
had been insufficient, particularly from managerial colleagues although peer 
support was viewed more positively. A lack of support for doctors who 
receive a complaint was also found by Bourne et al. (2016), with doctors 
reporting that they felt powerless, distressed and harboured negative feelings 
towards the complaint handlers. The authors found that particularly stressful, 
for doctors, was the uncertain duration of the investigation, poor 
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communication between clinician and complaint handler, the unpredictability 
of the complaints process and procedures, with many viewing the complaints 
process being biased in favour of the complainant. As a result, doctors ‘felt 
neglected and betrayed by complaints procedures’ (Bourne et al. 2016, p.2). 
 
2.5 Learning from complaints  
 
Complaints can be considered as patient identified significant events and 
Jones et al. (2006) suggest that if complaints are considered as means to 
improve services rather than to blame individuals, then there will be 
opportunities to improve the health care system. Complaints can indicate 
problems within the health care system (Zengin et al. 2013, Cunningham and 
Wilson 2011, Friele et al. 2015, Hseih et al. 2006) and in the last thirty years 
there has been interest in the relationship between complaints and the quality 
of care (Adams, et al. 2018, Beaupert et al. 2014, Gallagher and Levinson 
2013). Some researchers believe that there is a clear correlation between 
complaints received and the quality of care (Kroening et al. 2015, Harrison et 
al. 2016, Born and Query 2004, Walton et al. 2012), while other researchers 
do not believe that this is the case (Cunningham and Wilson 2011, Bismark 
and Studdert 2010, Cunningham 2004). In support of the latter view, it has 
been argued that ‘complaints act as a distorting mirror magnifying problems 
in some areas while obscuring problems in others’ (Cooke 2006, p.983). If 
true, then this would question the utility of complaints to act as a potential 
service improvement tool and may be compounded if health organisations 
view quality assurance as the search for poorly practising professionals 
rather than systemic learning processes (Berwick 1989). Research by Jones 
et al. (2006) also casts doubt on the ability of complaints to be used as 





Complaints can be opportunities to learn if they are recognised by 
organisations as triggers for learning (Vos et al. 2008). Learning from 
complaints can be considered as an integral element of clinical governance 
(Haw et al. 2010). Complaints have been considered ‘windows of opportunity 
to improve health services’ (Bismark and Paterson 2006, p.281), ‘an 
important source of information for service improvements’ (Siyambalapitiya et 
al. 2007, p.107), are able to act as a driver to improve the quality of clinical 
services (Bennett and MacDougall 2007), can support the recognition of 
adverse incidents, act as an early warning system and help the identification 
of areas for improvement (Allsop and Mulcahy, 1995), ‘should lead to 
improved medical practice’ (Cunningham 2004, p.2), and ‘offer invaluable 
learning opportunities’ (Healthwatch 2004, p.8).  Walton (2003, p.41) states 
that ‘medical mistakes mainly occur in isolation (one patient at a time)’ and 
this, therefore, makes it harder to recognise system errors. Hseih (2010, 
p.453) suggests that while ‘patient complaints should be part of a quality 
management system’ there is a lack of tools which would enable complaints 
to promote system improvement.  
 
Gray and Williams (2011) argue that the learning culture associated with 
error is associated with sets of defensive behaviours which aim to pretend 
that learning has occurred, when in fact, there has been little understanding 
of what happened and why, potentially together with some degree of cover-
up. Learning within the NHS depends significantly upon information obtained 
from the analysis of adverse events and complaints but, in doing this, the 
result is that the NHS focuses its learning activities on ‘low frequency events’ 
(Sujan and Furniss 2015, p.8). Sujan and Furniss (2015) continue that this 
focus on low frequency events brings with it negative connotations which 
lead to negative behaviours and a focus on safe events, thus limiting the 
utility of what learning can be gained. They continue, complaints often 
emphasise what has gone wrong which sets the tone of the investigation and 
creates a set of negative implications and, from this, a negative learning 
culture. If the NHS is to be able to learn fully from complaints then it is 
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important that health organisations and professionals recognise the negative 
behaviours that drive inappropriate responses to complaints (Cunningham 
and Wilson 2011).  
 
Gray and Williams (2011, p.439) further suggest that the approaches from 
the NHS to organisational learning ‘include a surface approach to learning 
and a blame learning culture’ where surface learning is characterised by a 
transient gain of new learning and practise, while the latter becomes ‘ … 
“things that cannot be discussed”, which are in effect fear, shame and 
personal trauma’. The teaching of health professionals often ‘encourage[s] 
surface learning approaches which promote single loop learning’ (Gray and 
Williams 2011, p.445; Hseih 2011) while learning associated with blame 
cultures perpetuate ‘what’ is learned and not ‘how’ is it learned (Gray and 
Williams 2011, pps.446-447). 
 
Gray and Williams (2011) propose that to break out of this negative culture 
requires a move from a focus on failure and blame to a re-framed focus 
which attempts to recognise the positive learning features contained within 
an adverse event. Based upon this idea, Gray and Williams (2011) 
successfully piloted an approach which sought to re-frame negative 
experiences involved in adverse events by focusing on what went right and, 
by doing so, increased learning from the adverse events. Bismark and Morris 
(2014, p.428) state that what is needed is a ‘paradigm shift [in culture] that 
allows health practitioners to see them [complaints] as an invitation to learn’. 
Braithwaite et al. (2005) suggest that the answer is the adoption of a ’no 
blame’ culture although they recognise that a shift from a no blame to a 
learning culture will not be simple or quick.  
 
The literature review, so far, has considered literature relating to health 
complaints from the perspective of both a complainant and those complained 
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against, as well as considering the ability of complaints to contribute towards 
system improvement. The literature review now moves on to a consideration 
of the administrative justice system, the ombudsman’s place within it and the 
ombudsman’s contribution to service improvement and complaint handling. 
 
2.6 Administrative justice 
 
In recent decades, there has been a significant change in the extent and 
range of government and public administration affecting almost every citizen 
(Gamble and Thomas 2010, p.3). As a consequence of these changes, it has 
become more difficult for both politicians and citizens to understand the 
increasingly fragmented governing process, with Gamble and Thomas (2010 
p.6) claiming that a distinguishing feature of modern governance 
arrangements is that, as decisions are taken by an extensive range of 
bodies, it is ‘increasingly hard to pinpoint who has responsibility, who is 
accountable, or where policies come from’. They further suggest that as a 
result, individual citizens are, for the first time, unable to understand the 
governing arrangements under which they are situated (Gamble and Thomas 
2010, p.3). The vast majority of legal decisions now made in modern 
democracies are not made by courts or tribunals but by a range of public 
administrative functionaries in areas such as tax, welfare benefits or 
immigration. 
 
In parallel to this development of the state, there has been the development 
of what Gamble and Thomas refer to as the ‘integrity arm of the government’, 
that is the establishment of bodies with the express purpose of overseeing 
the conduct of public administration and referred to as the administrative 
justice system (Gamble and Thomas 2010, p.14, see also Buck et al. 2011). 
The development of this ‘integrity arm’ is intended to mediate ‘the behaviour 
of civil servants, ministers, advisers and agencies’ and ‘hold Ministers to 
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account and to redress citizens’ grievances’ (Gamble and Thomas 2010, 
p.14).  
 
Administrative justice has been defined in different ways by different 
theorists. For Mashaw (1983, p.24) administrative justice is ‘the qualities of a 
decision process that provide arguments for the acceptability of its decisions’. 
Creyke and McMillan (2000, pps. 3-4) define administrative justice as ‘a 
philosophy that, in administrative decision-making, the rights and interests of 
individuals should be safeguarded’, although Creyke claims that McMillan 
later refined the definition to take account of ‘the need for government 
agencies to balance justice in the individual case with other imperatives’ 
(McMillan, cited by Creyke 2010, p. 274). This highlights one of the 
challenges facing public administrators – how do you balance the rights of 
the individual with those of the wider public in a publicly funded, and hence 
financially constrained, service?  
 
Disagreements about the nature of administrative justice has led to claims 
that it is in ‘a muddle’ (Abraham 2012, p.91). Harris and Partington, (1999, 
p.2) picks up this issue of confusion surrounding administrative justice, 
arguing that there is disagreement about the meaning of the term 
‘administrative justice’, suggesting that some consider administrative justice 
to be concerned with legal entitlements and the decisions of courts or 
tribunals, while others consider it more broadly, encompassing the concept of 
maladministration or poor service delivery. Despite this common agreement 
about confusion and disagreement with the concept of administrative justice, 
Ison (1999, p.26) suggests that there is a ‘demand’ for a ‘common thread’ or 
‘common overview’. 
 
Mullen (2010, p.383) suggests that the term, administrative justice, can be 
used either prescriptively or descriptively. When used prescriptively it refers 
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to the principles used to determine the justice in any administrative decision, 
while, when used descriptively, ‘the term administrative justice denotes a field 
of study’ arguing that writers need to be clear about the definition used. Buck 
et al. (2011, p.54) claim that the term can be used descriptively or 
normatively. However, for them, when used descriptively, the term refers to 
the interface between government agencies and individuals or bodies such 
as courts tribunals or ombudsman while, when used normatively, 
administrative justice describes how administrative decisions ought to be 
made. Tomlinson and Thomas (2016) suggest that administrative justice can 
be considered as a network of systems such as courts, tribunals or 
ombudsman or as a set of principles and values that underpin administrative 
decisions. These principles include ‘fairness; participation; accessibility; 
accuracy; proportionality; transparency; finality; consistency; efficiency; 
effectiveness; and value for money’.  
 
Part of the definition of administrative justice is the concept of citizen redress 
that arises when a mistake has been made in the delivery of public services. 
Dunleavy et al. (2010, p.421) suggest that redress includes the remedy of a 
harm (or reparation if that is not possible), in a way that is visible to the 
individual concerned but should also include the correction of contributory 
factors and a public apology for the error. In delivering these objectives, Buck 
et al. (2011, p.36) warn of the limitations in relying upon courts as a means of 
defending good administrative standards. They suggest that ‘the concept of 
good administration goes much further than legal standards alone and 
include non-legal rules that define the standard of conduct which ensures the 
proper functioning of public administration (Buck et al. 2011, pp. 32-33). They 
argue that, as a result, the concept of administrative justice has gone beyond 
courts and tribunals to include ‘the importance of the first-instance decision 
making process’ (Buck et al. 2011, p. 54, see also Thomas and Tomlinson 
(2016, p.4) and Harris and Partington (1999, p.2)). 
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Central to the concept of administrative justice is the idea of accountability: 
‘individuals affected by decisions should have the ability to call to account 
those responsible for those decisions’ (Gamble and Thomas 2010, p.19). 
This accountability has two benefits: it enables individuals to receive that to 
which they are entitled and, if appropriate feedback mechanisms are in place, 
should lead to improvements in public services. However, due to the 
fragmentation of the delivery of public services and the confusion about who 
is responsible for what, Gamble and Thomas (2010, p.20) believe this 
combination leads to a decrease in the level of trust held by citizens in 
government and the state. Accordingly, one of the functions of the 
administrative justice system is to restore trust through the establishment of 
appropriate redress mechanisms. 
 
Adler (2010, p.129) suggests that administrative justice has two dimensions:  
a procedural dimension concerned with the way individuals are treated and a 
substantive dimension concerned with what an individual receives or 
contributes. This is a development on the initial idea that administrative 
justice was concerned with individuals receiving that to which they are 
entitled. It now encompasses how individuals are treated and recognises that 
to individuals, how they are treated is important, whether or not they get the 
desired outcome, and that individuals assess the fairness of the process 
separately from the outcome received (Adler 2010, p.129). Thus, 
administrative justice is concerned with both procedural and substantive 
justice. Procedural fairness can be secured either through the imposition of 
principles by organisations external to the public body by organisations such 
as courts, tribunals or ombudsman, or the self-imposition of principles 
established by the body itself such as through quality control or audits and 
that both internal and external imposition of such principles co-exist (Adler 




Initially, the external control centre would have been the courts or tribunals. 
Courts achieve this through the judicial review of the decision and, 
particularly, the processes used in reaching that decision. However, as Adler 
(2010) states, data on judicial review ‘do not suggest that judicial review 
provides a very effective check on routine administrative decision making’ 
and, that, as courts ‘provide little procedural protection for administrative 
decisions’, this led to the establishment of ombudsman. However, despite 
this, Adler (2010, p. 147) still believes that external means of control, 
including ombudsman, can provide little evidence of their effectiveness.  
 
2.7 Conceptual models of administrative justice 
 
Mashaw (1974) was responsible for seminal research on social welfare 
payments which, instead of focusing on external controls on administrative 
decisions, focused on the very large number of decisions made by first-
instance decision-makers. In this research Mashaw (1974, p.24) defined 
administrative justice as ‘those qualities of a decision process that provide 
arguments for the acceptability of its decisions’. From his research he 
developed three competing models of administrative justice: bureaucratic 
rationality, professional treatment and moral judgment. However, Mashaw’s 
work has been criticised as it does not include consideration of the rights of 
citizen redress (Buck et al. 2011, p.58). 
 
Mashaw’s three models define three differing considerations of administrative 
justice. The bureaucratic model is concerned with the efficient and accurate 
implementation of decisions which reflect the legislature’s will; the 
professional model is dominated by a professional culture which takes 
account of the incompleteness of information, the fact that no two cases are 
alike, and therefore professional judgment is required to make decisions; the 
moral judgment model is concerned with determining which side is to be 
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supported when the interests and values of two sides are in conflict (Mashaw 
1983, pp.26-30).  
 
Adler (2003) developed Mashaw’s models of administrative justice in the light 
of changes in society and, firstly, recast Mashaw’s moral judgment model as 
a legal model, as he suggested that Mashaw’s moral judgment model, which 
was legitimated by ‘fairness’, was unhelpful as it implied that the other 
models were ‘unfair’ (Adler 2003, p.329). Instead, Adler felt that the model’s 
legitimating value was the assertion of legal rights. Secondly, Adler identified 
three additional models: a managerial model, a consumerist model and a 
market model. Adler (2010, p. 333) defines the managerialist model ‘in terms 
of managerial autonomy, the pursuit of efficiency gains, and the use of 
performance indicators to assess accountability’ and the ability to highlight 
failure to hit performance targets as a means of pressurising management to 
improve. The consumerist model takes a view which holds that the individual 
is an active participant in the process unlike in Mashaw’s three models, and 
thus is about meeting consumer satisfaction with services. Adler’s third 
addition is the market model which, he states, combines elements of the 
managerialist and consumerist models and involves the matching of supply 
and demand through the use of price. Individuals choose the supplier who 
best meets their needs or wants (Adler 2010, p.334). 
 
Mashaw (1983) suggests that his three models are in competition with each 
other and argues that, in any one particular organisation, one of the models 
will become pre-eminent. Adler (2010, p.150) highlights not only that these 
models may be in competition but also that what may appear in one model to 
be fair may appear to be unfair using a different model. One sees this in the 
delivery of health care in the United Kingdom where politicians, managers 
and health professionals are often in disagreement over the allocation of 
resources and how healthcare should be best delivered to patients. Adler 
(2010, p.153) argues that this competition between differing views regarding 
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a fair outcome indicates that there are no invariable principles of procedural 
fairness that apply in all administrative contexts. Adler (2006, p.621) notes 
that in the delivery of healthcare the dominant model is likely to be the 
professional judgment model. If true, it raises interesting issues about what 
happens when differing approaches to administrative justice clash, as may 
occur between health ombudsman and healthcare organisations, such as, 
which model will dominate and is the communication between the parties 
adversely affected?  
 
As well as being in competition, as all models were legitimate but involved 
different approaches, both Mashaw (1983) and Adler (2003) also agreed that 
the dominance of one model necessitated trade-offs where aspects of the 
other approaches were diminished. Each of the three models, bureaucratic 
rationality, professional judgment and legal, can be associated with an 
external redress mechanism: administrative review, second opinion or 
complaint to a professional body, and, an appeal to a court or tribunal, 
respectively, (Adler 2003, p.330). However, Adler (2003, p.344) was cautious 
about the degree of impact that external bodies can have on administrative 
decision-making. 
 
Carney et al. (2017) make a distinction between professional judgment, with 
its focus on the making of an appropriate decision drawn from a range of 
options designed to be in the best interest of an individual, and the legal 
model which they describe as ‘grounded in the application of rules after 
extending a fair hearing to any aggrieved party’ (Carney et al. 2017, p.75). 
The authors further note that proponents of the legal model may be critical of 
the professional model for being deferential to both peer and second opinions 
while also noting that the professional model may overcome ‘the rigidity, 
arbitrariness, and procedural straightjacket commonly associated with the 
legal model (Carney et al. 2017, p.75). 
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Buck et al. (2010, p.64) argue that together Adler’s six typologies ‘represent 
the underlying drivers of administrative justice which are in competition with 
each other for dominance’. The importance of the six typologies of normative 
models of administrative decision-making is that the three developed by 
Mashaw represent internal means of decision-making and accountability 
while, Adler’s three models, focus on external means of accountability. Adler 
(2003, p. 324) argues that his revised model is a theoretical framework 
through which administrative decision-making can be analysed.  
 
Kagan (2010, p.168) identifies some factors which may influence which 
model of administrative justice is adopted by an organisation. These include 
the organisation’s legal mandate, its operating environment and, importantly, 
the beliefs and attitudes of the organisation’s senior management. While the 
underpinning legislation upon which an ombudsman office is founded will 
play a significant role in shaping the activities of an ombudsman office, the 
ombudsman post-holder will be the primary influence in determining which of 
these models its office adopts. Public sector ombudsman normally hold 
‘corporate sole’ status which means that they have absolute authority over 
the running of their office, and formally accountable only to Parliament. In 
addition, ombudsman offices have limited resources and it is a matter for the 
ombudsman discretion as to where the balance of resources and hence 
activity are placed (Seneviratne 2002, p.17, Buck et al. 2011, p.91 and 
p.150).  
 
Tomlinson and Thomas (2016) consider the utility of the different modelling 
approaches and conclude that there are three main benefits. The first 
claimed benefit which they identify is that they help people understand why 
public bodies operate and make decisions in the way that they do. A 
pluralistic approach enables differing normative views on how the 
administrative justice system ought to operate to be proposed. The second 
claimed benefit is that it aids the understanding of the tensions that arise 
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within the administrative justice system as the models are in competition. 
Thirdly, Tomlinson and Thomas claim that it enables an understanding of the 
trade-offs that need to be made in decision-making and allows for the 
consideration of whether these trade-offs are acceptable and desired. 
  
2.8 The development of the ombudsman institution 
 
The idea of the modern ombudsman is considered to date back to the 
establishment of the Justitieombudsman in Sweden in 1809, whose role was 
to consider complaints made by individuals against public officials (Abedin 
2010, p.221), although it was another 110 years before another country, 
Finland, established its ombudsman in 1919 (Seneviratne 2002, p.2). 
However, it was the establishment of an ombudsman by Denmark in 1955 
that led to world-wide interest in the ombudsman concept an interest which 
was reinforced when New Zealand became the first non-Nordic country to 
establish its ombudsman in 1962 (Seneviratne, 2002, p.3).  
 
Since the establishment of these ombudsman there has been an exponential 
increase in the number of ombudsman with this growth described by 
commentators as ‘spread[ing] explosively around the world (Gill et al. 2013, 
para 2.2), an ‘ombudsman explosion’ (Anderson 1980, cited in Abedin 2010, 
p.225) and ‘ombudsmania’ (Rowat 1985, p.83). The growth had been so 
exponential that, in 2002, Seneviratne (2002, p.2) felt able to declare that the 
ombudsman concept had ‘conquered the world’ with Buck et al. (2011, p.3) 
declaring the ombudsman to be ‘one of the essential institutions that a 
constitution should possess’. Currently the International Ombudsman 
Institute (IOI) lists 222 members from 120 countries as well as the European 
Union Ombudsman (IOI 2020) which represents an increase of 23 members 




Abedin (2010) considers the reasons that help explain the rapid growth in the 
ombudsman phenomenon and identifies three background factors: the 
establishment of new countries as a result of decolonisation, the collapse of 
the communist state system, and the development of the civil and human 
rights movement around the world. Upon these background factors Abedin 
(2010) then identifies specific factors which include the expansion of the role 
in government, the erosion of traditional institutions to protect individuals 
(exemplified by the court system becoming increasingly unaffordable to the 
average individual) and economic globalisation, where bodies such as the 
International Monetary Fund or World Bank increasingly insist on the use of 
ombudsman types institution to deal with ‘bureaucratic and political 
inefficiency, ineffectiveness, corruption and lack of public accountability and 
transparency of administrative processes in return for investment’ (Abedin 
2010, pp. 226-229). 
 
Gill et al. (2013, pp. 9-11) describe five phases of ombudsman development 
in the United Kingdom and make the important point that these developments 
were not planned in any orderly way, the process being described as 
‘blinkered and haphazard’ by Merricks (2009, cited by Gill et al. 2013, p.11) 
and, ultimately, claim that the resulting landscape ‘defies logic’ (Gill et al. 
2013, p.11). Buck et al. (2011) state that it would be a mistake to think of 
ombudsman ‘as neatly fitting into any standard and fixed model’. 
 
One issue that arises out of this flexibility and evolution is the difficulty that 
arises in defining what is an ombudsman. Gottehrer and Hostina (1998) try to 
circumvent this by describing the essential characteristics that a classical 
ombudsman should possess: independence, impartiality and fairness, 
credibility of the review process used by the ombudsman, and confidentiality. 
Rowat claims that ombudsman possess three characteristics: the 
ombudsman is an independent supervisor of public administration whose role 
is either provided for in a constitution or statute; the ombudsman considers 
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specific complaints concerning administrative injustice; and, has the power to 
investigate such complaints and to criticise but not to overturn the 
administrative decision (Rowat, cited by Abedin 2010, p.224).  
 
However, those characteristics describing an ombudsman relate to classical 
public sector ombudsman and, with the spread and diversity of ombudsman 
in recent years, these definitions are increasingly outmoded. Gulland (2010, 
pp.470-471) asserts that ‘defining an ombudsman is difficult, as the name 
means different things in different countries and, even within the United 
Kingdom, there is a variety of different definitions’. Seneviratne (2002, pp. 7-
10) states that there are many different definitions, arising from the ability of 
ombudsman to react to, and meet the needs of, local circumstances.2 A 
common starting point in trying to define an ombudsman is the definition 
developed by the International Bar Association:  
An office provided by the constitution or by action of the legislature or 
Parliament and headed by an independent high level public official 
who is responsible to the legislature or Parliament, who receives 
complaints from aggrieved persons against government agencies, 
officials and employees or who acts on his own motion, and has the 
power to investigate, recommend corrective actions and issue reports 
(International Bar Association cited in Seneviratne 2002). 
 
In recognition of the changing ombudsman world this definition was updated 
in 2001 by the American Bar Association to state: 
An ombudsman is a person who is authorized to receive complaints or 
questions confidentially about alleged acts, omissions, improprieties, 
and broader, systemic problems within the ombudsman defined 
jurisdiction and to address, investigate, or otherwise examine these 
issues independently and impartially (American Bar Association 2001). 
 
As well as there being a range of definitions for the ombudsman concept, 
Stuhmcke (2010, p.162) states that ‘the [term] ‘Ombudsman’ … contains no 
                                            
2 For a discussion on the definition and taxonomy of ombudsman see Carl (2012) 
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prescription to usage’ and provides examples of ombudsman descriptors 
such as a ‘watchdog’ or a ‘protector’ with Abedin (2010, p.223) providing 
other examples, including ‘grievance-man’, ‘mediator’ and ‘citizens’ 
defender’. 
 
Unsurprisingly, given that ombudsman have developed in ways to meet local 
circumstances, the exact means of service delivery used by ombudsman can 
vary between each scheme although Seneviratne (2002, p.12) claims that 
the different methods are underpinned by two concepts, that of informality 
and flexibility. Once an ombudsman accepts a complaint, they take 
responsibility for its investigation where the complainant and body concerned 
are participants rather than drivers of the process (Mullen, 2010, p.393). The 
ombudsman decides on the methods used, which are normally inquisitorial 
and informal, with the consequence that both complainant and body lack the 
procedural safeguards associated with the adversarial process (Mullen 2010, 
p.393). It is a low-cost model with the complainant incurring no costs at all 
(Mullen 2010, p.402). Adler (2003, p. 327) states that the methods used by 
ombudsman are effectively instrumental in so far as an upheld complaint is 
used to justify redress including service improvement.  
 
Abraham, the former Parliamentary and Health Service Ombudsman, while 
recognising that an ombudsman is an alternative to the court system, 
differentiates the means used by ombudsman in their complaint 
investigations role from both courts and systems of mediation highlighting 
that it is still a decision-making forum and ‘not an alternative to decision-
making’ (Abraham 2008, p.3). Abraham claims that the distinguishing feature 
between ombudsman and courts is that it makes adjudications by different 
means from those used by courts, based on informality, a ‘common-sense’ 
approach to evidence, inquisitorial processes with a focus on the individual 
case, unbound from precedent (Abraham 2008, p.4). 
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Mullen (2010 p. 417) states that it is important to maintain this separation of 
the court and tribunal systems from ombudsman as the former consider legal 
rights and duties while ombudsman deal with ‘administrative defects’. Indeed, 
he goes onto assert that a key reason behind the establishment of public 
sector ombudsman in the United Kingdom was their intended ability to 
consider such administrative failings. The consequence of this was that 
ombudsman could use tests of maladministration or injustice rather than 
illegality and utilise different means of to investigate the issues presented 
(Mullen 2010, p.417). 
 
As discussed above, it is clear that the ombudsman institution has 
developed, altered and, arguably mutated, from its classical origin. Classical 
ombudsman originally focused on the resolution of individual complaints but, 
over time, ombudsman began to also focus upon system improvement and, 
more recently, on functions such as auditing and monitoring which are not 
normally considered to be within the purview of classical ombudsman 
(Stuhmcke 2012). Stuhmcke (2012) advances three principal reasons for this 
growth and diversity of ombudsman models.  
 
Firstly, such changes are a reflection of the political environment in which the 
ombudsman institution exists. Public ombudsman are creations of the state 
to resolve some current political issue. Therefore, the construct of the 
ombudsman institution will be determined by both the nature of the political 
issue and the view held by politicians about the ombudsman institution and 
its role. The second reason for the growth and diversity of ombudsman 
relates to the willingness of the postholder to accept additional 
responsibilities. The third reason concerns the ‘acceptance and trust of the 




In the above paragraph it was noted that the growth and diversity of the 
ombudsman office lies in part in the willingness of the postholder to accept 
additional responsibilities. With public sector ombudsman, the postholder 
often holds what is known as corporation sole status. A corporation sole is a 
specific individual who embodies an official position which is a separate legal 
identity and can only be established via statute. While an ombudsman will, 
necessarily, employ staff to enable her to discharge her responsibilities, the 
ombudsman is responsible for all decisions made in her name. Thus, the 
ombudsman postholder is able to individually determine the priorities of the 
office as long as their decision is compliant with the offices underpinning 
legislation. This provides the ombudsman postholder great influence upon 
the balance of activity between individual complaint handling and system 
improvement. This is unlike the situation that occurs with traditional 
organisations and private sector ombudsman where there is likely to be a 
board which will agree the overarching policy approaches and strategies. In 
this regard, this research should be regarded as a snapshot in time. Different 
ombudsman postholders are likely to have differing priorities. This was the 
situation found by Stuhmcke (2006) in her research on the Commonwealth 
Ombudsman where a change in ombudsman postholder was linked to a 
change in the balance between individual complaint handling and systemic 
investigations. In making such a decision, the postholder will need to take 
into account the views of their Parliament to which they are accountable, their 
underpinning legislation, relevant case law and other political and contextual 
developments. 
 
These changes in the range and scope of ombudsman institutions has led to 
attempts by academics to categorise them into different models of modern 
ombudsmanry with Stuhmcke’s (2012) model one of the more renowned. In 
her model, Stuhmcke (2012) identified three broad categories or models of 
ombudsman: the reactive, variegated and proactive models of ombudsman. 
The reactive ombudsman model is based upon the classical ombudsman 
idea and has a primary focus on resolving individual complaints, although it 
36 
 
may undertake proactive system improvement work, through activities such 
as recommendations to resolve specific failings, and even systemic 
investigations. The variegated ombudsman model ‘is characterised by an 
increasing scale and scope in jurisdiction’ (Stuhmcke 2012, p.86) although 
this model of ombudsmanry retains its primary focus on the resolution of 
individual complaints. Stuhmcke (2012, p.86), suggests that this represents a 
move by ombudsman away from bodies in jurisdiction’s policies and 
processes, into a role of ‘verification and examination’. A final identifier for the 
variegated ombudsman model, identified by Stuhmcke (2012), is that of 
education, where ombudsman participate in educating bodies in jurisdiction 
on good practice complaint handling. The third, and final, ombudsman model 
is the proactive ombudsman model, where the ombudsman makes a 
conscious decision, to move away from a primary focus on individual 
complaint handling into proactive activities such as training and major 
systemic activities although it may continue to undertake some individual 
complaint handling. Caution should be taken not to think of these categories 
as absolute. For example, a reactive ombudsman may undertake some 
system improvement activities but its primary focus will remain on individual 
complaint handling. 
 
2.9 Ombudsman and system improvement 
 
It is clear that ombudsman are seen as an integral part of the administrative 
justice scene, with their own modus operandi and approach to remedying 
injustice. But, Harris (1999, p.134) poses the question of what is the role of 
the ombudsman within the administrative justice system? When the 
Australian Government was considering whether to establish its 
Commonwealth Ombudsman, it posed the question of whether the role of an 
ombudsman was to ‘swat flies or to hunt lions’, that is to be concerned with 
individual complaints or have a wider more systemic role, before deciding it 
was the former (Snell 2007).     
37 
 
However, this approach adopted by the Australian Government is not a view 
shared by ombudsman, or one that has been undertaken in practise. Emily 
O’Reilly, the European Ombudsman described the role as being like ‘the 
canary in the coal mine’ ‘checking the health of a democracy by checking the 
air of the administration’ (O’Reilly, 2015). Abraham (2012), the former 
Parliamentary and Health Service Ombudsman, makes a claim for an 
‘ombudsman dividend’ that is a role greater than individual dispute resolution. 
Through the publication of case reports and documents offering guidance to 
public bodies, the ombudsman role expands from investigating complaints to 
system improver.  
 
The role of an ombudsman has been of interest to academics and a broad 
consensus has developed. The initial role of the ombudsman was to 
investigate individual complaints. However, over time, as ombudsman made 
use of the large degree of discretion available to them in determining the 
activities they undertook, that role has grown. Colin Neave, the former 
Australian Commonwealth Ombudsman, stated that viewing an Ombudsman 
as an individual who investigates individual complaints against public bodies 
is a  
very old-fashioned notion. In reality, we are leaders in building public 
administration. We have a critical place between government and the 
public, and we are a safety net for members of the community … We 
promote good governance, accountability and transparency through 
oversight of government administration and service delivery. (Neave 
2014, p.1-2). 
 
Both Seneviratne (2002), and Healy and Walton (2016) state that 
ombudsman have two roles, that of individual complaint handling and to 
improve standards of public administration. Kirkham (2005, p.745) suggests 
that the early Parliamentary Ombudsman saw its role as having two 
functions: to right individual injustices and to ensure that lessons learnt from 
their complaint investigations was used to improve public administration more 
generally thus preventing errors occurring in the first place (see also Kirkham 
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2012, p.2; Behrens 2015, p.3 and Gulland 2010, p.475-476). Stuhmcke 
(2010, p.163) suggests that it is now an expectation of ombudsman that their 
activities lead to system improvement. Neave (2014, p.2) suggests that the 
system improvement is achieved in two ways. The first is that information 
from upheld complaints is fed back directly to the body concerned, allowing 
for the body to learn from the complaint, and, indirectly, where he asserts, 
that the existence of an ombudsman that has oversight over the body is an 
incentive for the body to improve their administrative actions. 
 
In an influential paper on the role of ombudsman, Harlow and Rawlings 
(2009, pp.537-542) developed the concept of ‘fire-fighting’ and ‘fire-watching’ 
roles of ombudsman. The ‘fire-fighting role’ refers to individual dispute 
resolution function of ombudsman, while ‘fire watching’ refers to an 
ombudsman role in system improvement. This categorisation was developed 
further by (Snell 2007)3 with the addition of a ‘fire-setting’ function which 
takes account of a trend by ombudsman to take on additional audit type 
functions and where the ombudsman activities are no longer driven by 
complaints. Buck et al. (2011, pp.19-21) refer to these three fire related 
categories as ‘putting it right’ relating to the handling of individual complaints, 
‘getting it right’ relating to ombudsman system improvement roles where they 
help bodies to get it right first time, and ‘setting it right’, which places the 
ombudsman within a larger network of organisations aimed at improving the 
overall administrative system. 
 
Despite widespread academic and practitioner agreement that ombudsman 
have at least a dual role of resolving individual grievances and contributing to 
system improvement, Carney et al. (2017, p.82) make the point that 
balancing both a focus on system improvement and individual complaints 
                                            
3 The Snell reference appears to predate the Harlow and Rawlings reference on the same 
subject. This is due to the author citing the latest edition of Harlow and Rawlings while the 
Snell paper has not yet been updated. Thus, Harlow and Rawling’s concept of fire-fighting 
and fire-watching predates Snell’s development. 
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resolution is problematic ‘both conceptually and in the overall governance 
system’. 
 
In public sector ombudsman, recommendations arising from findings are 
normally non-binding. Despite this, Steyvers et al. (2009, p.18) claim that the 
lack of power does not imply a lack of influence. The authors claim that 
ombudsman have significant ‘moral authority’ arising from the quality of their 
investigations and their relations with both the public and bodies in 
jurisdiction means that ‘the office can have influence without power’. Buck et 
al. (2011, p.126) make a similar argument that it is the power and depth of an 
ombudsman investigation that creates legitimacy to the resulting 
recommendations creating influence.  
 
Hertogh (2001) compared the impact of the Netherlands’ ombudsman and 
courts. He found that the impact of courts arose through their powers of 
coercion while, for ombudsman, he found that an ombudsman’s impact arose 
from their cooperative approach with bodies in jurisdiction. Hertogh (2001) 
concluded that the degree of impact achieved by either courts or ombudsman 
related to their operating style. Hertogh (2001) further concluded that the 
cooperative approach adopted by ombudsman led to better communication 
and better understood and accepted decisions. The result was that Hertogh 
believed it likely that ombudsman had more policy impact than courts 
(Hertogh 2001, p.63). 
 
Buck et al., (2011, p.149) recognise the importance of the cooperative 
approach between ombudsman and bodies but caution that a more active 
role may appear threatening to a body, resulting in lower levels of 
cooperation and, ironically, increased difficulty for ombudsman in undertaking 
their work. Counterposing this view, Bizjak (1999) asserts that ‘While [an] 
ombudsman cannot turn hell into heaven, he can at least make life in hell 
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more bearable’ (Bizjak 1999) by which he means an ombudsman can 
support bodies in jurisdiction in improving the system, a view in keeping with 
that of Hertogh. 
 
By what methods do ombudsman make ‘hell more bearable’? Stuhmcke 
(2010a) identified the following range of broad activities: complaint handling, 
the production of formal reports, submissions, meeting with agencies, 
publicising its activities, audit, compliance, conducting major projects and 
own motion investigations. Not all the listed activities are available to all 
ombudsman and the prioritisation of the available range of activities will 
depend upon the views of the incumbent ombudsman. Buck et al. (2011, pp. 
132-146) identified a broadly similar range of activities undertaken by 
ombudsman in their system improvement roles: the production of thematic 
reports, undertaking systemic investigations, the production of follow up 
reports, undertaking own initiative investigations, widening the scope of an 
investigation, the production of guidance, the production of submissions, the 
delivery of training, and undertaking audit, inspection and monitoring.  
 
John McMillan, the former Commonwealth Ombudsman, identified a range of 
activities that ombudsman could use to improve public administration. These 
include seeking publicity for the work of the office, and being constructive 
with the development of recommendations (McMillan 2010).  Kirkham et al. 
(2008) claim that an ombudsman’s ability to enforce their reports arise 
through a combination of an ombudsman powers of persuasion, the ability to 
publicise its activities and the access it has to the political process. 
 
2.10  Health complaints and the ombudsman 
 
Health ombudsman are a source of external scrutiny over health 
organisations. Continued public confidence in such external scrutiny bodies 
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depends in part on them retaining public confidence and trust in their 
operation (Brewer 2007). Kent (2007), considers such external scrutiny 
bodies as secondary targets of trust – that is independent bodies responsible 
for ensuring continued public trust in primary targets of trust, which are 
people or organisations with which the public have direct contact. Trust in the 
system depends upon these secondary targets of trust ensuring that 
breaches of trust between the public and primary targets of trust are 
condemned and remedied. Carney et al. (2016) warn that, if external 
agencies focus on individual complaints and redress, this may be achieved at 
the price of insufficient emphasis on overall system improvement. Walton 
argues that some health professionals exhibit negative feelings towards 
independent complaint authorities including ombudsman, but claims that 
there is significant evidence demonstrating the benefit that accrues to the 
medical profession from the existence of independent complaint authorities, 
going so far as to say that independent complaint bodies help ‘sustain 
medicine as a profession’ (Walton 2001, p.75). 
 
Healy and Walton (2016, p.503) suggest that health ombudsman will manage 
most complaints at the ‘softer base of a regulatory pyramid’ (see Figure 1 
below) using activities such as advice, referring the complainant back to the 
body in question or securing a rapid apology and explanation. In some cases, 
more interventionist actions will be undertaken, such as conciliation, 
investigation, the publication of reports, and in the case of certain Australian 




Figure 1 Pyramid of ombudsman regulatory mechanisms (Healy and Walton 2016, p.501) 
 
Carney et al. (2017) claim that the matters dealt with by ombudsman-type 
bodies differ significantly from other administrative type tribunals.  These 
insights were summarised by Carney et al. (2017) as follows: 
1. The decisions made by health ombudsman are not normally simple 
binary decisions. Despite the fact that United Kingdom ombudsman 
tend to pronounce complaints as being upheld or not upheld, Carney 
et al. (2017) note that health complaints are normally multifaceted 
making simple upheld/not upheld outcomes problematic. They further 
note that health complainants are often interested in the quality of 
services, thus making upheld or not upheld outcomes for their 
complaints less than satisfactory. 
2. Health complaints raise particular issues as they may require the 
consideration of multiple interests concurrently, and complainants may 
not all be wanting identical outcomes. 
3. Ombudsman that use a range of approaches in their attempt to 
resolve disputes may create uncertainty and discomfort in 
complainants (Carney et al. 2017). 
There are two broad approaches to improving the healthcare system. The 
first approach is to focus on improving practice, whether through activities 
such as personal education and development or activities that improve 
clinical effectiveness. The second approach is to focus on reducing poor 
practice though activities such as clinical audit which focuses on clinical 
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performance or though sanctions against poorly performing health 
professionals. 
 
In the health ombudsman environment, these two approaches become, 
firstly, an emphasis on recommendations which encourage health 
organisations and professionals to review and improve their practice, seeking 
solutions based on activities such as education and training, the rewriting of a 
policy or protocol or change to a patient environment, and, secondly, 
sanctioning sub-standard performance from health professionals through 
naming and shaming, disciplinary action or financial redress. Although the 
English Health Service Ombudsman awards financial redress in most upheld 
investigations, this is an atypical consequence of an ombudsman 
investigation while sanctioning health professionals is an even more atypical 
action for a health ombudsman. In that regard, the ability of the Office of the 
Health Ombudsman, Queensland (OHOQ) to commence disciplinary action 
against health professionals makes it unusual in the health ombudsman 
world4.  
 
Walton (2001) suggests that health ombudsman can improve health care 
through, improvement in practice, the maintenance of standards, reduction in 
the level of litigation, the maintenance of trust between patients and 
clinicians, the encouragement of reflection by clinicians, the protection of the 
public, and act as reminder to doctors of their ethical and professional 
responsibilities. Pollock and Kerrison (2001, pps.123-124) suggest that 
health ombudsman do find failures by health bodies and that changes do 
arise as a consequence, but suggest that, overall, it is a weak system by 
which to enforce change, concluding that the ombudsman’s ‘influence and 
                                            
4 In addition to the OHOQ, the New South Wales Health Care Complaints Commission is the 
only other health complaints entity that can prosecute clinicians. 
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persuasion’ have had little effect on bringing the NHS to account (Pollock and 
Kerrison 2001, p.128). 
 
Writing in the Australasian context, Bismark and Studdert (2010) also 
suggest that complaints received by healthcare complaint commissions can 
act as a driver to system improvement noting that each year the eight 
Australian and New Zealand healthcare complaint commissions receive over 
10,000 complaints, claiming that many highlight preventable adverse events. 
They further claim that for each of these known adverse events there are 
‘dozens more [that] lie below the waterline’ (Bismark and Studdert 2010, 
p.12). Asserting that healthcare complaint commissions have adopted the 
ethos of quality improvement, Bismark and Studdert (2010) note that 
commissioners recognise that complaints can be a source of learning which 
can be used to facilitate improvement to the healthcare system. Having 
acknowledged this intent, Bismark and Studdert (2010, p.12) note that 
commissioners have not published many comprehensive analyses of 
complaints implying that this is due to the fact that such analyses have not 
occurred.  
 
Walton et al. (2012) claim that the commissions play an important role in the 
overall health governance framework, holding health services and 
professionals accountable, and provide redress to those who have been 
found to have been failed. Walton et al. (2012) suggest that the commissions 
are important for six reasons, and, which it is suggested, are equally 
applicable to health ombudsman in the United Kingdom: firstly, they are 
independent watchdogs able to hold health bodies and professionals to 
account; secondly, they enable patient voices to be heard; thirdly, as 
alternative dispute resolution bodies, commissions offer a quicker, less 
stressful avenue for redress; fourthly, unlike courts which can only provide 
financial remedy, commission normally have a range of potential remedies 
available to them; fifthly, they are an independent route by which patients can 
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complain about their health care; and, finally, the complaints received, singly, 
or in aggregate, can shine a light on the quality of healthcare.  
 
Smith-Merry et al. (2016) researched the response of complaint managers to 
the recommendations for system improvement from two Australian health 
complaints commissioners (effectively ombudsman type organisations). The 
researchers carried out semi-structured interviews with 17 complaints 
managers from 11 hospitals and the data was subject to thematic analysis 
using Braithwaite’s typology of motivational postures (2014).  
 
Braithwaite (2014) described the responses from organisations to the outputs 
of overseeing bodies as ‘motivational postures’ and suggests that these 
motivational postures provide an important insight into the organisation’s 
attitude to its controller and its willingness to accept the controller’s rules and 
processes (Braithwaite 2014, p. 915). Braithwaite (2014) described five 
motivational postures which are firstly, commitment, which indicates a 
willingness to accept the authority and recommendations of the external 
controller, secondly, capitulation, which indicates acceptance of the 
authority’s conditions as a means of avoiding trouble and having a quiet life, 
thirdly, disengagement, which indicates the body views the authority as 
irrelevant, fourthly, game playing, which indicates the body will try to appear 
as if it is accepting of the controller’s authority while actively trying to 
circumvent its authority, and, fifthly, resistance, which indicates opposition to 
the controller’s authority. It is important to note that individuals and 
organisations can adopt more than one posture and that several can coexist. 
If authorities understand the motivational postures adopted by organisations 
then they will be able to engender cooperation from the bodies concerned 
thus improving their own effectiveness (Braithwaite 2014, p. 918). In a review 
of the literature on the applicability of motivational postures, Braithwaite 
(2014) notes that they are applicable in a wide range of scenarios including 
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the compliance of farmers with environmental laws, taxation, the regulation of 
care homes, policing and child protection.  
 
Smith-Merry et al. (2016) found that these motivational postures were 
applicable to the responses by hospital managers to the findings and 
recommendations made by their health complaint entity. In this research, 
Smith-Merry et al. (2016) found that three sets of postures, commitment, 
disengagement and resistance, were demonstrated. The researchers found 
that the complaint managers interviewed, as a group, displayed commitment 
to their complaint entity’s recommendations. The hospital managers saw the 
commissioner’s recommendations as helpful in improving services. 
Interestingly, the respondents, echoing Hertogh’s (2001) cooperative control, 
indicated that recommendations were more likely to be implemented if there 
had been discussion of the proposed recommendations prior to their 
finalisation (Smith-Merry 2016, p. D). Some complaint managers indicated 
disengagement, suggesting that many complaints should be referred back to 
the hospital for consideration while in cases where the hospital managers felt 
the recommendations to be unreasonable actively, demonstrated potential 
resistance by considering the risks of not implementing the recommendations 
citing issues around resources or other policies, which echoes Hertogh’s 
(2001) barriers to change.   
 
Smith-Merry et al. (2016) also found that complaint managers generally 
supported the intervention of their health care complaint commission when a 
serious complaint had been submitted, recognising the authority of their 
complaints commission. Smith-Merry et al. (2016, p.530) were informed by 
complaint managers that the findings of investigations into serious complaints 
by commissions were rarely different from internal hospital investigations but, 
nonetheless, complaint managers found their commission potentially helpful 
as ‘another pair of eyes’. In addition, Smith-Merry et al. (2016) were informed 
by complaint managers that the recommendations made by commissions 
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could be used by complaint managers to encourage otherwise disinclined 
staff to accept the need for change. Despite this apparently positive view of 
recommendations, complaint managers argued that, while committed to the 
process, commissions should undertake greater negotiations with complaint 
managers on the content of the specific recommendations, suggesting that 
recommendations ‘were more likely to be implemented if the commission 
discussed options with the hospital before finalising recommendations’ as 
this would allow discussion of what was possible, including time-scales for 
action (Smith-Merry et al. 2016, p.530). Smith-Merry et al. (2016) make the 
point, however, that complaint bodies may wish to maintain a circumspect 
relationship with the body in jurisdiction to avoid regulatory capture and 
conclude that commissions should consider the potential for negotiating final 
recommendations for change while recognising that bodies could use the 
opportunity to raise potential barriers to implementation, which if accepted 
could prevent necessary change.   
 
Smith-Merry et al. suggest that regulators ‘should take note of the views of 
those that they regulate in order to be an effective and responsive regulator’ 
(Smith-Merry et al. 2016, p.B) which is a similar finding to that of Hertogh with 
his cooperative control model. Merry-Smith et al. (2016) concluded that the 
relationship between the health commissioners and the hospitals was 
positive indicating general commitment to implementing recommendations 
although the hospital managers wanted greater discussion and negotiation 
during the investigative and recommendation process.  
 
2.11 Research on ombudsman 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             
Empirical research into the impact of ombudsman is scarce (Hertogh 2013; 
Bizjak 1999; Siemaitycki et al. 2015; Stuhmcke 2012a; Gill 2011) with 
Hertogh claiming that that the research which is available is either juridicial or 
48 
 
descriptive in approach (Hertogh 2013, p.2). Part of the reason for this may 
be that measuring the effectiveness of ombudsman is difficult. Danet, who 
was one of the first to attempt to evaluate ombudsman, notes that many 
ombudsman goals are ‘intangible’, including aims such as making 
bureaucracies humane or reducing alienation from government and 
concludes that ombudsman are concerned with justice and ‘what can be 
more intangible than “injustice”’ (Danet 1978, pp.341-342). Bizjak (1999, p.1) 
suggests that the difficulty in assessing the effectiveness of an ombudsman 
is due to a combination of lack of clarity over the role of ombudsman, and 
that some of the functions are reactive while others are proactive. Siemaitycki 
et al. (2015, p.85) suggest that it is the landscape in which ombudsman 
operate that creates barriers to research and this landscape includes the fact 
that ombudsman work is wide ranging, which means that the way 
ombudsman operate varies according to the office, along with differences in 
ombudsman jurisdiction, socio-economic and political context. Stuhmcke 
(2012, pp.3-4) suggests that ‘the “natural” obstacles’ to research include: 
firstly, the fact that the ombudsman is part of a wider system in which it plays 
only a limited part, secondly, an ombudsman often works informally, thirdly, 
asks whether a reduction in complaints received by an ombudsman a sign of 
success or not, and, fourthly, the objectives of an ombudsman is not to make 
citizens happy but to reduce maladministration in administrative decision-
making. 
 
A significant element of ombudsman research focuses on the effectiveness 
of an individual ombudsman office rather than examining the impact of the 
ombudsman office on the policies and processes of bodies in jurisdiction. An 
ombudsman is normally only one part of a complex set of regulatory bodies 
and sorting out who is responsible for which change can be challenging 
(Stuhmcke 2012, p. 3). Ombudsman recommendations are only one set of 
demands for change that a body in jurisdiction may face at any one time 
which, inevitably, leads to prioritisation by the body. As Smith-Merry et al. 
(2016) and Hertogh (2001) identified, and supported by a PHSO/IFF 
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Research (2010) study, recommendations by ombudsman may lead to direct 
change or act as a catalyst for other changes already under consideration. 
As Ayeni (1999, p.184) claimed, ‘evaluating programs like the ombudsman 
institution is an exceedingly difficult and uncertain endeavour. It is impossible 
to come up with a framework that is foolproof’. 
 
Not only is there limited empirical research on the impact of ombudsman, and 
very little on health ombudsman in particular, there is also disagreement 
among academics about the level of impact, if any, that ombudsman can 
claim to have made on administrative decision making beyond the level of 
the individual complaint. Kirkham (2005) has noted that observers are 
unconvinced as to whether ombudsman are effective or not, a view to which 
Steyvers and Reynaert (2009) are in agreement. Adler (2003) believes that 
they do have a positive impact as does Seneviratne (2002). To help close 
this gap of empirical independent research into their effectiveness, 
ombudsman offices have started undertaking such research themselves 
(Stuhmcke 2012; Gill 2011). Gill (2011) concluded that the available evidence 
demonstrates a ‘mixed picture of the influence that the ombudsman may 
have in this area’. 
 
In this next section of the literature review, the focus of the review is on 
research relevant to this thesis, either through its focus on health 
ombudsman or because of its relevance to the discussion later in the thesis. 
 
Hertogh (2001) conducted an exploratory study examining the policy impact 
of the Netherlands courts and ombudsman investigating whether the degree 
of impact by courts and ombudsman was related to their respective models 
of administrative control those of coercive and cooperative control. Table 3 
below identifies the key features of the coercive and cooperative models of 
administrative control. The starting point for Hertogh is that he suggests that 
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three important differences exist between courts and ombudsman. Courts 
consider administrative decisions, whether the administrative decision was 
lawful, and their decisions are legally binding; for ombudsman the position is 
that they are concerned with administrative behaviour, whether the body 
acted lawfully and their decisions are non-binding.  
 
Table 3 Models of administrative control (Hertogh 2001) 
 
Hertogh (2001) suggests that the administrative decision-making process 
consists of three consecutive phases, the information, transformation and 
processing phases. In the information phase, the body asks what is the ruling 
of the ombudsman? During the transformation phase, the body asks itself 
what does the decision mean for it, what is the underlying normative value 
within the decision and how is that related to the goals and operations of the 
body? The body, thus, internalises the external decision. In the processing 
phase, the body asks itself what it should do with the decision, that is, should 
it implement the decision (Hertogh 2001, p.58). 
 
Hertogh then builds upon this model by identifying, for each of these three 
phases, a barrier to implementation which, respectively, are clarity, policy 
tension and defensive reactions. To maximise policy impact, firstly, the 
decision has to be written in such a way that the normative rule within it can 
be discerned, secondly, the acceptability of the ombudsman’s decision is 
determined by the difference between the decision and the existing 
organisational program and the level of commitment to that program by the 
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body so that the greater the change the less likely it will be implemented, 
and, thirdly, the degree of defensiveness by the body to the decision of the 
ombudsman. The degree of impact is related to the strength of these barriers 
and how well the ombudsman’s decision can navigate them (Hertogh 2001, 
pp.58-59). 
 
Reviewing the available evidence, Hertogh (2001, p.52) noted that the courts 
in the Netherlands have little impact on administrative decisions. Hertogh 
then contrasted that with available evidence on the impact on policy of the 
Netherlands Ombudsman and found there to be some evidence of 
substantial impact concluding that legal force does not automatically translate 
to policy change (Hertogh 2001, p.53). Instead, Hertogh postulated that the 
impact of ombudsman and courts is related to their style of control, being 
either coercive in the case of courts, or cooperative in the case of 
ombudsman (Hertogh 2001, p.53). 
 
Stuhmcke (2006) undertook a case study of the Australian Commonwealth 
Ombudsman in which she established the concept of ‘thick’ and ‘thin’ impact 
where thick impact related to change in policy while thin impact related to 
changes in procedures (Stuhmcke 2006, p.30). Stuhmcke then developed 
the idea of direct impact, which she defined as impact that is measurable, 
and indirect impact, that is impact which is immeasurable. Examples of 
immeasurable impacts of an ombudsman is its existence, which may act as a 
means of encouraging public confidence in the overall system, or the 
ombudsman in its advisory role (Stuhmcke 2006, p.31).  
 
The Parliamentary and Health Service Ombudsman (PHSO 2010), working 
with IFF Research, undertook research to assess the impact of the PHSO in 
2010. IFF Research conducted the research but the findings are in the format 
of a PowerPoint presentation with little information on methodology. The 
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information provided indicate that interviews with 45 individuals involved with 
the implementation of the recommendations of 21 upheld investigations took 
place. No information is provided on the 21 investigations including the sector 
of the body complained about. For those staff involved, they stated that the 
intervention of the PHSO brought a complaint to an end, that the 
recommendations led directly to improvements, which may be single in 
nature, or to a ‘far-reaching change [in] culture]’, which broadly translates to 
Stuhmcke’s thick and thin impacts discussed above. These changes can be 
the direct consequence of the PHSO recommendations or provide leverage 
to accelerate changes that the organisation was already planning, or at least, 
added to other evidence of which the organisation was aware and furthered 
the case for change. Of the 21 investigations, the informants claimed that the 
recommendations led to significant improvement in 17 cases. As such, the 
PHSO was described as ‘a partner in improvement’ (PHSO/IFF Research 
2010, p.23).  
 
Silva et al. (2014) undertook a qualitative case study of a municipal health 
ombudsman, following its establishment in Minais Gerais, South-Eastern 
Brazil in 2009, and found that the existence of this new ombudsman had had 
a positive impact in monitoring the public health system and the identification 
of common problems in healthcare delivery.  
 
This brief review highlights the following points: there is limited empirical 
research on the impact of ombudsman; the empirical research that does exist 
demonstrates a mixed picture with the balance slightly in favour of 
ombudsman offices having a positive impact; there is no one single model on 
how one should evaluate the impact of an ombudsman office although 
several have been proposed. There are good reasons for the existence of 
this situation. As discussed above, the nature of ombudsman, their roles and 
functions can vary significantly between offices and even within an 
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ombudsman office, the role and functions are liable to change dependent 
upon the priorities of the ombudsman currently in post.  
 
Stuhmcke (2012, p.3) raises the argument that the success of an 
ombudsman should not be measured in terms of customer satisfaction but 
rather in terms of the absence of maladministration. This situation could 
result in fair decisions yet dissatisfied complainants. Stuhmcke (2012, p. 6) 
concludes 
the measure of success of [an] ombudsman in delivering justice (or 
good administration) may be proven through efforts of an office to 
create a shared knowledge amongst stakeholders as to where the 
edge of injustice lies. Ombudsman offices build a just administrative 
culture based on a shared understanding of principles such as 
integrity and accountability and while the data evidencing this may not 
be obvious many of the examples given above – such as training and 
speeches may contribute to the cataloguing of efforts made by an 
ombudsman institution to define the edge of injustice. These efforts 
should not be sidelined in any evaluation of impact. 
 




This chapter reviews the academic literature relating to both complaints and 
to the ombudsman institution. The underpinning thesis for this research, 
which is claimed by both academics and ombudsman, and is being tested in 
this research, is that health ombudsman contribute to the improvement of the 
healthcare system as a result of their roles and activities. Complaints are a 
regular feature of life within healthcare systems and their number has been 
increasing in recent years. One key outcome sought by health complainants 
is to ensure that lessons are learned and that the system is improved but 
there is disagreement within the academic community on whether complaints 
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do achieve this outcome. Health ombudsman type institutions were 
established in the United Kingdom, Australia and New Zealand to provide 
second-tier resolution on unresolved health complaints and, as with 
complaints, there is the hope that they contribute to the improvement of the 
healthcare system. There is, however, little research which demonstrates that 
they do make a significant contribution. This chapter also considered the 
development of thought around the administrative justice system. The role of 
the ombudsman institution as part of the administrative justice system was 
introduced and a discussion on its proposed contribution to system 
improvement undertaken. Finally, a summary of ombudsman research, 





















The impact of an ombudsman institution, by which it is meant in this thesis is 
the institution’s ability to contribute to system improvement, lies in the degree 
to which it is able to engender change in an organisation over which it has 
oversight. In this thesis, two theoretical constructs are used to provide the 
conceptual and theoretical framework for the research, and are those of 
organisational learning and institutional logics.  
 
This thesis is based upon the premise that the reports and recommendations 
produced by an ombudsman are potential triggers for organisational learning 
by bodies in jurisdiction. To make an appropriate change in response to an 
ombudsman’s output, a body in jurisdiction has to undergo the process of 
organisational learning, during which it needs to understand what is the 
appropriate response that it needs to make. In understanding the response of 
bodies in jurisdiction to these external triggers, this first strand of the chapter 
considers three constructs which affect the willingness of health 
organisations to implement recommendations from their health ombudsman 
and are accountability, feedback and learning.  For organisational learning to 
occur there has to be an acceptance of an accountability relationship 
between an ombudsman and body in jurisdiction, there has to be recognition 
that the output of an ombudsman is a source of feedback to an organisation, 
and an organisation has to be willing to learn from that feedback. The 
analysis begins by considering accountability and the nature of the 
accountability arrangement that exists between ombudsman and bodies in 
jurisdiction, then examines how organisations seek and react to feedback, 
before considering how organisations can use this feedback to improve its 
performance through organisational learning.    
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The second strand of this chapter concerns the metatheory of institutional 
logics. The metatheory of institutional logics has been developed to explain 
the behaviours and actions of organisations and their staff. It will be argued 
that institutional logics create a system which influences the thinking and 
actions of individuals within an organisation.  
 
Organisational learning and institutional logics provide the theoretical 
background to the underpinning thesis of this research, presented in the 
introductory chapter, that health ombudsman contribute to the improvement 
of the healthcare system as a result of the roles and activities that they 
undertake together with the way that they work with bodies in jurisdiction. 
Together, they assist in the understanding of how ombudsman contribute to 
system improvement as their activities act as a trigger for organisational 
learning within bodies in jurisdiction and explains how the responses of 
bodies in jurisdiction of bodies in jurisdiction  are facilitated by the nature of 
their relationships with their ombudsman and which are mediated by the 
dominant institutional logic that exists within the ombudsman.  
 
3.2 Organisational learning 
 
Public bodies are responsible for millions of decisions every year and it is 
important that as many as possible are correct, not only for reasons of 
individual justice but also to ensure that democratic decisions taken through 
parliament are appropriately implemented. Concerns have been raised about 
the errors made by administrative bodies and this has led to a focus on a 
‘right first-time agenda’ (Thomas 2015, p.111). Thomas argues that to 
improve decision-making public bodies should engage with organisational 
learning which he defines as, 
… when individuals within an organisation experience a problematic 
mismatch between expected and actual results and inquire into it on 
the organisation’s behalf. Organisations learn when they identify 
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appropriate lessons from history which are then encoded into routines 
that guide future behaviour (Thomas 2015, pp.111-112). 
 
Vos et al. (2008, p.8) consider that complaints present an opportunity from 
which organisations can learn. However, they argue that organisational 
learning has not been integrated with complaint management despite 
complaints being an opportunity for gaining insights about the services 
delivered (Vos et al. 2008, p.9). For Vos et al. (2008), the learning experience 
begins with an unexpected event that triggers the learning process and ends 
when the learning has taken place and change occurred. In between these 
start and endpoints are the activities which relate to the process of learning.  
 
In this thesis, the start begins when a body receives feedback in the form of 
an ombudsman report and is recognised as establishing a tension which ‘… 
comes from seeing clearly where we want to be, our vision, and telling the 
truth about where we are, our current reality’ (Senge 1990, p.9). Such 
tensions are necessary for organisations to learn (Senge 1990, p.9) and act 
as a trigger for action.  Following this trigger, learning activities can take 
place. For Vos et al. (2008, p. 15), the appropriate response to feedback from 
an ombudsman investigation would be an interactive learning approach as 
the response is not concerned with the analysis of the complaint but how to 
resolve the tension between current and recommended changes. The result 





The idea of accountability can be considered in two ways. Firstly, it can be 
considered as a virtue, where it relates to the normative standards used to 
assess the behaviour of individuals. This translates to the idea of ‘being 
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accountable’ to someone or some body and is seen as a positive 
characteristic and often viewed as a public-sector value along with being 
transparent or responsive to customers. The alternative way of considering 
accountability is to see it as a mechanism where a person or body has to 
clarify and justify their conduct to another body (Schillemans and Bovens 
2011). To Lindberg (2013), accountability is the relationship between, firstly, 
a principle and, secondly, an agent to whom power has been delegated 
where the agent is held accountable for the decisions that they make and, 
where, if necessary, the principle can apply sanctions for any failure by the 
agent. For an accountability relationship to exist the agent must have 
discretionary power.  
 
Bovens (cited in Frees et al. 2015, pp. 30-31) considers the issue of 
accountability in terms of who is accountable to whom, why and for what? He 
states that the ‘who’ can be at the level of an individual, as with professional 
accountability, hierarchical, as occurs with a Chief Executive being held 
responsible for the actions of staff within their organisation, or corporate, as 
with the example of corporate manslaughter. The ‘whom’ can be considered 
in five different ways: firstly, political towards politicians and voters, secondly, 
legal towards courts and tribunals, thirdly, administrative towards auditors 
and ombudsman, fourthly, professional to professional bodies, and, fifthly, 
societal towards citizens, the media or special interest groups. The ‘why’ can 
be considered in three dimensions; vertically, horizontally and diagonally. 
The first of these, vertical accountability, occurs where a person or 
organisation holds formal power over another person or body and can hold 
the latter to account. Secondly, there is horizontal accountability where there 
is no formal obligation to give account of oneself but where it is given 
voluntarily. Finally, there is diagonal accountability which exists where there 
is no formal hierarchical nor voluntary accountability which reflects an 
accountability which has both horizontal and vertical elements Bovens 
(2005). Frees et al. (2014, p.31) claim that administrative accountability 
mechanisms, such as ombudsman are an example of diagonal 
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accountability. In this model, there is no hierarchical relationship between 
ombudsman and body but the relationship is more than voluntary as 
ombudsman may be able to use the courts or parliament to support its 
recommendation(s). The ‘what’ relates to the aspect of behaviour the agent is 
accountable for. It can vary according to the office but for bodies in 
jurisdiction to ombudsman it is normally about the implementation of 
administrative or other parliamentary policy.  
 
Another way of categorising accountability mechanisms relates to the nature 
of the bodies to which one is accountable. Romzek and Dubnick (1987) 
identified four such types of bodies, bureaucratic, legal, professional and 
political. The four types of accountability mechanisms are derived from 
whether the agency control is internal or external and the degree of control 
the accountability mechanism has over the body in jurisdiction. The authority 
in internal control can be drawn from either formal hierarchical relationships 
or more informal social relationships. External sources of control can be 
drawn from either a formal legal relationship such as a contractual 
relationship or from the informal exercise of power by an interest outwith the 
body. In bureaucratic accountability relationships, the controller has a high 
degree of control and operates internally. This occurs in organisational 
hierarchies where junior staff are accountable to more senior staff. 
Professional accountability is associated with an internal locus of control and 
low degree of control. The classical types of professional accountability are 
with health professionals, lawyers and teachers to their regulatory bodies. 
Legal accountability mechanisms have an external locus of control which can 
exercise a high degree of control. Courts and tribunals are characteristic of 
this model. The fourth model is the political accountability mechanism which 
is where a person or body is accountable to a Minister, parliamentary 
committee or the local government equivalents dependent upon the level of 




Bovens (2005) suggests an additional fifth model, that of administrative 
accountability for independent external bodies such as by ombudsman or 
auditors, which exercise administrative or financial oversight on public 
bodies. Using Romzek and Dubnick’s model, this administrative 
accountability model is located externally to the body in jurisdiction and, with 
their statutorily based, but rather limited, powers, is situated between the 
legal mechanism with significant control and the political with their more 
limited powers of control.  
 
Aucoin and Heintzmann (2000, p.45) suggest that accountability mechanisms 
have three purposes. These are to control for the abuse and misuse of public 
authority. The second is to provide assurance in respect to use of public 
resources and adherence to the law and public service values. The third is to 
encourage and promote learning in pursuit of continuous improvement in 
governance and public management. 
 
Reflecting on these three purposes, one can map them to the putative roles 
of an ombudsman. The initial role of ombudsman was to investigate 
complaints about public administration and this would include the first two of 
Aucoin and Heintzmann’s purposes. Over time, as ombudsman developed 
their system improvement role, they have been trying to deliver more fully on 
the third purpose. It is this third purpose that is of relevance to this thesis 
which considers the means by which ombudsman contribute to the 
improvement of the healthcare system. 
 
The central purpose of public accountability mechanisms is to hold public 
bodies to account. One of the reasons behind the establishment of 
ombudsman was to assist parliament in holding public administrations to 
account and, for Bovens (2005) this is the main purpose of public 
accountability schemes, that is to support the democratic control of public 
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services. Bovens (2005) suggests that a second function of accountability 
mechanisms is to promote trust and legitimacy in public services, as the 
existence of the accountability mechanism supports quality improvement 
activities and discourages the misuse of delegated powers.  A potential third 
function of the accountability mechanism, and linked to the second, is that 
the accountability mechanism supports improvement of the system by 
encouraging learning from errors that it has, in turn, identified (Van Loocke 
and Put 2010, cited in Frees et al. 2015).  
 
While it is clear that accountability mechanisms exist between ombudsman 
and bodies in jurisdiction, are these mechanisms able to fulfil the belief that 
they can encourage organisational learning? Frees et al. (2015) suggest that 
there are five potential mechanisms that can be used to achieve this aim and 
which can be split into two categories, firstly, that of information reflection and 
debate, and, secondly, the ability to sanction the body. In the former 
category, the ombudsman provides feedback information which should 
provoke a period of reflection by the body concerned on the service provided 
which in turns provokes discussion about how the body should correct an 
identified error. In the second category lies the ability for ombudsman to 
make their reports public. This acts as a form of moral suasion on the body to 
cooperate with ombudsman recommendations lest it bring public 
disapprobation. Finally, sanctions can act as a motivator to managers in 
public services to improve their services (Bovens, Schillemans and t’Hart 
2008). 
 
However, the potential for adverse publicity and sanctions can be seen as a 
double-edged sword. It may encourage the defensive reactions identified 
discussed by Hertogh (2001) such as lack of cooperation with an 
ombudsman investigation or indeed resistance to accept findings and was 
discussed in the previous chapter. The risk of adverse publicity and sanctions 
may also encourage public service managers to avoid risk taking which is a 
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necessary element to organisational change and improvement (Van Loocke 




For Frees et al., ‘feedback information allows an organisation to correct its 
errors, to adjust its goals, to restore its performance levels, and to align itself 
with its environment’ (Frees et al. 2015, p.4). The authors have identified four 
sources from which public sector organisations can obtain feedback. These 
are from staff employed by the organisation, other organisational 
stakeholders such as customers or partner organisations, from internal 
monitoring systems or organisations involved in policy evaluations and from 
ombudsman or other administrative accountability mechanisms (Frees et al. 
2015, p.24). The focus of feedback can be considered in two different ways: 
goal-seeking feedback considers the degree to which stated goals, and 
policies are achieved without questioning the validity or rightness of these 
goals or policies while goal-changing feedback seeks to challenge the 
appropriateness of the goals or policies. (Frees et al. 2015, p.26). 
 
Inherent within the concept of organisational feedback is the idea that the 
organisation is open to receiving it. Academic thinking on this issue is 
focused on system thinking and is founded upon the idea that organisations 
are systems and, in particular, are open systems (Frees et al. 2015, p.15). An 
open system is one that is able to interact with its environment and adapt to 
changes within its environment (Katz and Kahn 1978) and actively seeks 
feedback in order to maintain an equilibrium with its environment.  
 
Some authors suggest that organisations have limits to their openness and 
that organisations may be more or less receptive to signals and feedback 
from their environment (Frees et al. 2015, p.20). Frees et al. (2015, p.21) 
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describe this openness as a ‘perception filter’ which varies in thickness. The 
thicker the filter, the less likely an organisation will respond to feedback and 
the feedback to which it does respond must be more consistent with its 
internal culture and polices. This is similar to Hertogh’s (2001) view that a 
barrier to the impact of ombudsman depends on the degree of policy tension 
which the ombudsman recommendations has with internal policies. To 
complicate matters, subsystems within the organisation may have different 
perception filters meaning that different parts of the organisation may 
respond differently to the same feedback leading to confusion and problems 
of communication within the organisation as a whole (Katz and Kahn, 1978). 
There are advantages to operating a relatively closed system. It limits the 
complexity of interaction with their environment, decreases turbulence and 
stops the organisation responding to every piece of feedback (Frees et al. 
2015). Organisations need to be able to filter the feedback that they receive 
and this filtering may vary at differing points of an organisational life.  
 
Feedback is a key element of an ombudsman’s system improvement role 
and the underpinning premise is that if an organisation receives feedback 
about its performance then it will be able to learn from it. 
 
3.2.3 Learning  
 
Assuming that an organisation is open to feedback then it can learn from that 
feedback in different ways. The simplest means is through ‘single loop 
learning’ (Argyris and Schön 1978). In single loop learning the organisation 
will attempt to correct the problem by the simplest means possible, which is 
by attempting to effect change through alterations within the same policies or 
procedures. In this sense, it is learning which takes place with a goal-seeking 
focus. There is no attempt to change anything beyond the immediacy of the 
identified error. For Frees at al (2015, p.7) it can lead to a gradual 
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improvement of existing approaches but will ignore the question of why the 
problem arose in the first place. However, if the organisation does ask itself, 
why did the error or failing arise in the first place, this may lead to a deeper 
consideration of the organisation’s underpinning polices or procedures. That 
is, to question the appropriateness of the policy or procedure. In turn, this 
may lead to a change in the organisation’s operating models or principles. 
This is ‘double loop learning’ which occurs with goal-changing behaviour and 
involves changing an organisation’s underpinning assumptions, policies and 
goals leading to discontinuous change (Frees et al. 2015). 
 
Gnyawali and Stewart (2003, p.69) introduced the idea of ‘modes’ of 
organisational learning by which they mean the process through which 
learning is shared in organisations and suggest that there are two dominant 
modes of learning, the informational and interactional learning modes. The 
informational learning mode is the ‘systemically based structural processes 
used in organizations to collect, analyze, and distribute information’ where 
‘organisations develop systems to acquire and share information, and to 
store the information in organizational memory’ (Gnyawali and Stewart 2003, 
p.69). One weakness of the informational approach to organisational learning 
is that organisational learning also requires the development of shared 
‘schemas’, a development not included within the informational learning 
mode (Gnyawali and Stewart 2003, p.69). The creation of such schemas 
requires an interactive learning mode defined as a ‘systemically based social 
process used in organizations to develop shared schemas through the 
actions and interactions of various individuals and units in the organization’ 
and is viewed as essential in the development of shared understanding 
(Gnyawali and Stewart 2003, p.70). Organisations will not use only an 
informational learning mode or an interactional learning mode but will 
combine the use of both approaches to differing degrees (Gnyawali and 
Stewart (2003). Where there is a higher degree of interactional learning the 
resultant changes will be more fundamental and the creation of new learning, 
while, where the informational learning mode is dominant, the resultant 
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learning will be incremental in nature, with changes to, but the retention of, 
the existing knowledge base and approaches used by the organisation 
(Gnyawali and Stewart (2003). Informational learning is a simpler process 
and tends to be used in large, hierarchical organisations (Gnyawali and 
Stewart (2003, p.81). Gnyawali and Stewart (2003) liken informational 
learning to single loop learning and interactional learning to double loop 
learning. 
 
While organisational learning has received significant academic focus, there 
is no generally accepted theory or model and even the term organisational 
learning has no agreed single definition (Frees et al. 2015). One of the 
debates surrounding organisational learning is whether organisational 
learning relates to learning by individuals or learning by organisations. Frees 
et al. (2015, p.8) summarise the debate as a ‘focus on the learning of 
individuals in the organizational context’ as opposed to a focus on an 
’organization-level process that is distinct from individual learning’. Simon 
(1991, p.125) states ‘all learning takes place inside individual heads’ and 
suggests that that the learning of an individual is influenced by the 
organisation to which the person belongs and has effects on the organisation 
that extend further than can be inferred by observing the individual’s learning 
(Simon 1991, pp.125-126). Knight (2002), meanwhile, argues that 
organisational learning is more than the combined learning of people within 
that organisation and that organizations have the capacity to learn albeit with 
the caveat that ‘learning is a notion that can be usefully applied at different 
levels, provided that we accept that the detailed conceptualization of learning 
and associated constructs, such as memory, are not identical across the 
levels’ (Knight 2002, p.436).  
 
For example, Lam (2006, p.124) argues that organisational memory is ‘the 
accumulated knowledge of the organization, stored in its rules, procedures, 
routines and shared norms’. Thus, organisational learning occurs at a higher 
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level than what an individual learns and involves group learning. Schilling and 
Kluge (2009, p.338) articulate this group level of learning and its relationship 
with an organisation’s rules, procedures and culture with their definition ‘We 
define organisational learning as an organisationally regulated collective 
learning process in which individual or group learning experiences 
concerning the improvement of organisational experience and/or goals are 
transferred into organisational routines’.  Frees et al. (2015, p.10) summarise 
the academic debate and consider organisational learning to be ‘the 
combination of individuals and groups learning in an organisational context, 
and the organization learning through intra-organizational interaction’. 
 
Fiol and Lyles (1985) suggest that organisational learning arises as a 
dynamic relationship between cognitive and behavioural development. 
Cognitive learning refers to the development of new insights as a result of 
filtering, interpreting and processing new information about performance (Fiol 
and Lyles, 1985). The behavioural element refers to those changes in 
behaviour that reflect the insights and changes arising from the cognitive 
element, what van Ackers et al. (2015, p.26) refer to as ‘the 
institutionalization of the lessons learned’. 
 
Academics have also considered the process that organisations utilise during 
organisational learning. One approach was described by Huber (1991), who 
has detailed a four-stage process of the acquisition of knowledge, the 
distribution of knowledge, the interpretation of the information and the 
storage of this information in the organisational memory. 
 
Acquiring knowledge is the start of the resolution process and organisations 
need to be able to seek the information which will assist resolve the creative 
tension. Greve (2003) describes ‘problemistic search’ where organisations 
seek information to help them resolve their immediate problem. For Gilson et 
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al. (2009) this is common with single loop learning. Where double loop 
learning is undertaken the key organisational focus will again be problemistic 
learning, but the organisation will undertake a wider search (Gilson et al. 
2009, p. 18). An alternative approach to search for information is ‘slack 
research’ which occurs when the organisation devotes sufficient resources to 
allow for a wide-ranging reflective approach to problem-solving and which 
may involve trials of new ways of working to identify new ways of doing 
things (Gilson et al. 2009, p.18). 
 
The acquisition of knowledge by an organisation can either be a deliberate 
activity where the organisation notes a gap in its knowledge and wants to 
improve what it does or when knowledge acquisition arises unconsciously. 
There are a wide range of potential sources of knowledge from which an 
organisation can draw. These include ‘internal resources and experiences’ 
such as staff expertise, ‘citizens and consumers’ such as customer feedback, 
‘partners, rivals and comparators’ and which includes the use of consultants 
and secondments, ‘top down direction and control’ which for public-sector 
organisations could include Treasury Notes, Cabinet Office or Departmental 
advice, ‘critiques, advice and media’ such as parliamentary select 
committees, pressures groups, the media, academia or think-tanks, and 
‘testing interactions, crises and review’ such as audit, capability or serious 
incident reviews (Gilson et al. 2009, pp.30-31).  
 
Once information has been acquired, the second phase is for its distribution 
across the organisation. Mariotti (2012) claims that organisational learning is 
a collective endeavour involving a series of relationships within the 
organisation. These relationships further the distribution of information. 
Organisations will facilitate this information distribution through a range of 
mechanisms. Without such mechanisms organisational learning would not be 
possible. Huber (1991, p.105) suggests that this is ‘a determinant of the 
occurrence and breadth of organizational learning’. The degree of sharing of 
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information (its breadth) is a determinant for how successful an organization 
will learn. For Huber (1991, p.108), there are five factors that can affect the 
extent of information sharing and are firstly, the degree of conformity of belief 
systems among individuals within the organisation which will affect their 
interpretation of new information, secondly, the way the information is framed 
will affect its interpretation, thirdly, the ‘richness of the media used to convey 
the information’ where media richness is defined as the ‘capacity to change 
mental representations within a specific time interval’ (Daft and Huber 1987, 
p.14), fourthly, the information load placed upon individuals or organisational 
units, and, fifthly, and the degree of ‘unlearning’ that must take place before 
the new learning can be generated and internalised. 
 
There is then a need for the information to be interpreted. Crossan et al. 
(1999) describe this as the process that occurs when that part of the 
organisation, whether an individual or group, which has obtained the relevant 
information, share, and explain the relevance of this information, to others 
within the organisation. This step is intended to create a shared 
understanding of the information and its relevance in addressing the creative 
tension that has been noted to exist. Daft and Weick (1984, p.286) describe 
this as ‘the process of translating events and developing shared 
understandings and conceptual schemes’.  
 
The final phase is organisational memory which is where the new learning is 
routinised into the standard operating procedures of the organisation 
(Crossan et al. 1999). Fiol and Lyles (1985) argued that this was a cognitive 
process although the generally accepted position is that it involves both 
cognitive and behavioural elements (Vos et al. 2008, p.12). Thus, it leads to 
changes in both the way individuals think and behave. Huber (1991) notes 
that organisation memory can be affected by the turnover of personnel, 
failure to anticipate information needs in the future means that information 
useful in the future but of no immediate need is not retained, and even if the 
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information is retained individuals may not know where that information is 
stored.  
 
Organisations do not always learn in isolation. Of increasing academic 
interest is inter-organisational learning. Knight (2002) defines inter-
organisational learning as the learning of organisations within an inter-
organisational network. Van Acker et al. (2015, p.27) note that inter-
organisational learning can refer to the ‘sharing and transferring of 
knowledge from one network partner to another’. Van Acker et al. (2015, 
p.27) go on to state that it would be wrong to think of inter-organisational 
learning in terms of the transfer of explicit knowledge. ‘Instead, knowledge is 
continuously reviewed, recreated or reappreciated as it is taken into different 
settings or is rediscovered in relation to new purposes or alongside existing 
“old knowledge”’ (Hartley and Bennington 2006, p.104).  Thus, the transfer of 
organisational learning is commonly a process of adaption and not of 
adoption (Van Acker et al. 2015, p.27).  
 
According to van Acker et al. (2015 pp.27-28), for inter-organisational 
learning to take place it needs to be supported by institutional arrangements, 
such as learning networks that allow organisations to share their 
experiences. However, these opportunities can be undermined as 
organisations may see it as counter-productive to share information with 
potential or actual competitors. Although the public-sector is often seen as 
being based on collaboration and not competition, there is the risk of free 
loading, where people and organisations can gain knowledge through 
participation in the learning network but make little contribution in return, 
while a third potential problem relates to the composition of the network. 
Should the network be composed of similar or dissimilar organisations? 
Heterogeneity among members can allow learning from a wider range of 
experiences while homogeneity among members promotes the transfer of 
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tacit knowledge due to a shared language and knowledge base (Mariotti 
2012). 
 
Thomas (2015) provides further causes that inhibit public bodies from 
becoming true learning organisations. These include bureaucratic structures, 
the reality that many public organisations have complicated subsystem 
structures each of which may only be aware of part of the issue or its 
solution, that simple changes in large organisations may necessitate 
significant change programmes and the associated organisational capacity to 
manage too many change programmes at any one time, and ineffective 
resources and mechanisms to encourage learning.  
 
Van Ackers et al. (2015, pp.15-16) consider why public-sector organisations 
have problems with change and innovation and identify four principle reasons 
for this. The first is the lack of true competition that most public-sector 
organisations face means that they have less reason to improve. The second 
is that change always involves risk and uncertain results and public-sector 
organisations are generally risk averse as, if things goes wrong, they will be 
accused of wasting public money, and the general political climate means 
that failures are heavily associated with blame with associated risks to 
career. The third is that the public-sector tends to be affected by short-
termism due to the fact that they are under the influence of government and 
parliaments who need to respond to the electoral cycle. Politicians need 
results before the next election not failures. The fourth, and final, reason for 
low levels of public-sector change is the rule obsession that is innate within 
the public-sector bureaucratic culture.  
 
Vos et al. (2008) do not criticise the bureaucratic culture, rather, recognising 
that this approach provides legal certainty and guarantees which are 
important values to the general public. They highlight that the problem arises 
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when the rules become the ends and are insufficiently questioned or 
challenged. Reschenthaler and Thompson (2001, p.53) go so far as to say 
the public administrative bodies are ‘seriously disadvantaged as learning 
organisations’.  The result of these barriers is that public-sector organisations 
have limited ability and desire to conduct interactional learning. Instead, it is 
mainly focused on informational learning aimed at improving what they 
already do. It is only when significant problems arise that necessitate 
interactional learning will a public body engage in it. 
 
The chapter, thus far, has considered how organisations learn. The response 
from bodies will be guided, in part, by the approach to their role adopted by 
their ombudsman. To understand this, the metatheory of institutional logics is 
used to help explain how organisations develop a shared understanding of 
thought and behaviours.  
 
3.3 Institutional logics 
 
As discussed in the literature review, ombudsman attempt to undertake two 
distinct roles, both of which have an intrinsic logic: firstly, they investigate 
complaints, trying to identify what happened and what should have 
happened, using normative standards such as guidelines and policies 
(accountability logic), and, secondly, seek to contribute to the improvement of 
the system over which they hold jurisdiction (learning logic). Dodds and 
Kodate (2011) state that these twin approaches of an accountability logic and 
a learning logic, are forms of institutional logics which have been defined as a 
‘set of material practices and symbolic constructions’ (Friedland and Alford 
1991, p.248) and which are used by organisations to ‘guide behaviour’ 




The underpinning premise of institutional logics is that ‘the interests, 
identities, values and assumptions of individuals and organisations are 
embedded in dominant institutional logics’ (Thornton et al. 2011, p.6). 
Institutional logics create a belief system which shapes the thinking and 
behaviours of individuals within the institution. Institutional logics can be 
important as they can ‘help tease out the ways in which institutions influence 
actors’ room for manoeuvre’ (Dodds and Kodate 2011, p.329) and shape 
their reasoning (Thornton et al. 2013). Institutional logics act as a framework 
to influence the decisions and behaviours of organisations and organisational 
actors. 
 
The metatheory of institutional logics has four underpinning principles: firstly, 
the duality of agency and structure where structures and individual agency 
both constrain and enable each other; secondly, institutions are both material 
and symbolic, where material represent structures and practices while the 
symbolic refers to organisational ideals and meaning and both the material 
and symbolic are interrelated in a form of dialectical relationship and, 
therefore, are not necessarily stable; thirdly, institutions are historically 
contingent where the historical environment and situation in which an 
organisation faces itself will impact upon the institutional logic that is 
dominant; and, fourthly, institutions are amenable to multiple levels of 
analysis where individual actors are nested within higher levels of 
organisations such as individual, team, organisation, field and societal levels 
all of which are likely to impact upon the actions and behaviours of 
individuals.  
 
As indicated above there are more than one institutional logic and each 
institutional logic demonstrates ‘unique organizing principles, practices and 
symbols that influence individual and organizational behaviour’ (Thornton et 
al. 2013, p.2). Within institutions there may be different institutional logics that 
co-exist and compete for dominance (Dodds and Kodate 2011, p.329, 
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Thornton et al. 2013). The dominant institutional logic will guide how 
individuals respond to a given situation as the individual will be embedded 
within a broader cultural structure that will both enable and constrain the 
individual’s agency (Thornton et al. 2011). Differing institutions will hold 
different institutional logics and these, will in turn, result in different practices. 
The practices of organisations which interact may result in both sets of 
practices being affected.  
 
While differing organisations may hold differing internal institutional logics, 
there tends to be consistency in institutional logics among organisations 
operating in the same area and where this occurs this is known as an 
institutional field. An institutional field has ‘collectively agreed upon rules, 
norms and practices to which their members adhere’ (Purdy and Gray 2009, 
p.357). One such institutional field is that of healthcare which was long 
dominated by a professional institutional logic but which, since the 
introduction of new public management in the 1980s, has seen the 
introduction of managerialist and market-oriented logics. As this indicates 
institutions may borrow logics from other areas to create new logics (Purdy 
and Gray 2009). The development of new logics requires the introduction of a 
new logic, competition between this new logic and the existing logic for 
dominance, and once dominant for the new logic to be structurated into 
behaviours and actions (Purdy and Gray 2009, p.357).  
 
The relationship between individuals and institutional logics, especially where 
there are competing institutional logics, provides both opportunities and 
constraints. Intrinsic to institutional logics is the idea of agency, which is the 
ability of individuals to have some effect on the environment and world that 
they inhabit, whether through altering rules, changing relationships or 
distribution of resources (Thornton et al. 2011, pp.6-7). Opportunities arise 
when internal institutional contradictions create space for individual agency 
and can result in institutional change. However, as institutional logics shape 
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the preferences, interests and behaviours of actors, these will act as a 
constraint on actors to support the existing institutional logic – here the 
dominant institutional logic will establish an underpinning schema for action 
(Thornton et al. 2011). How institutional logics shape the actions of actors as 
referred to as ‘embedded agency’ – here actors are embedded within an 
institutional logic which constrain their choices and actions (Thornton et al. 
2011).  
 
The ability of individuals to exercise agency allows for the pursuit of self-
interest and the concomitant fulfilment of personal desires but these are also 
mediated not only by the dominant institutional logic but also by the social 
identity adopted by the individual. Social identities are derived from a 
person’s sense of attachment with other categories of persons. Therefore, 
people have multiple social identities. For example, people can identify with a 
range of social identities which could include their work team, employing 
organisation, profession, political party, religion, or ethnic group among 
others. Individuals will hold some social identities more strongly than others.  
 
Which social identity informs the individual’s agency will depend upon the 
situation and this combination of interests and identity is referred to as 
‘individual intentionality’ (Thornton et al. 2011). Not all goals may be 
congruent with a person’s identity – the threat of a penalty may lead 
individuals to take actions that are not consistent with an individual’s desired 
goals. Most individuals seek approval and try to avoid negative 
consequences. In this way normative processes may act as a substitute for 
social identity. Taking this together we see that individuals are both 
embedded within an institutional logic and exercise individual intentionality 
which are likely to be congruent with personal identities and interests 




Organisations and individuals may assume multiple roles and identities which 
may result in a conflict which impacts upon their actions and behaviours 
(Thornton et al. 2011). At an organisational level this conflict may result in 
differing parts of the organisation adopting different practices, described by 
Meyer and Rowan (1977) as ‘loose coupling’. Loose coupling enables 
organisations to conform with environmental pressures for change while, at 
the same time, protect the core operations of the organisation – people or 
organisations may thus decouple who they are from how they act (Thornton 
et al. 2011, p. 58). Thornton et al. (2011) claim that the literature identifies 
two types of loose coupling: defensive loose coupling which occurs when 
organisations attempt to maintain their internal consistency, and strategic 
loose coupling where organisations use loose coupling to create an 
impression of change to external actors in the expectation of receiving certain 
benefits.  
 
Some organisations will be under the jurisdiction of multiple institutions, and 
each of these latter institutions may set normative standards with which the 
organisations in jurisdiction must comply. For example, in health there may 
be health ombudsman, professional regulators, healthcare quality 
commissions, the courts and governmental departments, all of which are able 
to influence how health professionals and organisations conduct their work. If 
a body is under the jurisdiction of multiple organisations then there may be 
competition between these organisations for influence and the bodies in 
jurisdiction may select which overseeing body has most influence (Heimer 
1999). Those bodies which are able to influence and work through internal 
organisational practices have the most influence (Heimer 1999, p.18). In 
other cases, organisations may adopt changes for ‘symbolic’ purposes, that 
is, without making substantive operational changes, rather than for 
‘instrumental’ purposes, that is, using recommendations to make substantive 
operational changes, and organisations achieve this through decoupling, 
although if the decoupling becomes too pronounced it could result in 
organisational confusion (Heimer 1999, p.22). Making symbolic changes may 
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be the result of organisations seeking to maintain legitimacy in the eyes of 
the overseeing body (Heimer 1999). 
 
One other risk is that if a body adopts changes recommended by an 
overseeing organisation then these changes may create internal problems for 
these initial bodies – how will they conform with existing institutional logics 
and organisational policies and practices? Will they alienate staff or other 
stakeholders? Ultimately, what is decided depends upon who is involved in 
the decision-making, which problem facing the organisation is held to be the 
most urgent to resolve, what solutions are being advocated and by whom, 
and do participants in the decision-making processes have other competing 
issues with which to contend. As a result, some decisions may be selected 
for opportunistic reasons rather than because they are the best fit to the 
problem (Heimer 1999, p.23).  
 
Effective regulators are those which strike a careful balance between logics 
(Ayres and Braithwaite 1992). However, the institutional logics adopted by 
regulators and ombudsman are likely to be strongly influenced, in turn, by the 
expectations of the ombudsman’s key stakeholders. Health ombudsman 
have to accommodate the expectations of the public, clinical and non-clinical 
staff within health organisations and, finally, governments and other 
regulatory and accountability bodies (Carney et al. 2017, pp. 70-71). 
 
Purdy and Gray (2009) researched the development of a new institutional 
field, that of alternative dispute resolution within the United States of 
America. The scholars claim that the development of alternative dispute 
resolution was driven by two competing logics: firstly, a judicial logic, which 
saw alternative dispute resolution as a means of improving the USA’s justice 
system, and secondly, a social change logic, as a means of improving 
decisions and of empowering participants in disputes. The judicial logic is 
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characterised by language such as rights, disputes and justice leading to 
better, quicker, cheaper for the user, services, while the social change logic 
is characterised by the ideas of harmony and satisfaction of needs leading to 
better services and reduced litigation (Purdy and Gray 2009).  
 
Purdy and Gray (2009) do describe a third model, that of a model that tried to 
combine both the judicial and social change logics but they noted the 
fundamental differences in the logics and that research indicates that where 
organisations have differing logics, one will eventually dominate. Alternative 
dispute resolution offices utilised different approaches to dispute resolution 
dependent upon which of the logics was dominant (Purdy and Gray 2009). 
Not only does this research demonstrate that institutional logics strongly 
influence the actions and behaviours of organisations and staff, it also 
indicates that the dominant logic within an alternative dispute resolution office 
will determine how the office conducts its dispute resolution processes. That 
is, either with a focus on accountability, the judicial logic, or learning and 
improvement, the social change logic. This is of importance to the 
ombudsman institution which is a form of alternative dispute resolution. 
 
3.3.1 Institutional logics and healthcare 
 
In a review of research into institutional logics that have been ascribed to 
healthcare, Dodds and Kodate (2011) advance an argument that three 
differing institutional logics can be identified within policy approaches towards 
patient safety. The authors state that the first, and traditional logic, is that of 
professional judgment as evidenced by the historically dominant self-
regulatory approach to medical regulation. However, due to failings in this 
approach, as evidenced by numerous health scandals, two new logics 
emerged relating to patient safety, firstly, a logic of accountability and, 
secondly, a logic of learning.  
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As the names suggest, the accountability logic focuses on allocating 
responsibility and is seen in the new regulatory framework which includes 
revalidation and increased oversight of clinical competency though 
mechanisms such as health ombudsman or the Practitioner Performance 
Advice service in England. It is predicated upon the idea that clinicians are 
accountable for their actions and should be able to justify their actions by 
comparing their practise with that of their peers. It is, thus, focused upon the 
individual and notions of responsibility and accountability.  
 
Meanwhile the learning logic places an emphasis on organisational learning 
and places importance on learning from patient safety incidents. In this logic 
health care organisations and professionals should use patient safety 
incidents as opportunities from which they can learn. Intrinsic to this 
approach is the reduction of a ‘blame culture’ which is seen to be a 
disincentive to openness from clinicians – clinicians are concerned that 
admitting errors could affect their careers and/or reputations. It is predicated 
on the basis that, if health professionals routinely reported adverse incidents 
and they were properly investigated, then learning from these adverse events 
could be obtained and which could be used to improve health care. For 
Dodds and Kodate (2011), such a logic supports the idea of clinical 
‘perfectability’. This approach is much more focused upon the system and 
often adopts a ‘no blame’ culture to encourage openness and learning 
(Dodds and Kodate 2011, Allsop and Saks 2002, p.85).  
 
Dodds and Kodate (2011) assert that learning and accountability logics are in 
conflict: the emphasis on blame reduction inherent in the learning logic is 
seen to be in conflict with the apportioning of responsibility inherent in the 
accountability logic. ‘The new focus on creating a “blame-free” culture directly 
goes against the notions that individual clinicians should be accountable for 
their mistakes’ (Dodds and Kodate 2011, p.335). In a further complication, 
Dodds and Kodate (2011) note that much information collected through 
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approaches to support the learning logic are then used to support the 
accountability logic. For example, data collected on patient falls to 
understand why they occur and how they can be prevented is used to pass 
judgment on the safety of the NHS (Dodds and Kodate 2011, p.341).  
 
Both Allsop and Saks (2002) and Dodds and Kodate (2011) state that there 
is a lack of agreement over which of the two logics should dominate in the 
patient safety arena, potentially leading to ‘a health care sector enjoying 
reduced legitimacy and organisational confusion’ (Dodds and Kodate 2011, 
p.342). Dodds and Kodate (2011, pp.342-343) conclude that, in the health 
service, ‘two differing logics are being promulgated as policy, and applied in 
practice, to the same organisational field simultaneously, with no escape for 
those who work in the service, and little official recognition of the conflicts 
between these alternative policies’. Dodds and Kodate (2011, p.341) 
consider whether this is ‘more a matter of emphasis than a significant cause 
for concern’ before concluding that when it comes to patient safety such a 
conflict is harmful to patients.  
 
Dodds and Kodate’s (2011) suggestion that the two dominant logics in the 
sphere of patient safety are the accountability and learning logics are in 
conflict may have implications for health ombudsman as they will also be 
faced with this conflict as they attempt to reconcile their dual roles of 
adjudicating on individual complaints, which will involve the accountability 
logic, and contributing to the improvement of the system, which implies a 
learning logic. It is suggested that the dominant logic within the ombudsman 
is likely to affect the nature of the relationship between ombudsman and body 







While ombudsman reports and recommendations are intended to act as 
triggers for organisational learning, their ability to do so depends upon three 
constructs: accountability, feedback and learning. There needs to be an 
acknowledged accountability relationship between ombudsman and body. 
The body also has to accept that the reports and recommendations produced 
by their ombudsman are a form of feedback which should act as triggers for 
learning. Finally, the mode of organisational learning that results from this 
feedback can be either informational learning, where the organisation tries to 
resolve the immediate problem though incremental change, or interactional 
learning, where the organisation undertakes a deeper reflection of the issue 
looking for underlying causes and which may necessitate changing to 
prevent recurrence. Organisational learning is a multi-faceted, complex 
process that needs to be actively managed by organisations for it to be 
successful. 
 
There was also consideration of the metatheory of institutional logics. 
Institutional logics shape how organisations and individuals behave and act. 
It was noted that, within organisations, there are likely to be multiple 
institutional logics present, although one will become dominant. Within 
healthcare and alternative dispute resolution there are two dominant logics 
that exist, those of accountability and of learning. Which logic dominates will 
determine how organisations and individuals make decisions and how they 
respond to problems. In situations, such as exist between health ombudsman 
and health organisations, the logic of the ombudsman will strongly influence 










This chapter presents the methodology used to research the approaches 
adopted by health ombudsman in their contribution to system improvement 
and how bodies in jurisdiction respond to these approaches. When 
undertaking such research, researchers must decide, from the outset, on 
their methodological approach which will inform the nature of their work and 
their view of the world (Pansiri 2008, p.84). This chapter, therefore, starts by 
considering the research aims, objectives and questions that drove the 
research process. It continues with a general discussion on research 
philosophies before explaining and justifying the philosophical and personal 
stances that have been adopted. The chapter then details and justifies the 
methodology that has been used in this research before providing details on 
the approaches used in case selection, data selection and data analysis and 
concludes with the consideration on the methods utilised to ensure the 
quality of the research. 
 
4.2 Research aims, objectives and questions 
 
Savin-Baden and Howell Major (2013, p.87) state that ‘Choosing “who” or 
“what” to study is one of the most important decisions that researchers will 
make …’ as to answer this question determines the research question and 
subsequent research approach. They call this the ‘phenomenon of study’ 
(Savin-Baden and Howell Major 2013, p.87). Patton (2002, p.229) states, 
‘The key issue in selecting and making decisions about the appropriate 
[phenomenon] is to decide what it is you want to be able to say something 
about at the end of the study’. In this research the phenomenon of study is 
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the means by which health ombudsman attempt to bring about improvements 
in the health system and how bodies in jurisdiction respond.  
 
The overall aim of the research is to explore the approaches used by health 
ombudsman that are intended to contribute to the improvement of the 
healthcare system and to understand how these approaches are received 
and acted upon by that system. The health ombudsman’s role as system 
improver includes any, and all, of their actions intended to improve the overall 
system.  
 
This overall aim was supported by more detailed research objectives: 
1) To describe the approaches used by health ombudsman to 
administrative justice. 
2) To describe the differing approaches utilised by health ombudsman 
with differing statutory functions, as they seek to secure system 
improvement. 
3) To describe the response of bodies in jurisdiction to the approaches 
utilised by health ombudsman. 
 
To meet these objectives, the following research questions were identified: 
1) What approaches do the OHOQ and the SPSO take to administrative        
justice? 
2) What approaches do the OHOQ and the SPSO, with their differing 
statutory functions, use as they seek to secure system improvement? 
3) How do those in the healthcare system receive and respond to these 
approaches? 
 
The underpinning hypothesis that this research examines is that health 
ombudsman make an important contribution to the improvement of the 
healthcare system as a result of the roles and activities that they undertake 
together with the way that they work with bodies in jurisdiction. 
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4.3 Developing a philosophical stance 
 
When undertaking research, a researcher’s ontological and epistemological 
approach influences their key decisions in both designing and conducting the 
research and analysing the outcomes. Thus: 
Two scholars who hold different beliefs on ontology and 
epistemology may be interested in examining the same 
phenomenon, but their beliefs will lead them to set up their 
studies differently because of their different views of evidence, 
analysis, and the purpose of research (Potter 1996, pp.35-36). 
 
This next section provides a review of ontology, epistemology and the more 
common research paradigms before explaining why this research adopts a 
philosophical stance based on critical realism.  
  
Ontology considers questions concerning the nature of reality (Flew, 1984). 
Gray (2009 pp.17-18) suggests that the concept of ontology dates back to 6th 
century B.C.E. Greece where two competing models on the nature of reality 
developed: one of ‘becoming’ and one of ‘being’. Gray (2009, p.17) argues 
that the development of Western philosophy has been based upon the model 
of ‘being’ which suggests that there is a ‘permanent and unchanging reality’. 
According to this model, ‘clearly formed entities with identifiable properties’ 
exist and ‘can become represented by symbols, words and concepts’ as they 
are stable (Gray 2009 p.17). In contrast, the ‘becoming’ model emphasises 
the changeable nature of the world where meaning is ‘imposed on an object’ 
by an individual. The individual therefore creates meaning but does so from a 
‘collective unconsciousness’ such as ‘dreams … [or] … religious beliefs’ 
(Gray 2009 p.18). 
 
Meanwhile, Savin-Baden and Howell Major (2013 p.57) describe an 
ontological continuum between two extremes of realism and idealism upon 
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which qualitative researchers place themselves. Realists contend that there 
is an ‘objective external and knowable reality that exists independent of 
individual means of apprehending it’ (Savin-Baden and Howell Major 2013, 
p.57).  This view argues that reality is a matter of the physical universe, and 
separate from human experience and perception (MacKay 1997). The 
implication of this view is that both physical and social realities must exist. 
Meanwhile, idealism ‘is the view that suggests reality is subjective and is 
constructed by individuals and groups’ (Savin-Baden and Howell Major 2013, 
p.57). This perspective implies that reality is the product of thinking and the 
meaning that individuals ascribe to their lives (Schuh and Barab 2008). 
 
Epistemology is concerned with knowledge, where knowledge is the 
information obtained by humans and held to be true and considers questions 
such as: what is knowledge and how is it gained? And, does knowledge 
represent reality (Savin-Baden and Howell Major 2013, p.58)? A researcher’s 
epistemological position will affect how the researcher understands and 
interprets the matter being researched. Gray (2009 p.17) argues that there 
are three epistemological positions: firstly, an objectivist position which 
believes that there is a reality which exists independently of our own 
awareness. This position is linked to an ontology of ‘being’ in which meaning 
is discovered, secondly, a constructivist approach which believes that truth is 
not independent of our awareness but is created by our interactions with the 
outside world. While this approach is also associated with an ontology of 
‘being’, this constructivist position views meaning as being constructed, and, 
thirdly, a subjectivist position which assumes an individual imbues an object 
with meaning and has close associations to a ‘becoming’ ontology. 
 
4.4 Research paradigms 
 
A researcher’s ontological and epistemological beliefs will inform their 
research paradigm which has been defined as: 
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… world views that signal distinctive ontological (view of reality). 
epistemological (view of knowing and relationship between 
knower and to-be known), methodological (view of mode of 
inquiry) and axiological (view of what is valuable) position 
(Sandelowski 2000 p.247). 
  
Researchers, generally, approach their work from different perspectives 
because of their personal ontological and epistemological beliefs and the 
subsequent adoption of a research paradigm consistent with these beliefs. 
However, this is not absolute and some researchers change their research 
paradigm when undertaking different research investigations. This suggests 
that, rather than there being a deterministic approach whereby ontology 
determines epistemology which together create a fixed research paradigm 
and, in turn, determines the research methodology, research design and, 
lastly, the research instruments used (see, for example, Sarantakos, 2005, 
p.29), some researchers adopt different philosophical stances at different 
times, potentially indicating a willingness to adopt different views of 
themselves and the world that they inhabit. For example, Savin-Baden 
explains how she may use different philosophical stances according to the 
planned research (Savin-Baden and Howell Major 2013, p.29). In addition, 
Savin-Baden and Howell Major (2013, p.65), describe how ‘situationalist’ 
researchers ‘believe that different philosophies should be applied to different 
situations and contexts’ although they will ensure that the chosen 
philosophical stance guides the remainder of the investigative process. One 
can conclude that for some researchers their chosen research paradigm is 
not fixed but informed by the question ‘What to study?’ as discussed above.  
 
Pansiri (2008, p.84) describes two broad social science paradigms: positivist 
and interpretive and that ‘many authors have identified a number of different 
paradigms which largely depend upon this positivist/interpretive dichotomy’. 
Within this broad dichotomous split, Savin-Baden and Howell Major (2013, 
p.3) similarly claim that researchers are ‘faced with an overwhelming number 
of [paradigms]’. Lincoln and Guba (2005) identify four principal paradigms: 
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positivism and post-positivism, both of which are associated with a 
quantitative methodology, and critical theory and constructivism, which are 
associated with a qualitative methodology. Walliman (2006, p. 20), however, 
describes a fifth philosophical stance, that of critical realism. These five 
stances are briefly discussed below following which the explanation for 
adopting a critical realist approach to underpin this thesis is provided. 
 
A positivist philosophy has been traditionally associated with the natural 
sciences and holds that there is an external reality independent of human 
thought and that knowledge is something that is discovered through scientific 
enquiry. Researchers are interested in establishing facts and integral to a 
positivist approach are the principles of objectivity, rationality and neutrality 
(Savin-Baden and Howell Major 2013, p.19). A positivist approach is 
intended to establish causal relationships (Walliman 2006, p.15) and ideas 
can only become knowledge if able to be tested empirically (Gray 2009, 
p.19). 
 
Positivism and its application to the social sciences has come in for 
significant criticism. Sarantakos (2005, pp.33-36) provides a summary of the 
critique of positivism which includes disagreement that reality is objective but 
is subject to interpretation, hypotheses developed before the conduct of the 
research bias the subsequent conduct of the research, an over-importance 
on measurement, and, a misplaced belief that positivist research is objective 
which ignores the fact that the personal stance of the researcher influences 
the research. 
 
Post-positivism developed as a response to the criticisms of positivism yet 
retained some of positivism’s central tenets such as the existence of an 
external reality which may be discovered through logical investigative 
techniques and a belief in objectivity. However, in contrast to positivism, post-
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positivists believe that this external reality can only be imperfectly known. 
Thus, post-positivists believe that no human viewpoint can be fully correct 
but, instead, should be tested. Knowledge can never really be fully 
established but only refuted (Savin-Baden and Howell Major 2013, pp.19-21). 
 
The third philosophical approach, that of constructivism, holds that ‘there is in 
practice neither objective reality nor objective truth’ but that ‘reality is 
constructed’ (Sarantakos 2005, p.37). That is not to suggest that the world is 
not real but that it has no meaning before an individual interacts with that 
world (Sarantakos 2005, p.37) or as Walliman (2006, p.20) puts it ‘we can 
only experience it personally through our perceptions which are influenced by 
our preconceptions and beliefs’. Therefore, reality is being perpetually 
constructed and reconstructed based upon a person’s interpretations of the 
world in which it interacts and therefore leads to multiple views of reality.  
 
Critical theory offers a different perspective to those discussed above. Critical 
theorists challenge extant values, assumptions and social structures (Gray 
2009, p.25) with the intention that the outcome of the research process 
should be a guide for action. Savin-Baden and Howell Major (2013, p.23) 
suggest that it is held by researchers interested in social justice and change. 
Marx is associated with this paradigm hence the view that describing the 
world is not enough, the intention must be to change it.  
 
While critical theory is a philosophy that offers a different perspective to those 
of positivism and constructivism, critical realism is seen as a ‘reconciliatory 
approach’ between positivism and constructivism (Walliman 2006, p.20), 
although Savin-Baden and Howell Major suggest that it is, in fact, a 
development of post-positivism (2013, p.21). Critical realists, while 
recognising an external world in common with positivists, do not accept that it 
can be understood solely through observation but that there must also be the 
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process of interpretation, an approach in common with constructivists. Critical 
realists do not argue that the concepts which they construct need a direct link 
with observable phenomena, but that ‘concepts and theories about social 
events are developed on the basis of their observable effects and interpreted 
in such a way that they can be understood and acted upon’ (Walliman 2006, 
p.20). Critical realists differ from constructivists in that they believe that pre-
existing social structures exist which create social action and understanding 
while constructivists would argue that there is no general social structure 
separate from the experienced event (Walliman 2006, p.22).  
 
Critical realists view reality as ‘a stratified, open system of emergent entities’’ 
[authors’ emphasis] (O’Mahoney and Vincent 2014, p.6). This statement can 
be broken down to three constituent parts. ‘Open’ which means that that the 
events under study cannot be separated from their context. ‘Entities’ are 
things ‘which ‘make a difference’ in their own right, rather than as mere sums 
of their parts’, can be either physical or conceptual, and are made up of 
different layers (or strata) to create an organised hierarchy (O’Mahoney and 
Vincent 2014, p.6). Thus, to comprehend fully one part of the system one 
must place it, and understand it, within its context. An example given by 
O’Mahoney and Vincent is that one could not fully understand the function of 
a heart without placing it within its context of both the circulatory system and 
the whole body (2014, p.7). Emergence occurs when an entity has properties 
which are more than the sum of its parts.  So, another example from 
O’Mahoney and Vincent, would be that the entity water has physical 
properties that are different from equivalent amounts of hydrogen and oxygen 
(2014, p.7). The third element of the definition is that of ‘stratification’. Critical 
realists may observe a phenomenon, and from these observations a set of 
‘rules’ or repeated actions may appear to emerge. Critical realists would not 
accept these observations as being the totality of the phenomenon but would 
seek to look beyond the events observed to understand what is happening at 
different layers of the system and the interaction(s) which brought about that 
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repeated behaviour. This focus on the different layers of the system is 
referred to as a ‘depth ontology’ (O’Mahoney and Vincent 2014, pp.9-11). 
 
Its relevance to empirical research is that critical realists are ‘interested in 
looking for and establishing as correct particular causal relationships and for 
understanding the necessary connections between [them]’ (O’Mahoney and 
Vincent 2014, p.13). Thus, a critical realist researcher ‘seeks to provide a 
theoretical explanation for the social world’ accepting ‘that some views of the 
world are more accurate than others’ (O’Mahoney and Vincent 2014, p.13). 
 
For the author a critical realist approach is held to be appropriate because of 
his belief that there is an external observable reality independent of the 
observer yet the reality that is drawn from the observation(s) of it is 




Sarantakos (2005, p.13-14) discusses the potential of researchers to 
deliberately manipulate research for political ends and cites three potential 
sources: the researcher; the consumer of research; and what he refers to as 
the ‘controller of knowledge’, a term which covers those individuals or groups 
who have the power to control the production or distribution of knowledge, for 
example, research committees, interest groups, or publishers. Beyond this 
risk of deliberate manipulation of research, sub-conscious bias on the part of 
the researcher could affect the results as a result of their personal stance. 
 
The researcher’s personal stance towards their work is derived from their 
core beliefs and values (Savin-Baden and Howell Major 2013, p.68). These 
beliefs will impact the entire research process including its design, the 
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analysis of the data collection and the writing of the final report. It is 
important, therefore that researchers understand how their personal stance 
may impact their research.  
 
This is particularly the case in my own situation. I have long previous 
experience as a general medical practitioner, and in director roles in both a 
range of health organisations and at the Parliamentary and Health Service 
Ombudsman. In all these roles I have had active involvement in the 
resolution of complaints and the intended use of complaints to improve 
services. I have developed a positionality statement which clarifies my 
position in relation to this research and which is attached as Appendix 1.  
 
Despite being aware of my declared position I have to recognise the 
impossibility ‘of disentangling the positionality of the researcher from his/her 
methods and values’ and that ‘researchers are part of their research’ which 
are both risks to bias (Clough and Nutbrown 2012, p.63). According to Gray 
(2009, p.183) researchers need to develop ‘theoretical sensitivity’ which is 
the ability to understand the research process and its outputs while being 
able to appreciate the difference between the important and unimportant. An 
example Gray cites is being sensitive to the risk of bias. Gray states that 
researchers should, therefore, adopt a reflexive approach, which involves 
reflecting upon, and being sensitive to, the many ways that bias may 




Reflexivity is ‘the process of a continual internal dialogue and critical self-
evaluation of positionality as well as active acknowledgement and explicit 
recognition that this position may affect the research process and outcome’ 
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(Berger 2015 p.220) and is recognised as a ‘major strategy for quality control 
in qualitative research’ (Berger 2015 p.219).  
 
Reflexivity is based upon the premise that ‘the researcher is not a neutral 
observer’ and ‘the researcher … is someone whose observations are by their 
very nature, selective, and whose interpretations of results are partial’ (Gray 
2009, p.498). This partiality is particularly the case when much of the data 
gathering is through interviewing (Ryan and Golden 2006). Gray (2009, 
p,498) recognises two forms of reflexivity: epistemological and personal. The 
former relates to the researcher’s beliefs about the source and nature of 
knowledge. The latter refers to a researcher’s personal beliefs and values. 
This reflection is bidirectional: the personal beliefs and values of the 
researcher impact the research process but the research process will, in turn, 
impact the researcher’s personal stance. The researcher’s position has 
already been recognised as an issue in this research. It may also affect the 
nature of the relationship between researcher and the willingness of 
participants to grant access and share their opinions and information. Finally, 
the researcher’s world view, originating in a health ombudsman, could affect 
how information is collected, analysed and the subsequent derived 
conclusions.  
 
The researcher undertook reflexivity during the research process to manage 
issues arising from my positionality. I utilised the following reflexive strategies 
based upon the work of Savin-Baden and Howell Major (2013, p. 80): 
 Developing a positionality statement. 
 Identifying the preconceptions that I hold about: health 
ombudsman; their role within administrative justice; the 
participants at both organisational and, where relevant, 
individual level. 
 Noting reflections that occur during the research and keeping 
them in a reflexive journal. 
 Being aware of, writing down and reflecting upon any worries, 
ideas or issues that arise during the research.  
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Attached as Appendix 2 is the research memoire for this research. This 




The research paradigm adopted by a researcher informs their methodology. 
For Silverman and Marvasti (2008 p.134), a methodology details how a 
researcher will undertake the investigation of the phenomenon of study. 
Clough and Nutbrown (2012, p.46) describe the essential task of a 
methodology as persuading ‘the reader of the unavoidably triangular 
connection between these research questions, these methods used to 
operationalise them and these data so generated’ [their emphasis]. Yin 
(2009, p.24) states that ‘Research design is the logic that links the data to be 
collected (and the conclusions to be drawn) to the initial questions of the 
study’. 
 
As detailed above, the research paradigm underpinning this research is that 
of critical realism. Ackroyd and Karlsson (2014, p.23) argue that only a 
limited number of research designs lend themselves to an approach based 
on a critical realist paradigm. Even within this limited number there are two 
that they consider the most appropriate and commonly used by critical 
realists – case studies and comparative case studies. Indeed, they argue that 
the case study could be held to be the basic design of critical realist research 
as a case study allows for the study of a mechanism or process in whole or in 
part within its specific context. Using abduction, a researcher may then be 
able to develop new theories about the causal mechanisms.  
 
This thesis adopts a qualitative case study approach as the research aims to 
explore the approaches used by health ombudsman to improve the 
healthcare system and how these approaches are received and acted upon 
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by the system. To undertake this means taking account of the complexity of 
the contextual situation of both health ombudsman and their respective 
health care system together with the many influences that impact upon both. 
A qualitative approach was chosen as an in-depth understanding and 
description of participants’ thoughts, attitudes, intentions and reactions was 
felt to be needed to deliver the thick description required to fully answer the 
research questions. The research questions focus on understanding, 
perceptions, actions and behaviours. To address them fully needs a focus on 
cognitive processes which are not easily gained through quantitative 
methods but are likely to be achieved through qualitative approaches such as 
interviews and the review of documents. 
 
Hancock and Algozzine (2011, p.15), state that ‘Doing case study research 
means conducting an empirical investigation of a contemporary phenomenon 
within its natural context using multiple sources of evidence’. For Stake 
(1995, p.xi), it ‘is the study of the particularity and complexity of a single case, 
coming to understand its activity within important considerations’ and ‘is 
expected to catch the complexity of a single case’. Merriam (1988 p.2) 
highlights the versatility of the case study approach arguing that the ‘case 
study [method] is a basic design that can accommodate a variety of 
disciplinary perspectives, as well as philosophical perspectives on the nature 
of research itself’. The case study is therefore a popular approach among 
qualitative researchers (Savin-Baden and Major 2013, p.151).  
 
Hancock and Algozzine (2011, pp.15-16), identify a number of important 
characteristics that are integral to a case study: a focus on a representative 
of a group or phenomenon; the research must take place within the group or 
representative’s natural context and is bounded by space and time; and, the 
output of the research is ‘thickly descriptive’. Meanwhile, Merriam (1988, 
pp11-13) identifies four different characteristics of the case study approach. 
Case studies are: particularistic, in that they focus upon a particular 
94 
 
phenomenon, descriptive, as case studies describe the phenomenon of study 
in detail, heuristic, as case studies enlighten the reader’s appreciation of the 
research subject possibly leading to new insights, and, inductive, as new 
generalisations or theories will emerge from the data. Savin-Baden and 
Howell Major (2013, p.154) identify five salient characteristics as the case: 
exhibits clear limits to what is being studied, describes the whole of the case 
as well as constitutional parts, is particularistic, outlines the context in which 
the phenomenon is situated to allow a true understanding, and is firmly 
based on the underlying data to convey the resulting meaning. 
 
Different authors have categorised case studies in different ways. Stake 
(1995, pp.3-4) suggests three categories: intrinsic (where the choice is 
guided by the researcher’s particular interest in that phenomenon), 
instrumental (where the choice is guided by a desire to develop a better 
understanding of a theoretical issue. The issue being researched is thus 
instrumental in developing a better understanding of the underlying 
theoretical proposition), and, collective (where the researcher undertakes 
several instrumental case studies to enable the researcher to reach broader 
conclusions and more generalizable theoretical propositions). 
 
In contrast, Yin (2009, p.6) identifies three different design categories: 
exploratory designs which seek to explore an issue with the aim of 
generating potential future research, explanatory designs which seek to show 
a cause and effect relationship between events and their outcomes, and, 
descriptive designs which aim to provide an accurate description of a 
phenomenon within its own environment. Merriam (1988, p.27-28) also 
details three design categories: descriptive designs, interpretive designs 
which are based upon description but are used to either develop new, or 
challenge existing categories, concepts and theories; and, evaluative designs 




A number of advantages and challenges have been identified with the case 
study approach. For example, Savin-Baden and Major (2013, pp. 162-163) 
outline the following advantages with a case study approach. The method is 
inherently flexible; allows for a depth of investigation and perspectives 
meaning a well-produced case study is thorough; a case study is able to 
respond to changes within the phenomenon or its context during the research 
period; and, researchers can write case studies in ways that appeal to their 
intended audiences. 
 
On the other hand, Yin (2009, pp.14-16) outlines the following ‘prejudices’ 
against case studies: there is a lack of rigour in case study methodology (but 
this is a challenge with all research), a case study provides little basis for 
wider generalisation but, here, Yin differentiates between ‘statistical 
generalisations’ for which a case study approach may be inappropriate and 
an ‘analytic generalisation’ where the goal is to ‘expand and generalise 
theories’. Flyvberg (2004, p.243) refutes the assertion that one cannot 
generalise from a single case stating that ‘it depends upon the case one is 
speaking of, and how it is chosen’ citing ‘Galileo’s rejection of the Aristotle’s 
law of gravity’ as an example. In a well-argued case study, the link between 
data analysis, conclusion and generalisation should be clear thus affording a 
view on the reasonableness of any generalisation claimed. Yin (2009, pp.14-
16) continuing his analysis of prejudices against case studies lists: case 
studies take too long, but this need not be the case; and, case studies do not 
meet the requirements of ‘true experiments’ such as randomised controlled 
trials. Finally, Merriam (1988, p. 32) raises a significant concern that due to 
the nature of the research, the case study may over- or under-play reality 
leading to inaccurate conclusions. 
 
This research will be a case study that is: exploratory, as it seeks to 
understand the beliefs, attitudes, actions and reactions of those involved in 
the use of health complaints as catalysts to improve the health system; 
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collective, as it investigates two cases; instrumental, as it aims to provide a 
better understanding of the role, functioning and effect of health ombudsman 
as system improver; and, holistic, as it analyses both the participant 
ombudsman’s approaches to system improvement and the response of 
bodies in jurisdiction to these approaches.  
 
4.7.1 Case Selection 
 
Once the decision has been made to undertake case study research the 
question of which cases to investigate becomes paramount. A common view 
is that the first criterion in the selection of a suitable case is that it should 
‘maximise what we can learn’ (Stake, 1995, p.4) and a similar view is 
articulated by Sarantakos (2005, p.213), and Merriam (1988, p.48). Stake 
(1995, p.4) provides further detail when he suggests identifying ‘cases 
[which] are likely to lead us to understandings, to assertions perhaps even to 
modifying of generalizations’. When identifying the cases to be selected 
Sarantakos (2005, p.213) suggests that ‘The minimum parameters to be 
considered … are whether the case or cases are suitable, accessible, 
researchable and methodologically adequate and whether the study is 
ethically permissible’. The cases should define ‘a relationship between parts 
of systems and wholes’ (Savin-Baden and Major 2013, p.152). 
 
Researchers conduct some form of sampling in order to identify appropriate 
cases. Merriam describes ‘two basic types of sampling: probability and non-
probability sampling’ and ‘non-probability sampling is the method of choice in 
qualitative case studies’ [her emphasis] (Merriam 1988, p.47) for, as Stake 
states, ‘Case study research is not sampling research’ (1995, p.4).  
 
The usual approach in non-probabilistic sampling is ‘purposive’ sampling 
which is where you select a case based on the intended purpose and 
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outcomes of the case study (Merriam 1988, p.48). Sarantakos (2005, p.213) 
suggests that in multi-case research the typical case is the first chosen, and 
that even with single case research typicality is often the determinant. 
However, Stake (1995, p.4) suggests that it may not necessarily be the 
typical case and that ‘many … caseworkers feel that good instrumental case 
study does not depend on being able to defend the typicality of [the case]’. 
Sarantakos (2005, p.213) does suggest that case selection may be guided by 
other factors such as theory, convenience, the interest of the researcher or 
accessibility.  
 
One form of purposive sampling is criterion-based sampling where the 
researcher identifies the criteria to be used to select cases and produces a 
‘recipe of the attributes essential to one selected [case] and proceeds to find 
or locate a [case] that matches the recipe’ (Goetz and LeCompte, 1984, 
p.77). It was the approach used in this research to identify the two 
ombudsman schemes. Three criteria were used to select the case health 
ombudsman for this research: 
1) The research questions include the comparison of health 
ombudsman with different jurisdictional responsibilities 
therefore the chosen cases must have differing jurisdictional 
responsibilities.  
2) There must be evidence that the health ombudsman consider 
that they have a system improvement role. 
3) The number of healthcare complaints each health ombudsman 
investigated. It was felt that there had to be a reasonable 
number of complaints investigated by ombudsman to collect 
meaningful data on all approaches utilised by ombudsman to 
effect change.  
 
To begin the case selection process, the researcher prepared a list of all 
ombudsman that consider complaints relating to the delivery of healthcare 
but had to exclude all non-English speaking ombudsman from the sample 
due to language barriers. Accordingly, the sample effectively included the 
British and English-speaking ombudsman in Australasia. It should be noted 
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that while there are a larger number of English-speaking ombudsman 
services they do not have healthcare complaints within their jurisdiction. The 
researcher then undertook desktop research which consisted of reviewing 
the websites of each of the remaining health ombudsman examining their 
Annual Reports, Strategic Plans, Business Plans and other corporate 
information. From this information, the following features were identified:  
 Each health ombudsman’s jurisdictional responsibilities 
 Each ombudsman’s statutory obligations and strategic 
objectives 
 The healthcare sectors over which the health ombudsman held 
jurisdiction 
 The number of healthcare complaints each ombudsman 
investigated. 
 
It was difficult identifying the number of health investigations undertaken by 
each of the health ombudsman as they each report the information in 
different ways, with some ombudsman talking of complaints considered but 
without detailing which of these underwent a full investigation. Other 
ombudsman speak of ‘decisions’ without it being clear whether an 
investigation had actually taken place. This lack of clarity is the consequence 
of health ombudsman having significant discretion as to how they conduct 
their work and reflects the different approaches adopted. 
 
Table 4, p.99, lists the ombudsman and the number of health complaints that 
each body received and investigated in 2014/15. From this list a revised pool 
of potential cases was identified and two bodies finally selected. These were 
the Scottish Public Services Ombudsman and the Office of the Health 
Ombudsman, Queensland. With regards the selection of the UK and Ireland 
based health ombudsman, Ireland was ruled out as it does not have the 
powers to investigate the clinical actions of clinicians. As this is where most 
system improvement work by health ombudsman is focused, the inability of 
the Irish Ombudsman to investigate these issues suggested its usefulness as 












Australia and New Zealand   
New South Wales Health Care Complaints 
Commission 
5266 194 
Norther Territory Health and Community Services 
Complaints Commission 
198 4 
South Australian Health and Community Services 
Complaints Commission 
1808 117 
Victoria Health Commission 3436 8425 
Western Australia Health and Disability Services 
Complaints Office 
24196 17547 
Queensland Health Ombudsman 
 
3109 358 
Tasmania Health Complaints Commission 320 4 
New Zealand Health and Disability Commission 
 
1880 100 
United Kingdom and Ireland   
Parliamentary and Health Service Ombudsman 6815 4280 
Scottish Public Services Ombudsman 1542 394 
Public Services Ombudsman of Wales 769 151 
Norther Ireland Public Services Ombudsman 337 748 
Ombudsman of Ireland 634 519 
Table 4 Health ombudsman and the number of investigations (2014/15) 
                                            
5 Described in the Annual Report as Formal Resolution. This may include other methods to 
resolve complaints such as conciliation. 
6 Includes complaints about disability services 
7 The Annual Report does not provide a breakdown on closure type – e.g. closed after 
enquiry, assessment or formal resolution including conciliation, investigation or negotiated 
settlement. It does not break closure by complaint type e.g. health or disability service 
8 In Northern Ireland the bodies are combined health and social care providers. It is 
impossible, from the data contained within the Annual Report, to separate which proportion 
of the complaints’ figures relate to healthcare and which relates to social care. 
9 The Irish Ombudsman is unable to investigate complaints about clinical decisions. 
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director at the Parliamentary and Health Service Ombudsman. Conducting 
this research while holding that position would have increased the issues 
surrounding my insider status, and is likely to have had some effect upon 
participants from within both the Parliamentary and Health Service 
Ombudsman and participating health organisations, potentially affecting the 
accuracy and openness of responses from participants. Because of previous 
links with the SPSO between both Queen Margaret University and also from 
the researcher, the SPSO was approached and agreed to participate. 
 
In respect to the Australia and New Zealand Health Ombudsman offices, the 
New South Wales Health Care Complaints Commission, the OHOQ and the 
New Zealand Health and Disability Commission all have powers to prosecute 
healthcare professionals, thus making them co-regulators within their 
healthcare system. The remaining HCEs do not have such powers. As one of 
the criteria was to select health ombudsman with differing statutory 
responsibilities, the significant differences in powers and responsibilities held 
by the New South Wales Health Care Complaints Commission, the OHOQ 
and the New Zealand Health and Disability Commission identified these three 
health ombudsman as of particular interest. The researcher felt that the 
smaller number of investigations undertaken by the New Zealand Health and 
Disability Commission made it less than ideal for inclusion. As a result, the 
researcher approached both the New South Wales Health Care Complaints 
Commission and the OHOQ asking if they were willing to participate. The 
New South Wales Health Care Complaints Commission failed to respond to 
the request while the OHOQ responded positively to the request. Thus, the 
OHOQ was included as a case. 
 
Both ombudsman selected appeared to consider a similar number of 
complaints each year and both were variegated ombuds offices, that is, they 
both have the core ombudsman duty of investigating individual complaints 
but, in addition, they have additional statutory responsibilities. The Scottish 
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Public Services Ombudsman is responsible for the Complaints Standards 
Authority which undertakes standard setting and auditing of the handling of 
complaints by bodies in jurisdiction. The OHOQ has regulatory 
responsibilities as it is responsible for prosecuting serious complaints 
concerning registered individual health professionals.  
 
While both the OHOQ and the SPSO share some common features, as 
above, which provides a basis for comparison, they also exhibit significant 
differences. Unlike the SPSO, the OHOQ has the responsibility to prosecute 
health professionals it suspects has committed serious professional 
misconduct. The OHOQ is also able to attempt to resolve complaints using 
methods such as conciliation or mediation rather than solely relying upon 
investigation which is the case with the SPSO. The OHOQ, unlike the SPSO, 
is empowered to undertake systemic investigations or inquiries on its own 
volition. These differences are of interest to this research as they may 
significantly affect the results to the research questions: What approaches do 
the OHOQ and the SPSO, with their differing statutory functions, use as they 
seek to secure system improvement? And, how do those in the healthcare 
system receive and respond to these approaches? 
 
Further details on both schemes are provided at the end of this chapter, 
where contextualising information about the SPSO and the OHOQ offices is 
presented along with details about their respective healthcare and healthcare 
regulatory systems in the relevant chapters. 
 
4.7.2 Sampling Bodies in Jurisdiction  
 
Tables 5 and 6 provide data on complaints received by the respective 
ombudsman about health bodies in their jurisdiction.  This research aims to 
establish how bodies in jurisdiction respond to the approaches used by 
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health ombudsman to affect change in the system. Opportunistic sampling 
was used to identify bodies to investigate. The researcher looked at health 
bodies in the jurisdictions of the both the Scottish Public Services 
Ombudsman and the Queensland Office of the Health Ombudsman 
respectively, to identify potentially bodies to invite to participate. Although the 
approach to sampling was generally opportunistic in nature, the researcher 
ignored the five Scottish health boards and four Queensland HHS with the 
lowest number of complaints on the basis that the health board may have 
such limited exposure to their Ombudsman as to make it difficult for 
participants to answer questions fully and knowledgeably. 
 
Several health boards in Scotland were asked to participate and three health 
boards in Scotland agreed to do so. They have each been used in this 
research. For Queensland the situation was different as the researcher was 
unable to secure agreement from any HHS to participate. The researcher 
undertook a number of steps to try and secure agreement from HHS to 
participate. The steps included: obtaining ethical approval for the study which 
was granted in June 2018. While the ethical approval process was 
undertaken, the researcher made direct contact with HHS via email, including 
in the email documents which included a brief summary of the proposed 
research, the actual research protocol submitted for ethical approval and 
copies of the patient information sheet and the consent form. This approach 
was adopted to provide potential participating organisations with full 
information. The researcher also, during a trip to Queensland, visited one 
HHS to discuss the proposal with a Director of the HHS. In other HHS’s there 
were telephone conversations and email communication. Unfortunately, no 
HHS ultimately agreed to participate.  
 
It is known that it can be difficult to obtain participants in research. Even in 
obtaining the agreement from Scottish health boards to participate, where the 
researcher had previously been a director in a Scottish health board, some 
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health boards chose not participate. It becomes even more difficult to secure 
participation from organisations which are literally half way around the world 
and where there is no link or history and the difficulties in communication are 
challenging. For many busy organisations, the research is one more 
unnecessary activity and this results in reluctance to participate. 
 
In the absence of any HHS agreeing to participate, the researcher undertook 
desk research on all 15 HHS looking for information relating to complaints, 
the OHOQ, and the use by HHS of complaints to improve the healthcare 
system. The researcher found very limited information on all three of these 
areas of interest and not enough to make any meaningful contribution to the 
research. 
 
This inability to obtain meaningful data from HHS in Queensland had a 
significant impact upon the research. Initially, the proposal was to compare 
the approaches used by both health ombudsman and the responses of 
bodies in their jurisdiction. It would have been interesting to see how the 
differing roles and responsibilities of the two health ombudsman participating 
in the research affected the perception of staff from bodies in jurisdiction on 
their respective approaches to working with the body in jurisdiction and 
contributions to system improvement. Instead, the research became two 
interconnected comparisons: firstly, between two health ombudsman with 
differing roles and responsibilities on their approaches to working with bodies 
in  jurisdiction and their contribution to improvement of the healthcare 
system; and, secondly, a case study involving the SPSIO and health boards 
that focused on the awareness by health boards on the activities of the 
SPSO, the relationship between the SPSO and health boards and the 
willingness of health boards to learn from the recommendations of upheld 




Scottish Public Services Ombudsman 
Health Board Number of 
Complaints 
Ayrshire and Arran NHS Board 74 
Borders NHS Board 14 
Dumfries and Galloway NHS Board 25 
Fife NHS Board 56 
Forth Valley NHS Board 59 
Grampian NHS Board 85 
Greater Glasgow and Clyde NHS Board 282 
Highland NHS Board 87 
Lanarkshire NHS Board 109 
Lothian NHS Board 179 
Orkney NHS Board 4 
Shetland NHS Board 4 
Tayside NHS Board 90 
Western Isles NHS Health Board 5 
Table 5 Number of complaints received by the SPSO relating to each individual 










          Office of the Health Ombudsman, Queensland 
Hospital and Health Service Number of Complaints 
Brisbane10 2885 
Central West 9 
Darling Downs 207 
Far North11 326 
Gold Coast 710 
Mackay 160 
North West 31 
Sunshine Coast 357 
Townsville 170 
West Moreton 61 
Wide Bay–Burnett 381 
South West 28 
Table 6 Number of complaints received by the OHOQ relating to each individual  
HHS (2016/17) (OHOQ 2017, p.146) 
 
4.7.3 Data collection methods 
 
Case study research can use a number of potential data collection methods. 
Merriam (1988, p.68) and Stake (1995, pp. 60-68) identify three such 
methods: observation, interviews and document reviews. With observation, 
the researcher observes the phenomenon of interest. Stake (1995, p.62) 
advises that during the research the researcher keep ‘a good record of 
events to provide a relatively incontestable description for further analysis 
and ultimate reporting’ [his emphasis]. A second approach is the use of 
interviews which aim to capture the ‘observation and interpretations of others’ 
(Stake 1995 p.62). Different individuals will observe and interpret the same 
                                            
10 The Brisbane category consists of Metro North, Metro South and Children’s Health 
Queensland Hospital Health Services. The Queensland Health Ombudsman in his Annual 
Report does not break Brisbane into its constituent Hospital and Health Services. 




event differently. Collecting these multiple interpretations is important in case 
studies. Stake’s third method is document review. There are a wide range of 
documents that may be available to a researcher ranging from formal 
publications produced by organisations to minute of meetings and press 
releases.  These documents may provide useful data that aid data collection 
and analysis. 
 
To these three methods, Yin (2009, pp.98-113) adds three more: archival 
records, participant-observation and artefacts. Participant-observation is 
where the researcher potentially plays a variety of roles including an active 
role in the phenomenon being researched. Participant-observation is often 
used in anthropological studies (Yin 2009, p.112). Yin’s final method is the 
study of artefacts including objects such as technological devices, tools, work 
of art or, other, similar physical evidence (Yin 2009, p.113).  
 
This research uses documents, interviews and a review of the selected 
bodies’ responses to significant ombudsman investigations as sources of 
data for analysis. This research does not involve direct observation because 
of the many practical problems associated with this method such as: time, 
cost, permission, and the intrusive nature of the approach which may in fact 
impact upon the events being observed. Most importantly, a researcher 
‘cannot observe feelings, thoughts and intentions’ (Patton 1980, p.196). As 
this research is interested in the approaches used by health ombudsman in 
relation to their system improvement role observation was not considered to 
be a suitable method. Further, the complex nature of the bodies being 
investigated means that it would have been fortuitous if the observer actually 
observed something of relevance. This research ruled out using participant-
observation as a result of the practical problems that the method entails and 




Initially, available website documentary evidence was collected and analysed 
prior to the fieldwork being undertaken. For the two ombudsman offices, this 
data was sourced from their respective websites. While documentary 
evidence contains large amounts of information that is free and easy to 
access, (Merriam 1988, p.108), the researcher needs to remember that ‘it 
was written for some specific purpose and some specific audience other than 
those of the case study being done’ (author’s emphasis) (Yin 2009, p.105). 
To minimise the risk of being misled by documentary evidence, Yin suggests 
that researchers identify the objective behind the production of documents to 
minimise the risk of documentary evidence misleading them.  
 
This research also used personal interviews to establish ‘what is in and on 
someone else’s mind’ (Merriam 1988, p.71). Yin states that ‘well-informed 
participants can provide important insights’ and ‘facts as well as opinions’ 
(Yin 2009, pp.107-108). Stake (1995, p.65) argues that the purpose of an 
interview is to obtain a ‘description of an episode, a linkage, [or] an 
explanation’ through a ‘guided conversation’ (Yin 2009, p. 106). Stake (1995, 
p.65) continues that in qualitative research the same questions are rarely 
asked of each participant as each participant will have their own stories to 
tell. Stake (1995, p.65) suggests that researchers prepare a list of ‘issue-
oriented questions’. Yin, similarly, talks of the interview being ‘fluid rather 
than rigid’ (2009, p.106) but also of the need for open questions (2009, p. 
107).  
 
Merriam (1988, pp.73-74) identifies three types of interview: structured 
interviews where the questions and the order they are asked are determined 
in advance of the interview and this routine is the same for all interviews; 
semi-structured interviews, where there is some information that is sought 
from all participants but the order and exact wording are not pre-determined 
thus allowing the researcher the freedom to adopt a more conversational 
approach; and unstructured interviews where there are no pre-determined 
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questions allowing a completely free-flowing conversation. For Merriam 
(1988), the use of unstructured interviews is useful when the researcher has 
insufficient knowledge of an issue to be able to set specific questions.  
 
This research used a semi-structured interview approach. This approach 
allowed for a more conversational interview to take place while ensuring that 
all the subjects that it aimed to cover were in fact covered.  
 
For two of the Scottish health boards which agreed to participate, the most 
recent five published upheld investigation reports were identified from the 
SPSO’s website at the time of the interviews. The third Scottish health board 
did not want to participate in this analysis. During the interviews with the 
participants from the health boards that had agreed to this part of the 
research, enquiries of the participants’ awareness of these reports and their 




Patton (2002) describes four types of triangulation that can occur when 
conducting research where triangulation can, firstly, relate to the triangulation 
of data sources (data triangulation), secondly, triangulation among different 
researchers (investigator triangulation), thirdly, triangulation involving the use 
of differing perspectives on the same data (theory triangulation) and, fourthly, 
of methods (methodological triangulation). In case studies, triangulation is 
important as dependence upon a single source of evidence is not 
recommended (Yin 2009, p.114). It is argued that the use of multiple sources 
of evidence is more likely to lead to a more convincing and accurate analysis 
and conclusion (Yin 2009, p.116). In this research methodological 
triangulation will be used and occurs when different methods to collect 
evidence will be used: interviews, documentary analysis and case analysis. 
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Doing so also helps assure the construct validity of the research as the 
multiple datasets essentially allow for multiple analyses of the same 
phenomenon.  The use of multiple sources of evidence allows for a more 
complete picture of the phenomenon being studied especially if one source of 
evidence has any particular weaknesses (Merriam 1988, p.69). 
 
4.7.4 Interview participant selection 
 
A critical realist approach to the selection of participants when studying 
organisations has been detailed by Smith and Elger who identify two classes 
of participants, those called either ‘practitioners’ or ‘subjects’ and who 
recommend that researchers try to interview participants from both groups 
(2014, pp.120-122). Practitioners, usually senior managers, will have expert 
knowledge on how and why policies were developed, implanted and whether 
successful or not. However, because their experience is held to be 
‘embedded in specific contexts’, Smith and Elger (2014, pp.120-122) argue 
that practitioners will take much of what they do for granted, and therefore 
unacknowledged, and that their horizons may be narrow. Subjects, usually 
more junior operational staff, will have a narrower expertise but will be well 
placed to describe the impact of policies and have informal knowledge of 
policy development and implementation that can enrich analyses (Smith and 
Elger 2014, p.121). This view was used to inform the criterion-based 
sampling used in the identification of the participants.  
 
For the ombudsman offices involved in the research it was intended to 
interview both practitioners and subjects. Practitioners were those individuals 
senior enough within the ombudsman office to have contributed to the 
development of strategies or business plans or have responsibility for 
delivery. Therefore, it was at Ombudsman/Deputy Ombudsman, Director of 
Strategy, Director of Communications and Director of Operations or 
equivalent roles that were targeted. Each Ombudsman’s office is structured 
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differently dependent upon roles, responsibilities and available funding but 
these were the practitioner roles targeted.  In addition, interviews were to be 
conducted with participants at the ‘subject’ level with a participant from both 
casework and external affairs interviewed. 
 
In reality, those interviewed from ombudsman offices did not meet the 
original selection criteria. For the Scottish Public Services Ombudsman, 
seven participants were interviewed and did include a combination of 
practitioners and subjects. Five interviews took place. In one of these 
interviews there were three participants. This was at the request of the 
participants. However, for the Office of the Health Ombudsman Queensland, 
although eight persons were interviewed, they were all practitioners and the 
researcher was unable to interview subjects. This was unfortunate but 
reflected the reality that the researcher could only interview staff with the 
agreement of the ombudsman and, therefore, did not have completely free 
choice. Six interviews took place. In one of those interviews there were three 
participants. This was, again, at the request of the participants. 
 
For bodies in jurisdiction, the researcher intended to adopt different criteria 
using the lifespan of an ombudsman investigation as the key determinant. 
Thus, as well as participants having to have knowledge of their local 
ombudsman service, they had to have had some involvement in an 
ombudsman investigation, thus interviewing both subjects and practitioners. 
In identifying these roles, the PHSO report ‘The NHS hospital complaints 
system A case for urgent treatment?’ (2013) was used as it talks of complaint 
management from ward level to board level. Roles identified include 
complaint management, governance, service improvement, senior clinical 





The researcher contacted the Chief Executive of the potential health boards 
in Scotland submitting, with the request, a brief summary of the proposed 
research. Three health boards responded positively and each health board 
identified a liaison person as requested by the researcher. The researcher 
asked the liaison person to identify potential participants from within their 
organisation and to provide their details to the researcher. When the 
researcher had received that information, he then personally contacted each 
potential participant providing further information on the proposed research, 
namely, the brief summary of the proposed research, a participant 
information sheet and a copy of the consent form. When the potential 
participants then indicated agreement to proceed the researcher agreed a 
mutually agreeable time and location for the interviews. 
 
Ultimately, in two of the three Scottish Health Boards, the researcher was 
able to interview both practitioners and subjects. In these two Health Boards, 
eleven and three participants respectively were interviewed. For the third 
Health Board, there were participants from two groups of staff that were 
interviewed: firstly, a group of practitioners, occupying senior positions within 
the Health Board and a second group of participants from the complaints 
function. In this Health Board a total of eight participants were interviewed. 
This means that a total of 22 participants were interviewed. Twenty 
interviews were held. In two of the interviews, there were two participants 
interviewed at the same time. This was at the request of the participants. 
 
4.7.5 Data analysis 
 
When conducting the interviews, the researcher sought agreement to digitally 
record them and the subsequent recordings were transcribed. The software 
package NVIVO was used to assist with the data analysis. Table 7, overleaf, 
below shows the average length of interview for each of the participating 
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organisations. Note that in health board 3, the analysis of five upheld 
investigation reports did not take place. 
Organisation Average duration 
of the interviews 
SPSO 57mins 47 secs 
OHOQ 48 mins 17 secs 
Health Board 1 47 mins 29 secs 
Health Board 2 47 mins 39 secs 
Health Board 3 38 mins 40 secs 
Table 7 Average length of interview by participating organisation 
 
Braun and Clarke (2006, p.78) state that there are two broad types of 
qualitative analysis: those that are tied to a particular theoretical position and 
those that are effectively independent of an underlying theory and therefore 
can be used across a range of theoretical approaches. This research uses 
thematic analysis which falls into the latter category. Braun and Clarke (2006, 
p.79) define thematic analysis as ‘a method for identifying, analysing, and 
reporting patterns (themes) within data’ and state that thematic analysis 
‘offers an accessible and theoretically-flexible approach to analysing 
qualitative data’ resulting in it being ‘widely-used’.  
 
The researcher used thematic analysis to capture a ‘rich thematic description 
of the entire data set, so that the reader gets a sense of the predominant or 
important themes’. (Braun and Clarke 2006, p.83). This approach is 
particularly useful when ‘investigating an under-researched area’ (Braun and 




When conducting the thematic analysis, the following approaches were 
adopted: a theoretical rather than inductive approach was used as the 
researcher wished to test out a conceptual model that the researcher 
developed from the literature. The identified themes were analysed at a 
semantic level attempting to link the identified patterns with previous 
literature and theory. When undertaking this analysis an essentialist 
approach was used which assumes that ‘language reflects and enables us to 
articulate meaning and experience’ (Braun and Clarke, 2006, p.85). 
 
When conducting the coding an initial set of codes derived from the literature 
review was prepared. During the coding the limitations of this coding list to 
capture all the themes was identified and additional codes were created as 
required. 
 
In the results sections, participants have been allocated a female name 
randomly generated by a computer. Using a human name creates a sense of 
person behind the responses. As only one male participated in the research 
from the three health boards and male participants amounted to only 11% of 
all participants, in order to maintain confidentiality, all participants were 
allocated female names. 
 
4.8 Quality, Reliability and Validity  
 
Merriam (1988) argues that ‘all research is concerned with producing valid 
and reliable knowledge’ and ‘because of the nature of [qualitative case study] 
research these concerns may loom larger than in experimental designs’ 
(Merriam 1988, p.163). Merriam then identifies techniques that should be 
used in qualitative case study research that would enhance its internal and 
external validity and reliability. Table 8 lists the case study actions, identified 
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by Merriam (1988, pp.163-177) that can be used to ensure good quality case 
study research. 
 
This research used Merriam’s recommended actions to maximise the quality 
of findings and conclusions with a small number of exceptions. Merriam 
suggests the use of long-term observation, peer examination and 
participatory modes of research to ensure internal validity but none of these 
methods were suitable for this research. The issues concerning observation 
and participatory research have already been discussed in the data collection 
section above while peer examination was not possible.  
 
The assessment of the approach to securing quality, validity and reliability 
can also be considered via the different stages of the research approach. 
The research design has used existing theory to guide the approach to data 
collection and analysis including the interview frame. Meanwhile, the data 
collection process requires well-developed interview skills. The researcher 
undertook reading in this area, piloted the interview on an individual from a 
health ombudsman office not involved in the research (including recording 
the interview) and reflected upon these lessons to develop the appropriate 










Study actions Phase of Research in which tactic 
occurs 
 




researcher’s bias clarifying researcher’s philosophical and 









rich description composition 
explain typicality or 
otherwise of case 
composition 
cross-case analysis data analysis 
audit trail all stages of the research process 
Table 8 Case study actions for ensuring the case study validity and reliability 
(Merriam 1988) 
 
4.9 Ethical considerations 
 
Conducting this research raises a number of specific ethical issues. As 
discussed in the literature review, receiving a complaint can be 
psychologically traumatic for clinicians and interviews may risk resurrecting 
the trauma. In addition, for each complaint there will be a complainant to 
whom significant harm may have occurred either to them or to a family 
member. The contents of complaints can be very sensitive which is why 
health ombudsman are required to conduct their investigations in private. As 
the research was looking at the thoughts, attitudes and behaviours at a 
higher level than that of individual complaints, there was no need to look at 
individual complaints where such data may be revealed. (Note, in two health 
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boards, there was a review of five upheld cases but this part of the interview 
was based upon publicly available information previously published on the 
SPSO’s website and did not involve the identity of the person(s) complained 
about or any other information relating to the complaints). 
 
In order to minimise risk to individuals, participation in the interviews was 
entirely voluntary and participants were informed that they could withdraw at 
any time up to the submission of the thesis. Selection of health board 
participants was undertaken by the researcher’s health board contact and, 
prior to the interviews, the researcher was unaware if any participant had 
been subject to a complaint or SPSO investigation. At the first contact with all 
participants the researcher sent to all potential participants a written 
explanation of the proposed research and the consent form, both of which 
had been approved by ethical committees at Queen Margaret University. The 
researcher was asked by one health board to obtain ethical approval from an 
NHS ethics committee and this secured prior to the research being 
undertaken. Prior to commencing the interview, the researcher orally 
explained the research, obtained written consent and reinforced both the 
voluntariness of participation and that participants could withdraw at any time 
including after the interview. Participants were reassured about confidentiality 
and anonymity. 
 
Ethical approval for this research was gained from the Ethics Committee at 
Queen Margaret University and from a Scottish health board. Ethical 
approval was also obtained from Townsville HHS research ethics committee 
acting on behalf of all Queensland HHS. For both the Scottish health board 
and Queensland HHS the research ethics committees accepted that the 
submission could be light touch as there would not be the use of either 
patient/complaint identifiable information or personal information relating to 
the complained against. The result of these decisions was an ethics 
application similar to that required by Queen Margaret University.  
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4.10 Situating the research 
 
Both the SPSO and the OHOQ operate within a healthcare and healthcare 
regulatory system that are outwith their design and control. In this section, 
information about the Scottish and Queensland ombudsman offices as well 
as information about their respective healthcare and healthcare regulatory 
systems is provided. This detail will assist the reader in contextualising the 
research results and discussion.  
 
Before doing so it is helpful to note two points that relate to these systems 
and which will help contextualise the research findings and subsequent 
discussion. Firstly, as detailed below, there exists, within both Australia and 
Scotland, a polycentric model of healthcare regulation. This means that 
rather than there being a single authoritative regulator, health bodies are 
overseen by a range of regulators with differing regulatory responsibilities 
and regulatory strategies, leading to a more complex and challenging 
environment (Healy and Walton 2016). These health regulators, in turn, form 
‘more or less connected governance networks’ (Burris et al. 2005, p.31). 
Such polycentric governance arrangements are associated with concerns 
about accountability and legitimacy as there is ‘the dispersion of regulatory 
decision-making across multiple entities’ (Healy and Walton 2016, p.502). 
Carney et al. (2017) note that these health complaint bodies have two 
distinguishing features: firstly, the multiplicity of statutory purposes, and, 
secondly, the statutory relationship that exists between health complaint 
bodies and formal health regulators. 
 
Secondly, for Carney et al. (2017, pp. 70-71), health complaint bodies have 
to accommodate the following standpoints representing the expectations of 
different participant groups: firstly, for the public, the resolution of individual 
complaints; secondly, for managers, complaints are a mechanism by which 
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problems with services (or professionals) can be identified and action taken 
to remedy the problem; thirdly, for health practitioners, there is a dependence 
on public trust, which can be facilitated though transparent complaint and 
registration instruments which try to ensure the maintenance of professional 
standards; and, fourthly, for governments and the regulatory and 
accountability bodies, the maintenance of public safety is paramount. Carney 
et al. (2017, p.72) question whether any health complaint body in Australia 
can meet all these objectives, noting that it is both ‘unknown and untested’. It 
is suggested that this, equally, applies to the SPSO. Healy and Walton (2016, 
p. 501) consider the nature of the relationship between health complaint 
bodies and other members of the healthcare regulatory network suggesting 
that health ombudsman typically attempt to develop an ‘educative and 
reformative relationship using persuasion’.  
 
4.10.1 Australian and Scottish healthcare systems 
 
This section provides detail on the Australian and Scottish healthcare 
systems and their respective healthcare regulatory environments. 
 
The federal Australian government retains responsibility for setting national 
health policy, the funding of most public services, and the regulation of much 
of the healthcare system. Individual states retain responsibility for health 
service organisation and delivery, and their local regulation (Dugdale and 
Healy 2014). There is a mixed provision of healthcare in Australia with a 
national public health insurance scheme, Medicare, which provides automatic 
coverage for all Australian citizens and permanent residents, although over 
50% of Australians also hold private health insurance (Australian Prudential 
Regulatory Authority 2019). Within Australia there is a well-developed 
primary care service, which acts as a gatekeeper to specialist care. Hospital 
and specialist care are delivered through a mix of public, private and not for 
profit hospitals. It is claimed that this mix of public and private healthcare is 
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supported by the population (Dugdale and Healy 2014, p.14). This general 
picture of healthcare provision applies to Queensland. 
 
Healy and Walton (2016) note that, in recent years, many countries have 
been revising the regulation of healthcare to ensure that healthcare providers 
have increased accountability for the quality and safety of the services that 
they provide, yet, further note, that these changes, which have resulted in an 
increased number and range of healthcare regulators, has also led to 
increased complexity in the healthcare regulatory system.  
 
In Australia there exists the National Boards responsible for the registration 
of regulated healthcare practitioners such as doctors, nurses, dentists and 
pharmacists as well as setting the standards that such healthcare 
professionals must reach in order to be registered with their professional 
board and will investigate some complaints about registered health 
professionals. The National Boards are supported by the Australian Health 
Practitioners Regulation Agency (AHPRA) which is responsible for the 
registration and oversight of all health professionals. With the exception of 
the New South Wales Health Care Complaints Commission and the OHOQ, 
AHPRA will undertake an initial assessment of complaints on behalf of the 
National Boards. Both the New South Wales Health Care Complaints 
Commission and the OHOQ undertake this function for healthcare 
professionals within their jurisdiction. National Boards will normally manage 
complaints considered to be of a less serious nature, more serious 
complaints will be referred to their state- or territory- level civil and 
administrative tribunal for consideration (Healy and Walton 2016). 
 
At the Australian level there also exists the National Health Performance 
Authority which reports on the performance of hospitals and primary care 
against a national performance framework the Australian Commission on 
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Safety and Quality in Healthcare which reports on patient safety and the 
quality of healthcare against national standards, but cannot enforce 
improvements, and, the Australian Council on Healthcare Standards (ACHS) 
which accredits hospitals and other healthcare facilities (Dugdale and Healy 
2014). 
 
Within the Australian healthcare regulatory system, each individual Australian 
state and territory is responsible for managing health complaints and the 
regulation of healthcare professionals within their state or territory. From the 
mid-1980s each Australian state and territory has established a complaints 
body, generically referred to as a Health Complaint Entity (HCE) (Health 
Practitioner Regulation National Law Act 2009). These HCEs represent a 
move away from considering solely the merits of an individual complaint as 
they also try to secure the prevention of errors and to contribute to system 
improvement (Carney et al. 2017).  
 
Each HCE remains separate from one another with a range of goals and 
approaches adopted within the differing jurisdictions. The ‘powers, structure 
and functions of the health complaints commissioners [HCEs] all vary 
somewhat depending on their jurisdictional context and legislation’ (Carney et 
al. 2017, p.498). However, in common, all are statutorily based, funded 
through state or territory governments with commissioners appointed for a 
fixed-term, although this term can be renewed. The different HCEs may use 
differing definitions of complaints and utilise a range of approaches to resolve 
complaints, such as mediation, conciliation, assisted resolution, the provision 
of information as well as investigations (Carney et al. 2017).   
 
Some of the smaller HCEs may be incorporated within a larger complaint 
organisation and which includes a number of commissioners, each 
responsible for different jurisdictional areas of responsibility, or they may be 
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standalone commissions but which include additional responsibilities such as 
disability, community services or human rights (Carney et al. 2017, Healy and 
Walton, 2016). The larger complaint bodies may have had modifications 
made to the model (Carney et al. 2017). In this regard, while the smaller 
HCEs are restricted to responding to individual complaints, have little in way 
of formal enforcement powers and be unable to undertake own-motion 
systemic investigations, the two largest bodies, the New South Wales Health 
Care Complaints Commission and the OHOQ, have additional, stronger, 
powers (Healey and Walton 2016). Both the New South Wales Health Care 
Complaints Commission and the OHOQ are able to prosecute healthcare 
professionals where it is believed that the healthcare professionals have 
committed serious professional misconduct. In these cases, both the New 
South Wales Health Care Complaints Commission and the OHOQ act as co-
regulators in partnership with AHPRA and the National Boards in the 
disciplining and imposition of sanctions upon healthcare professionals. This 
is a significant and fundamental difference with the other HCEs. The 
additional powers and responsibilities held by the New South Wales Health 
Care Complaints Commission and the OHOQ may significantly impact upon 
their activities and priorities.  
 
In this thesis the relevant health complaint entity under investigation is the 
Office of the Health Ombudsman, Queensland. Figure 2 demonstrates this 





Figure 2 Queensland's coregulatory health system (OHOQ 2019, p.59) 
 
 
Prior to the establishment of the OHOQ, there existed the Queensland Health 
Quality and Complaints Commission (QHQCC), which was responsible for 
considering health complaints, monitoring the compliance of health bodies 
with quality standards, and was able to commence own motion enquires into 
any concern it had about the quality of healthcare. Finally, the QHQCC had 
the power to require health bodies to report back to the commissioner any 
action they had taken in response to his recommendations. Of import, the 
QHQCC had powers to set standards for health services and monitor health 
bodies compliance with these standards (Health Quality and Complaints 
Commission Act 2006, Chapter 3) and had a specific obligation to use health 
complaints to improve the quality of health care (Health Quality and 
Complaints Commission Act 2006 s50(1)). 
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This body was replaced by the OHOQ from 1 July 2014 and which was 
founded upon a statutory basis – the Health Ombudsman Act 2013. The key 
principle underpinning the Act is that the health and safety of the public are to 
be the ombudsman’s key consideration (Health Ombudsman Act 2013 
s.4(1)). This Act provides the office with ‘broad powers to deal with 
complaints and other matters relating to the health, conduct or performance 
of both registered and unregistered health practitioners and the services 
provided by health service organisations’ (OHOQ 2019). The OHOQ is able 
to consider complaints about both public and private healthcare 
organisations. Section 3(1) of the Act details the main objects to be achieved: 
(a) to protect the health and safety of the public; and  
(b) to promote—  
(i) professional, safe and competent practice by health practitioners; 
and  
(ii) high standards of service delivery by health service organisations; 
and  
(c) to maintain public confidence in the management of complaints 
and other matters relating to the provision of health services. (Health 
Ombudsman Act 2013 s 3(1))  
 
The Health Ombudsman describes the purpose of the office as, to: 
 Protect the health and safety of consumers 
 Promote high standards in health service delivery 
 Facilitate responsive complaint management (OHOQ 2020) 
 
The OHOQ has the following powers: to require a provider to provide a 
response, undertake conciliation or an investigation, make recommendations 
or apply sanctions, require and monitor compliance and to prosecute health 
professionals (Healy and Walton 2016). In addition, the OHOQ is able to 
undertake both systemic investigations and inquiries, the aim of which is to 
contribute to system improvement (see page 125). In relation to systemic 
investigations and inquiries, the power to initiate such activities lies principally 
with the Health Ombudsman, although the Minister for Health, under the 
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legislation is able to instruct the Health Ombudsman to conduct such an 
investigation or inquiry (Health Services Ombudsman Act 2013, Paragraph 
28). This makes the OHOQ both a co-regulator of health care, along with the 
National Boards and the AHPRA, as well as a health complaint entity, that is, 
a body able to consider health complaints. The OHOQ does not have the 
powers, held by the previous body, the QHQCC, to set and monitor health 
care standards or a specific obligation to use complaints to improve the 
quality of health care. The OHOQ is, however, now the sole entry point for all 
complaints about health care in Queensland, giving the OHOQ the 
responsibility for co-ordinating the handling of complaints (OHOQ 2019, 
p.33).  
 
In the consideration of complaints concerning registered health professionals, 
OHOQ ‘shares regulatory powers with AHPRA and the 15 national health 
practitioner boards’ (OHOQ 2019, p.13) and may refer a complaint to one of 
these bodies unless it, the OHOQ, believes that the substance of the 
complaint may constitute professional misconduct or result in the suspension 
or cancellation of the health professional’s registration, in which case the 
OHOQ is required to consider the complaint itself (OHOQ 2019). The OHOQ 
has responsibility for following up any complaint referred by it to another body 
to ensure that the complaint has been handled appropriately (OHOQ 2019, 
p.33). The ombudsman lacks powers to regulate unregistered health 
professionals (Healy and Walton 2016). 
 
Within the United Kingdom, healthcare is a devolved responsibility with the 
Scottish government assuming responsibility for Scottish healthcare from 1 
July 1999. The greater majority of healthcare provision in Scotland is funded 
through taxation and delivered by NHS Scotland through 14 geographically 
situated health boards. In addition, there are seven specialist NHS Boards 
and Healthcare Improvement Scotland. Health Boards are responsible to the 
Scottish government.  
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All Scottish health boards are unitary organisations. That is, they are 
responsible for the provision of acute services, maternity services, primary 
care services, community services, mental health services and health and 
social care partnerships, the last in partnership with local government. 
Population size, they vary from one of the smallest health organisations in 
Europe to the largest healthcare organisation in Europe. Many boards are a 
mix of rural and urban populations. This means that health boards are 
complex organisations and have complicated organisational structures to 
manage the different health sectors and/or geographical areas. In 
considering how bodies respond to SPSO this complexity must be 
remembered. Despite this complexity, there is broad similarity between the 
health boards that participated in this research on how they handle 
complaints and the problems that arise.  
 
As with Australia, in Scotland, there also exists a polycentric model of 
regulation. Healthcare Improvement Scotland is the primary body responsible 
for the regulation and inspection of health services in Scotland and is 
supported by the Mental Welfare Commission for Scotland, which regulates 
mental health services (British Medical Association 2020). The regulation of 
healthcare professionals is undertaken by eight United Kingdom wide, 
profession-based regulators, including bodies such as the General Medical 
Council or the Nursing and Midwifery Council. In turn, these regulators are 
overseen by the Professional Standards Authority (Hirst 2018). 
 
In Scotland, complaints about publicly provided healthcare are the 
responsibility of the Scottish Public Services Ombudsman (SPSO). The 
SPSO was founded on a statutory basis – the Scottish Public Services 
Ombudsman Act 2002. The Scottish Public Services Ombudsman is not only 
the ombudsman for health complaints, but as the name suggests, is the 
ombudsman for complaints about all public services in Scotland (Hirst 2018). 
Unlike OHOQ, the SPSO has oversight over public healthcare provision and 
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is not normally able to consider complaints concerning private healthcare 
providers. 
 
The Public Services Reform (Scotland) Act 2010 requires the SPSO both, to 
publish a set of complaint handling principles and model complaint handling 
procedures with which bodies in jurisdiction must comply and, also, to 
monitor compliance by bodies in jurisdiction with these principles and 
procedures and to promote best practice in this area. To meet this obligation 
the SPSO created within its organisation, the Complaints Standards Authority 
(CSA). The purpose of the CSA is 
to support continuous improvement in complaints handling by guiding 
all public service providers under our remit towards a simplified, 
standardised complaints procedure, which puts the service user at the 
heart of the process, focuses on early resolution, and values 
complaints as tools for feedback, learning and improvement (SPSO 
2020). 
 
The SPSO also acts as the Scottish Welfare Fund Independent Reviewer 
and, since 2020, also acts as the NHS Independent National Whistleblowing 
Officer. With regard to its healthcare complaint responsibilities, the SPSO 
has the following statutory obligations: 
 To receive complaints about bodies in jurisdiction and investigate the 
complaint if the ombudsman believes that such an investigation is 
appropriate (Scottish Public Services Ombudsman Act 2002, s.2) 
 Publish a set of complaint handling principles and model complaint 
handling procedures with which bodies in jurisdiction must comply 
(Scottish Public Services Ombudsman Act 2002, s.16A-B) 
 Monitor compliance with these principles and procedures and promote 
best practice in this area (Scottish Public Services Ombudsman Act 
2002, s.16D-G) 
 
The Scottish Public Services Ombudsman Act 2002 does not provide the 




The vision of the SPSO is to ‘contribute actively and positively to Scotland’s 
development and delivery of first-class public services: putting people and 
learning at the heart of what we do by being innovative and world-leading in 
our approach to complaints, reviews and standards (SPSO 2019d, p.2).  
 
4.11 Use of the term ‘investigation’ by the SPSO and the OHOQ 
 
Before considering the research findings, it is of value to consider the 
meaning of the term ‘investigation’ used by both the SPSO and the OHOQ. 
The use of the term ‘investigation’ is commonplace in the world of 
ombudsmanry but it can have different meanings dependent upon local 
context and statute. As the thesis has a strong focus on the potential 
systemic benefits to be accrued from complaint investigations it is useful to 
clarify the meanings used by both the SPSO and the OHOQ. 
 
The SPSO complaints resolution process begins with as assessment of the 
complaint. The purpose of this assessment is to determine whether or not the 
SPSO has the legal powers to consider the complaint and to determine 
whether or not there is likely to be a ‘significant benefit – or achievable 
outcome’ to be obtained. If the complaint passes these tests it will be 
investigated which is where the SPSO gathers information from both parties 
in order to be able to reach a decision (SPSO 2021). The conduct of 
investigations is detailed in the SPSO’s underpinning legislation, the Scottish 
Public Services Act 2002. Paragraph 2(4) of the Act empowers the 
Ombudsman to undertake actions that the ombudsman may think helpful in 
reaching a decision and when investigating a complaint, so long as the 
Ombudsman conducts the investigation in private and informs both parties 
that an investigation is being conducted is able to conduct the investigation in 
a manner considered most appropriate by the Ombudsman paragraph 
(Scottish Public Services Act 2002 para12(3)). Unsurprisingly, the SPSO 
128 
 
receives a much larger number of complaints than it investigates with 
approximately only one-third of complaints received by the SPSO closed 
after an investigation (see pages 150-1 for further details). 
 
In the case of the OHOQ upon the receipt of a complaint, the OHOQ will also 
assess how it believes the complaint can best be handled. The Queensland’s 
Health Ombudsman Act 2013 provides the statutory basis for the actions 
available to the OHOQ to resolve a complaint. The OHOQ is able to consider 
a wider range of actions than is available to the SPSO, including the 
facilitation of local resolution, conciliation, mediation, referring the complaint 
to another body for action as well as investigating a complaint. When 
investigating a complaint, the OHOQ will collect pertinent information from 
both parties and will interview relevant individuals. In respect of 
investigations, the OHOQ states that it will only conduct complaints for the 
most serious complaints, where the OHOQ considers that there is material 
risk to the public or evidence suggestive of serious professional misconduct 
(OHOQ undated). This is unlike the SPSO which will investigate allowable 
complaints where the SPSO believes that there is public benefit to be 
accrued. Again, similar to the SPSO, the OHOQ conducts investigations in 
only a minority of complaints it receives. However, unlike the SPSO which 
investigates around one-third of complaints received, the OHOQ only 
investigates around 2% of complaints that it receives (see pages 129-131 for 
details). This reflects the wider range of actions available to the OHOQ and a 
focus by OHOQ on investigating only the most serious complaints. 
 
4.12 The powers of the SPSO and the OHOQ for system improvement 
 
This section sets out the actual powers available to both the SPSO and to the 
OHOQ to contribute to system improvement that are contained within their 
establishing legislation. The SPSO’s underpinning legislation is the Scottish 
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Public Services Act 2002. This Act does not provide the SPSO with the 
powers to undertake own-motion investigations nor broad systemic 
investigations. In relation to upheld individual complaints the SPSO’s ability 
to contribute to system improvement lies in its ability to make 
recommendations for improvements that remedy the failing to the body or 
person concerned. Should the body or individual refuse to comply with the 
recommendation, the SPSO can find that this complaint remains unremedied 
and using its powers under Paragraph 16 of the Scottish Public Services Act 
2002 is able to lay a Special Report before the Scottish Parliament. The Act 
is silent as to what the Scottish Parliament will do with the report but the 
inevitable resulting publicity that would arise from the laying of such a report 
will act as a form of powerful moral suasion upon the body or person involved 
to accept the recommendation(s). Thus, the SPSO has limited formal powers 
with respect to its ability to contribute to system improvement. 
 
The situation is different for the OHOQ and its underpinning legislation, the 
Health Services Ombudsman Act 2013. Under this act the OHOQ has the 
power to conduct systemic investigations (Part 8 of the Act) or inquiries (Part 
12 of the Act) into issues that arise from complaints or other matters about 
which the Health Ombudsman becomes aware. The OHOQ’s legislation is, 
thus, significantly more permissive than the SPSO’s legislation in allowing the 
Health Ombudsman to conduct systemic investigations and contribute to 
system improvement. In relation to making recommendations, the OHOQ has 
a duty to consult with the body or person affected but no requirement to gain 
the agreement of the body or person affected before finalising and publishing 
such recommendation(s). Overall, the OHOQ has significantly more powers 







This chapter has provided detail on the methodology used to answer the 
research questions that had been identified. It also provided contextual 
information relating to the ombudsman offices central to the research along 



















Chapter 5 Research Findings – The Office of the Health 





This chapter presents the results of the research into both the Office of the 
Health Ombudsman, Queensland and the Scottish Public Services 
Ombudsman. The results for each ombudsman office are presented 
consecutively. Both sections begin by providing background information 
relating to the work of the individual ombudsman office which will help 
contextualise the results. The results for each office are then presented. 
When presenting the results in both chapters the section headings that are 
used reflect the themes that were identified and used in the analysis. For this 
Chapter the results start at Section 5.4 for the OHOQ and Section 5.8 for the 
SPSO. 
 
5.2 Office of the Health Ombudsman, Queensland 
 
‘Because that’s what we’re here for. We’re here to make sure that those 
rogues are dealt with’ (Lydia). 
 
The complaint handling process adopted by the OHOQ is detailed in Figure 
3. The key stages of the complaints process are: 
 
 Assessment: obtaining all relevant information and decide on the most 
appropriate course of action 
 Take immediate action: where, in the opinion of the health 
ombudsman the health and safety of the public is at risk, the 
ombudsman may place immediate sanctions against a registered 
health professional’s registration (including placing conditions or 









professionals, issue an interim prohibition order which prohibits or 
restricts the practice of such a practitioner. 
 Facilitate local resolution: the ombudsman facilitates communication 
between complainant and health service provider in an attempt to 
resolve the complaint short of ombudsman action. 
 Attempt conciliation: the office may provide independent conciliation of 
a complaint if both parties agree to participate. 
 Investigate the complaint: undertake a detailed examination of the 
complaint. The outcome of an investigation could include referral to 
the Director of Proceedings whose role is to consider referral to the 
Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal which conducts 
disciplinary matters against registered health professionals. 
 Refer the complaint to AHPRA, the provider’s registration board or 
other external organisation (OHOQ 2020). 
 
 
While one may think that complaint handling within the OHOQ will follow a 
linear process, that is intake, assessment, investigation, referral where 
appropriate, a complaint can ‘miss’ steps in the process or, can be sent back 
to an earlier step for reconsideration. A complaint may be referred to AHPRA 
or other external government entity at any stage of the complaints process 
from intake through to investigation. The Annual Report for 2018/19 provides 
37 pages of performance data but, while one can be confident of the 
outcomes at each stage of the complaints process, it is hard to be as 
confident about the outcomes of complaints as a whole. This is due in part to 
the fact that the consideration of complaints may well overlap reporting years, 
and, as mentioned, above, at each stage of the complaints process, case 
handlers are able to miss steps or refer the case back to a previous step for 
reconsideration. In addition, caseworkers will review each complaint and may 
break it down into separate components, each with a different action. For 
example, different elements of a single complaint it may be determined that 
one element is suitable for local resolution, a second element suitable for 




Although the OHOQ is able to commence formal inquiries into: 
(a) a matter to which a health service complaint relates: 
134 
 
     (b) a systemic issue relating to the provision of a health service:  
(c) another matter, the Health Ombudsman considers relevant to 
achieving the objectives of the Act’. (Health Ombudsman Act 2013, 
s.151), 
 
as at the end of the reporting year 2-018/19, the OHOQ had yet to conduct 
any inquiry at all (OHOQ 2019, p.35). 
 
 
5.3 Complaint numbers 
 
In 2018/19, the OHOQ received a total of 8,575 complaints. Of these, 7,592 
complaints were received from members of the public while an additional 881 
complaints were the result of mandatory, voluntary or self-notification and a 
final 102 complaints were received from an external agency such as AHPRA 
or the Queensland Police. Of 8,241 complaints where a final decision was 
reached in 2018/19, 5,129 complaints were accepted for consideration and 
action, an increase of 16% from the previous year and 3,112 complaints were 
not accepted (OHOQ 2019, p.23). Key numbers from the OHOQ’s Annual 
Report for 2018/19 include: 
 
1. 1,196 attempts at local resolution were completed with a success rate 
of 81%; 
2. 59 complaints were closed following conciliation between the parties; 
3. 197 complaints were completed after investigation, after which 87 
matters were referred to the Director of Proceedings, 80 cases 
referred to an external body for action and 66 cases where the case 
was closed with no further action; 
4. 96 cases were referred by the Director of Proceedings to QCAT while 
47 cases were referred back to the Health Ombudsman for 
reconsideration; 
5. The Ombudsman made 31 immediate registration orders (taking 
immediate action against a registered health professional where it is 
felt essential to protect the safety of the public prior to the complaint 
being fully considered; the sanction is usually the placing of conditions 
on the professional’s registration); 
6. The ombudsman made a further 18 interim prohibition orders (taking 
immediate action against an unregistered health professional where it 
is felt essential to protect the safety of the public prior to the complaint 
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being fully considered; the sanction is usually prohibiting the 
unregistered health professional from working); 
7. The Ombudsman consulted with AHPRA on 2,455 cases, leading to 
2,381 cases being referred by OHOQ to AHPRA for action; and, 












Public hospital 1780 
Correctional facility 1257 




Private hospital 236 








Table 9 Number of complaints by type of organisation (OHOQ 2019, pp.89-90) 
 
 
Practitioner Type Number of 
practitioners 
Medical practitioner 2498 
Nurse 590 












                                            






















The results of the research involving the OHOQ begins with the participants’ 
views concerning the objectives of the OHOQ. Following this, the results 
follow the handling of a complaint received by the OHOQ and described 
above. It then provides the results of the OHOQ’s approach to systemic 
investigations before ending with a review of the other activities undertaken 
by the OHOQ and which may contribute to improvement of the healthcare 
system 
 
5.4.1 Objectives of the OHOQ 
 
All eight participants from the OHOQ were asked about the objectives of the 
OHOQ. In each case, their first response was to say that the OHOQ’s 
primary objective was to protect the health and safety of the public: for 
example, ‘protect the health and safety of the Queensland community’ 
(Aisha), ‘protection of the health and safety of the public is paramount’ 
(Rachel), ‘it’s about protecting the health and safety of the Queensland 
public’ (Jasmine), ‘the paramount guiding principle under the legislation is the 
health and safety of the public’ (Lily), and ‘the paramount guiding principle is 
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to protect the health and safety of the public’ (Violet). On three occasions this 
answer was supplemented: ‘by providing a service where people can make a 
complaint about their treatment or how they feel they’ve been treated by 
practitioners’ (Aisha), the ‘ongoing improvement in the delivery of health 
services and ongoing improvement and management of health service 
complaints’ (Violet), and, ‘maintaining professional standards’ (Kara).  
 
The participants were asked how they identified issues that arrived at the 
OHOQ to be health and safety issues. Kara clarified that the office utilised a 
risk assessment process that assessed potential risk within the complaint at 
every stage of the process. Examples of issues that would be viewed as a 
risk to public health and safety include ‘professional sexual boundary 
violations’ (Kara), ‘anything to do with a criminal matter, any inappropriate 
touching of a patient’ (Kara), ‘it could even be verbally abusing a patient’ 
(Kara), ‘financial exploitation’ (Violet), and, ‘we look at vulnerability of 
patients, power imbalances’ (Kara). 
 
5.4.2 Complaint handling process 
 
5.4.2.1 Intake and assessment 
 
The first point of contact for any person with a complaint, enquiry or 
notification is with the OHOQ’s intake and assessment team (OHOQ 2019, 
p.21). At this stage, the OHOQ will collect relevant information relating to the 
complaint and make a decision about how best a complaint should be 
handled (OHOQ 2020m).  At the conclusion of the intake stage, 36% of 
accepted complaints were referred to AHPRA and the national boards, 31% 
were sent for further assessment, 21% referred for local resolution and 10% 
referred to another government entity (OHOQ 2019, p.23). Thus 67% of 
accepted complaints are referred to another body for action. Of the 31% of 
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complaints sent for further assessment, 9% of complaints were subsequently 
sent to AHPRA and the national boards, 34% referred to another government 
entity, 4% sent for conciliation, 4% sent for investigation and less than 1% 
sent for local resolution. 48% of complaints were closed with no further action 
being taken (OHOQ 2019, p.27). Thus, following the assessment stage, 
another 13.36% of the complaints originally accepted at intake are referred to 
an external body, meaning that slightly over 80% of complaints initially 
accepted by the OHOQ are referred to an external body for action by the time 
the complaint has been assessed.  
 
5.4.2.2 Local resolution 
 
‘Local resolution is a voluntary, informal and impartial process for resolving 
matters between complainants and health service providers as quickly as 
possible and with minimal intervention’  and ‘… matters identified for local 
resolution typically concern less complex clinical issues, breakdowns in basic 
systems or processes, or matters that result from a misunderstanding or 
failed communication between parties’ (OHOQ 2019, p.29). The office states 
that local resolution is suitable for non-complex complaints, often involving 
communication issues and where the issue may be resolved quickly. It is not 
suitable for potentially serious complaints (OHOQ 2020j). 
 
The office may play an active role in local resolution through analysing 
information and/or submissions provided by either party, facilitating meetings 
and/or communication between the parties concerned, and assist in the 
production of agreed actions that result (OHOQ 2019, p.29). The office plays 
an active role in local resolution starting with the facilitation of local resolution 
itself: ‘one of the outcomes we negotiate commonly in the local resolution 
space is actually a direct meeting between the parties’ (Betty), working with 
both parties ‘on a sort of agenda that they can talk about’ (Betty). Supporting 
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complainants appears to be a key objective for the office: ‘we try, if we can, 
to equip complainants to deal with a complaint themselves’ (Violet), ‘we’ve 
got some tips on the [OHOQ’s] website and links, I think, to other websites on 
the things to remember if you’re going to make a complaint direct to the 
health service’ (Violet). The office may even, on occasions, use its powers ‘to 
compel production of information’ (Betty). One of the reasons suggested for 
this involvement in local resolution is because ‘one of our important aspects 
in terms of improving the way that health service complaints are managed in 
the health system across the state is … equipping consumers and recipients 
of healthcare to have that kind of conversation’ (Violet). 
 
The most likely outcomes that arise from local resolution are apology and an 
explanation of the treatment or service provided (OHOQ 2019, p.30) although 
the office does state that the local resolution process may result in 
improvements in the service provided by the health professional or 
organisation (OHOQ 2020j). If a complaint remains unresolved after local 
resolution, the complainant is able to return to OHOQ which may decide to 
accept if for assessment or refer it to an external body (OHOQ 2020j).  
 
However, a positive outcome from local resolution depends upon an 
appropriate attitude from the complained about. As was discussed in Chapter 
3, clinicians do not always respond positively when they are the subject of a 
complaint, with many doctors questioning the legitimacy of complaints 
received. The issue of attitude applies, in particular, to the attitudes of health 
professionals who receive a complaint:  
if they’ve got a lawyer and it depends on their lawyer. That will have 
an impact upon how the matter is dealt with. The ones that deal with it 
well, will generally engage in the process and try to genuinely learn 




Nonetheless, there is an optimism within the OHOQ that referring a complaint 
back to the original body for facilitated local resolution may lead to system 
improvement with improvements to clinical practice, policies or procedures all 
listed as potential methods of resolution on OHOQ’s website (OHOQ 2020j), 
and also help improve complaint handling by health organisations, 
I think that's one of our important aspects in terms of our objectives in 
terms of improving the way that health service complaints are 
managed in the health system across the state is not only making sure 
that the providers know how to deal with a complaint but equipping 
consumers and recipients of healthcare in to have that kind of 
conversation (Violet). 
 
Despite this optimism, eight per cent of complaints sent for local resolution by 
the OHOQ are withdrawn by the complainant (OHOQ 2019, p.30), which may 
be indicative of the complainant’s unhappiness that the OHOQ is not taking 
on the complaint for independent consideration. Of complaints closed at local 
resolution, nearly 20% of complaints are unresolved. In addition, there is no 
routine follow up of the outcomes of local resolution to check that agreed 
improvements are implemented. Taken together, this optimism that 
substantive learning may be achieved from complaints resolved by local 
resolution may be unrealistic. The limitations of achieving system 
improvement through local resolution were noted by Betty who felt that 
conciliation was more likely to deliver improvement, ‘you can probably pull 
and stretch system improvement in the conciliation space more that you 




A small number of complaints are sent for conciliation. In 2018/19, 98 cases 
were sent for conciliation but, of these, 39 were closed as one party refused 
to participate (OHOQ 2019, p.31). Matters considered in conciliation are 
more likely to include complex issues which require greater assistance in 
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helping parties reach agreement (OHOQ 2019, p.31). ‘Conciliation is a 
voluntary process for resolving complex complaints that require detailed 
explanations or confidential complaint resolution’ (OHOQ 2019, p.31). Again, 
the OHOQ plays an active role in conciliation. Firstly, a complaint will have 
undergone internal assessment before referral to conciliation as ‘conciliation 
doesn’t have the power like local resolution does to ask for records, to ask for 
a submission, they really are at the mercy of the parties’ (Betty). Thus, the 
OHOQ will use its powers to obtain papers and, where appropriate, seek an 
independent expert opinion from a clinician (OHOQ 2020k). The OHOQ also 
facilitates conciliation through the use of specialist conciliators employed by 
the OHOQ.  
 
The OHOQ states that potential outcomes from conciliation include apology, 
explanation, system changes and compensation (OHOQ 2020k) and, as with 
local resolution, if conciliation is unsuccessful, the office may accept the 
complaint for investigation or refer the complaint to an external body (OHOQ 
2020k). While face-to-face conciliation is the preferred approach, if 
relationships are particularly poor, conciliation may commence with shuttle 
negotiations, with the intent of improving relationships to the extent that 
actual face-to-face conciliation can then take place (Betty). The approach to 
conciliation is evaluative rather than facilitative. This means that the OHOQ 
employed conciliators will ‘actually challenge people in terms of the level of 
information that they provide and we’ll challenge, we’ll reality test them on 
their views’ (Betty). 
 
There is some suggestion that conciliation is a particularly effective way to 
secure system improvements. Discussions and negotiations that take place 
during conciliation,  
are legally privileged and that’s why systems improvement in the 
conciliation space are probably better able to be negotiated in that 
space, because you have providers who are the ones that control all 
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the system changes and they don’t want to be admitting any liability or 
guilt in terms of what they’ve done Whereas they can do it probably a 
little bit more comfortably in the privileged area, because even if they 
agree to a process change, the complainant can't then go out and go 
into a court and seek legal proceedings, saying, well, clearly, it went 
wrong, they changed their processes and that's why it went wrong. So, 
you can possibly pull and stretch system improvements in the 
conciliation space more than you could in the local resolution space. 
And that's where they focus (Betty). 
 
Despite this,  
the provider thinks why should I [participate], assessment doesn't think 
that we did anything wrong, necessarily, nothing critical, so why 
should I engage in another resourcing pack for me, to come along to 
this conciliation, it's voluntary, so they drop out. So, we don't actually 
get a large proportion of the matters into conciliation to a table 
because they drop out (Betty).  
 
Nonetheless,  
during the course of conciliation, we could negotiate process changes. 
We'll try and steer parties to create a big picture outcome, which is 
more systems outcomes, rather than focus too much on what 
happened to them, and use that as a benefit to negotiate (Betty).   
 
However, ‘we don't monitor this, you know, it's not a recommendation that 
they have to follow’ (Betty). 
 
It was suggested by Betty, see above, that conciliation could result in 
significant system improvements. However, the commitments for system 
change made by health organisations are not routinely followed up and, as 
Betty said, providers may believe that if the assessment by the OHOQ did 
not indicate any significant issue of concern then why should they 
participate? Finally, only a small number of conciliations are undertaken each 
year. This, again, suggests that it would be optimistic to expect conciliation to 





‘For more serious matters the office conducts formal investigations, which fall 
into one of two categories: individual health practitioner investigations or 
systemic investigations’ (OHOQ, p.39). Compared to the number of 
complaints that it receives, the OHOQ undertakes a very low level of 
investigations with, approximately, only 1 in 40 complaints likely to lead to a 
completed investigation. 197 investigations were completed in 2018/19 
(OHOQ 2019, p.40) of which 178 investigations concerned individual health 
practitioners (OHOQ 2019, p.43). This low number is, probably, because the 
OHOQ states that its objective is to ‘Take proportionate and timely action in 
response to serious complaints and notifications about health practitioners’ 
(author’s emphasis) (OHOQ 2020i). The OHOQ (2019, p.39) states,  
In relation to individual registered health practitioners, we undertake 
investigations to determine whether the practitioner's conduct or 
performance constitutes professional misconduct, or whether another 
ground exists to suspend or cancel their registration. In relation to 
individual unregistered practitioners, we undertake investigations 
where it appears that the practitioner poses a serious risk to persons, 
due to the practitioner's health, conduct and/or performance.   
 
Of the 197 investigations completed in 2018/19,  
 87 matters were recommended for referral to the Director of Proceedings 
 50 matters referred to AHPRA (see page 59) 
 30 matters referred to another external agency (see page 32) 
 2 matters referred for conciliation (see page 30) 
 66 matters on which the office took no further action (OHOQ 2019, p.42) 
 
Roughly half of completed investigations resulted in a referral to the Director 
of Proceedings for consideration of prosecution at QCAT. Nearly 2 in 5 
investigations result in a referral to an external agency, of which about two-
thirds are referrals to AHPRA. Once a complaint is completed, the OHOQ 
may prepare a report of the investigation which may be shared with the 
complainant, the health provider concerned or external party and the report 
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may contain recommendations for action which may be followed up (OHOQ 
2020l).  
 
It appears to have been internalised within the OHOQ that it should only 
investigate ‘serious matters’ (all participants used this term in describing the 
cases that they accepted for investigation). The starting point for this view is 
the OHOQ’s underpinning legislation which states, 
The health ombudsman may refer a health service complaint or other matter 
concerning a registered health practitioner to the National Agency, unless 
the matter indicates that—  
(a) the practitioner may have behaved in a way that constitutes professional 
misconduct; or  
(b) another ground may exist for the suspension or cancellation of the 
practitioner’s registration. (Health Ombudsman Act S91(1)) 
 
and, while the OHOQ does have the power to investigate all complaints 
(Health Ombudsman Act 2013 s.14), it chooses not to do so. 
 
In making this determination of seriousness ‘you’re looking at it in terms of 
where it should go, whether it’s going to be unprofessional conduct or it might 
amount to professional misconduct. That will determine what the most 
appropriate action is’ (Rachel). Or, ‘for unregistered practitioners, that they 
pose a serious risk to the health and safety of the public’ (Rachel).  If it is not 
considered to meet the criteria in section 91(1) often, ‘we will refer matters to 
AHPRA, if it’s not in that serious category’ (Lily). ‘Anything that doesn’t hit the 
threshold of professional misconduct or other conduct or performance, that 
would result in cancellation or suspension of registration. Then that usually 
gets sent to AHPRA to deal with’ (Lydia). In some cases, the complaint may 
be split: ‘you can hive off an impairment aspect and send that over to AHPRA 
… whereas we will deal with the serious conduct aspect of it’ (Rachel). An 
interesting insight was also provided by Lydia when he said ‘Because that’s 
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really what we’re here for. We’re here to make sure that those rogues are 
dealt with’. 
 
If a matter is investigated and it is felt that the concerns are founded ‘then it 
goes up to the DOP, referred up to the DOP to make a decision as to 
whether or not to run it in a tribunal’ (Rachel).However if it is not felt 
appropriate to refer the matter to the DOP then the case may be closed, but 
the OHOQ,  
still have all the other relevant actions available. So, say at the end of 
an investigation you get to it and go, oh this isn’t serious, but there’s 
still conduct that might amount to unprofessional conduct … we’ll refer 
it up to AHPRA. (Rachel). 
 
Although the OHOQ can look at both conduct or performance issues,  
while we [OHOQ] do investigate performance matters, probably the 
larger majority of what we do is conduct matters (Jasmine) where 
conduct matters are the sexual misconduct or the fraud, or whatever, 
so the performance goes to their performance as a practitioner 
(Jasmine).    
 
One challenge that can be faced by the OHOQ during investigations is the 
attitudes with which they are faced from the complained about party, 
And I find that civil lawyers are anything but civil. They’re nasty, they 
make it personal, it’s always a fight, when there’s no need to be a 
fight. And I think that part of that is that indemnity insurers fund the 
disciplinary proceedings and there’s no incentive at the moment to 
settle, not that you can settle proceedings, but to co-operate in 
proceedings (Lydia).  
 
The OHOQ recognises that,  
From a performance context there can often be a situation where the 
doctor’s performance is influenced by a range of things, including 
hours of work and so forth; and the test that’s applied as to whether 
something constitutes professional misconduct in part takes that into 
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account, because the test is whether their performance has been 
substantially below the performance of someone of their qualifications 
and experience (Jasmine),  
and, 
Having said that, there may also be in that sort of situation you may 
identify systemic issues which are contributing to that; and, if that was 
the case, we would separate that off and do a separate systemic 
investigation on that. (Jasmine). 
 
5.4.2.5 Director of Proceedings 
 
A key statutory post within the OHOQ is that of the Director of Proceedings. 
Where the ombudsman believes that a complaint is of sufficient seriousness 
then he may refer the issue within the complaint to the Director of 
Proceedings. The role of the Director of Proceedings is to assess whether 
the practitioner should be referred to the QCAT for formal disciplinary action. 
If the Director of Proceedings makes such a determination then he is 
required to prepare and present the case to the QCAT. Where the Director of 
Proceedings determines that referral to the QCAT is inappropriate then he 
must refer the complaint back the ombudsman for reconsideration and may 
make recommendations on proposed actions (OHOQ 2019, p.51). In 
2018/19, the Director of Proceedings referred 96 matters to the QCAT and 
referred back to the ombudsman 47 matters. This number of 96 cases 
referred to the QCAT were a significant increase on matters referred in the 
previous two years (OHOQ 2019, p.53). During 2018/19, the QCAT delivered 
judgments on 18 cases referred to it by the OHOQ. In all cases, professional 
misconduct was found (OHOQ 2019, p.53). 
 
5.4.2.6 Referring complaints to partners  
 
The OHOQ may refer a complaint about a health professional to a national 
agency (in practice AHPRA) unless the complaint concerns professional 
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misconduct or other issue which may affect the professional’s registration 
(Health Ombudsman Act 2013 s.91(1)). Referrals will include complaints that 
indicate a need for health or performance assessment (QOH) 2019, p. 14) or 
conduct that does not meet the criteria of professional misconduct. The 
OHOQ states that it works closely with its regulatory partners, such as 
AHPRA and the national boards, to minimise the impact of the boundaries 
between them and works collectively on areas of system improvement 
(OHOQ 2019, p.58). 
 
AHPRA is required to inform the OHOQ of all serious concerns that it 
receives relating to registered professionals (Health Ombudsman Act 2013 
s.193(1)). In 2018/19, the OHOQ was referred nine cases by AHPRA, of 
which it accepted three, while OHOQ discussed 2,455 complaints with 
AHPRA, ultimately referring 2,381 complaints to AHPRA (OHOQ 2019, p.60). 
OHOQ also has responsibility for monitoring the performance of AHPRA and 
the national boards, as well as compliance with recommendations contained 
within investigation reports (OHOQ 2020h). The OHOQ is also able to refer 
complaints to another state or federal government agency. In 2018/19, the 
OHOQ referred 1,242 matters to these external agencies which include 
organisations such as the Queensland Police or Fairtrade, although ‘the 
range of government entities that we [OHOQ] refer matters to is extremely 
diverse (OHOQ 2019, p.33). 
 
5.4.2.7 Systemic investigations 
 
Section 80 of the Health Ombudsman Act 2013 provides the ombudsman 
with powers to conduct both systemic investigations and own-motion 
investigations. An own-motion investigation is an investigation started by the 
ombudsman with the intent of pursuing a goal detailed within the Act but 
where the ombudsman has not received a formal complaint about the issue 
concerned (Health Ombudsman Act 2013, s.80)). A key objective of the 
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OHOQ is to ‘Identify and analyse systemic issues impacting on the delivery 
of health services, the regulation of health practitioners and management of 
health complaints’ (OHOQ 2020i).  
 
Systemic investigations concern inquiries into issues ‘relating to the operation 
of a system, process or practice, including issues affecting the quality of 
health services rather than to the individual actions of a person or practitioner 
that occur within the system’ (OHOQ 2019, p.46). The ombudsman claims 
that conducting systemic investigations allows the office to adopt ‘a more 
strategic, proactive approach to protecting the health and safety of the public’ 
(OHOQ 2019, p.46). In 2018-19, a specific systemic investigation team within 
the OHOQ commenced ten systemic investigations and completed nineteen 
systemic investigations (OHOQ 2019). This team is looking to explore 
‘innovative ways to increase public awareness regarding emerging issues 
and trends impacting on the delivery of health services and quality of health 
services, based on the office’s internal intelligence’ (OHOQ 2019, p.47).  
 
Although it was noted by one interviewee that in the legislation which 
underpins the OHOQ, ‘there’s not really a huge focus in our legislation on 
that [systemic investigations], and, ‘there’s a lot of focus on individual health 
service complaints and your usual health providers’ (Lily), there was a lot of 
enthusiasm for the conduct of systemic investigations: ‘I think a greater 
service that we can provide is systemic issues that arise in the healthcare 
system’ (Aisha). One reason for this support is the assumed value for money 
‘where is the best bang for the buck and I think systemics are a big area’ 
(Rachel) and ‘that’s where I think we can add great value’ (Aisha).  
 




I think that’s [systemic investigations] where you can really make 
some effective change. The problem with a lot of regulation is that it’s 
reactive rather than proactive. And, I think that there has to be a 
balance, because if you can change the behaviour rather than 
constantly just react to it, then you’re winning (Lily)., and, 
I think systemic investigations are potentially far more valuable 
because they have a much greater impact across a broader area and 
also have that prevention aspect to them, so not only are you 
addressing systemic issues but you’re preventing poor outcomes 
moving forward (Jasmine). 
   
A final reason for the positive attitude towards systemic activities were the 
positive results that had already been achieved:  
we have had some really good systemics that have happened. So, the 
medicines regulation in Queensland, there was a report that was done 
in relation to that. I think that was a really big systemic and it was a 
really positive outcome. So, it changed a lot the way that sort of 
system worked (Lydia). 
 
One issue that arises in conducting systemic investigations is the method 
utilised,  
If you use traditional investigative methodologies it can take a very 
long time to progress the matter through, and by the time that you’ve 
progressed the matter through, any recommendations that may arise 
from it may well have been addressed to some extent anyway 
(Jasmine).  
 
This concern led to the OHOQ attempting new approaches:  
we’re going to try some very different approaches to systemic 
investigations where we meet with the agencies upfront and talk about 
what they are intending to do in response to particular incidents, and 
looking at implementing or getting an agreement around 
implementation a lot earlier (Jasmine). 
 
One respondent cited an example where this new approach worked with 
maternity services:  
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It let us go out to DG [Director General] Health and all the different 
HHS’s [Hospital and Health Services] saying, we’ve identified this 
issue, you need to get it together. We bring the key stakeholders 
together, run a forum about that to drive a consistent approach 
(Rachel). 
 
5.4.3 System improvement 
 
There was a feeling among those interviewed from the OHOQ that 
complaints could be used to improve services provided the complaints are 
used in a way … a proper way (Rachel) but that it depends upon the culture 
of the organisation:  
if you’re not in a continual improvement sort of mind-set, then you get 
the complaint come in, then you get adversarial you get your back up 
and you just say no. You don’t learn from the complaint So, yes, I’m a 
believer that when the culture of an organisation is such that they look 
at complaints in that sort of way, then yes, complaints can drive 
improvement, like any complaint (Rachel). 
 
A key element in securing system improvement is the recommendations 
arising from the systemic investigations that are undertaken and the 
subsequent monitoring of their compliance,  
And then we have recommendations coming out of the systemic 
issues; so when there’s an investigation report we generally publish 
them, and they will have a series of recommendations; they will have a 
recommendations monitoring plan; we negotiate those with the 
hospital and health service or the facility up front, and then once that 
report comes out then we’ll have time frames in the recommendations 
monitoring plan around the implementation and how we will measure 
the implementation. So, we’re trying to move away from sort of 
documentary proof of implementation where you get flooded by a 
large number of documents every six months or so which may or may 
not give you a good sense of whether things have really improved on 
the ground or not. We’re looking for recommendations monitoring 
things which we hope have more meaning, that we’ll go and observe 
meetings, that we’ll go and have discussions with people on the 
ground, that they will make staff available to us to talk to them about 
when they last had their training and what gaps they think they might 
have and… (Jasmine). 
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Of interest is the approach adopted to making recommendations,  
The position that we take on that [making recommendations] is that it 
is very much a negotiation. We’ve moved away very much from the 
position where you just go and impose a series of recommendations, 
because, really, that facility or that hospital and health service 
understands their business in a way that we don’t; and sometimes 
there are things that they are doing in other areas that can have 
impacts on what’s proposed (Jasmine), and, 
So, to have the best possible recommendations to make sure that 
they’re as meaningful as possible, that they’re going to contribute to a 
better hospital and health service in outcome, and that they will be 
meaningful on the ground, we find that having up front respectful 
discussions is the best way to achieve that (Jasmine). 
 
There is a clear approach of working with bodies to identify meaningful 
recommendations that can lead to desired changes: 
So, I think it’s about having the conversations with them up front about 
how we see our role, that we’re the agency that stands between them 
and people who make complaints and that it’s our job to investigate 
these matters and to look into them and to work out what 
recommendations are appropriate in the public interest; but we 
recognise that they don’t come to work to do a bad job, that they come 
to work to do a good job; and that we have a mutual interest in 
achieving that, so by working together we can get that right in a more 
effective way (Jasmine) 
 
As well as attempting to develop more meaningful recommendations, the 
OHOQ is also trying to ensure that the compliance process to ensure 
implementation of recommendations is also meaningful,  
So, we’re trying to move away from sort of documentary proof of 
implementation where you get flooded by large number of documents 
every six months or so, which may or may not give you a good sense 
of whether things have really improved on the ground or not. We’re 
looking for recommendations monitoring things which we hope have 
more meaning, that we’’ go and observe meetings, that we’ll go and 




An example was provided where a body had not appeared to deliver the 
intended change from previous recommendations:  
In this instance it’s about a series of adverse outcomes which they’ve 
had previous recommendations but the recommendations haven’t 
been implemented properly over time, so they’re getting the same 
repeat mistakes. So what we’re looking at is not so much a matter 
which is the subject of clinical views but rather how you manage 
performance monitoring and quality monitoring going forward, and 
what their committee framework has been to oversight that and what 
they do in practice to ensure that recommendations have in fact been 
implemented and how they do the assurance on that and checking on 
that over time. So, the subject of our discussions on that has been 
very much along those lines (Jasmine) 
 
This move away by the OHOQ from documentary evidence of 
implementation of recommendations is seen as important in assuring itself 
that intended changes have been made:  
Yeah. But this is something that we’ve had a lot of discussions about 
lately, because in the past the position has been they have to come up 
with all this documentary proof that this has been done; we’re saying 
we want a policy and procedure on this; and they’re saying, we’d like 
to develop the process and fine tune it and when we’re sure that we’ve 
got that process and right then we’ll enshrine that in policy and 
procedure. 
So, the easy thing to do would be to sit back and say, well, we want all 
these documents produced and, until we see those documents, we’re 
not saying that that’s implemented. I think it’s incumbent on us to work 
more constructively to work out what’s going to be the most effective 
way; on the one hand you’re carrying some risk there that they could 
be snowing you and that they’re not in fact doing what is going to be 
necessary to achieve the outcome; but on the other hand you can 
mitigate that risk by putting in place monitoring processes which will 
pick that up if they don’t. So, that’s where we want to do the more on-







5.4.4 Other activities undertaken by the OHOQ 
 
The OHOQ undertakes a number of other activities in discharging its 
statutory responsibilities. It provides brief advice on good complaint handling 
to people who, or organisations which, may be subject to a complaint (OHOQ 
2020a) and advice to members of the public on how to make a complaint 
(OHOQ 2020b). It publishes a number of reports: monthly performance 
reports which detail the sources of complaint, the disposition of complaints’ 
received, the age and sex profile of complainants, a summary of the issues 
contained within complaints and a profile of practitioners and bodies 
complained against (OHOQ 2020b); annual reports (OHOQ 2020c) and 
reports about the performance of AHPRA and the national boards. OHOQ 
also makes available on its website public information: educational videos 
(OHOQ 2020d), media releases (OHOQ 2020e), and, a range of fact sheets 
aimed at assisting in the submission of a complaint or notification (OHOQ 
2020f) as well as a range of supporting forms (OHOQ 2020g). 
 
The OHOQ undertakes a significant amount of stakeholder engagement, 
some of it of a general nature such as promoting the OHOQ to community 
groups and some which is more targeted such as to medical students at 
Queensland Universities (Lydia) or health bodies, law firms, medical insurers 
and staff unions (Lily). The OHOQ does attempt to encourage learning 
though outreach work. If the ombudsman becomes aware of issues then he 
may well ‘look at topics and go and speak to various professions about those 
topics’ (Lydia), including the unregistered area of jurisdiction:  
And I think the massage therapy one was one where the health 
ombudsman at the time, they brought in representatives from the 
different industry associations to talk to them about the kind of issues 





There was a general view that the OHOQ did not undertake sufficient media 
activity to promote itself as a body or the work that it undertakes, a view 
expressed by Aisha, ‘we’re not proactive in that, we’re sort of reactive, so if 
the paper or media outlet contacts us then we might do something’, Jasmine, 
‘I think that there’s a lot more that could be done from a media perspective’, 
and, ‘I think it would be good to get into the modern age and get Twitter 
handles’, and, Lydia, ‘I don’t think we promote ourselves well enough’,  and, ‘I 
think that social media is another platform that we could use and we don’t’. 
There was some concern about the balance that should be struck, with Lydia 
saying  
it’s a double-edged sword because we are already getting well, well 
above the number of complaints that were ever projected when this 
office was set up. If you go out there and promote it even more, it 
[OHOQ} means, again, you’re going to get more in the door. 
 
5.5 The Scottish Public Services Ombudsman 
 
‘our dual objective is to put right what has gone wrong …[and]… the other 
side of our work has to be about public sector improvement’ (Mia). 
 
The complaint handling process adopted by the SPSO is as follows: 
 Assessment: Ensuring that the SPSO has relevant information to 
determine if the matter is one which the SPSO is allowed to consider. 
If a complaint received by the SPSO is determined as not being 
suitable for action by the SPSO then it is closed as an enquiry. 
 Early resolution: This is where the caseworker confirms that the matter 
is in jurisdiction and begins the evidence collecting exercise. 
 Investigation: if it is considered appropriate, an investigation will be 
undertaken. Such investigations may be closed on proportionality 
grounds: ‘some cases are closed if we are able to resolve them 
[without an investigation], we consider there would be no significant 
benefit to the complainant, or the outcome desired is unachievable’ or 
by reaching a decision on the matter of complaint. 
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 Publication: the SPSO is required to lay its decisions before the 
Scottish Parliament and will publish decision summaries or full reports, 
dependent upon the importance of the complaint and the decision 
(SPSO 2019, p.13). 
 
Unlike with the OHOQ, the complaint handling process within SPSO is more 
linear in nature. A complaint considered by the SPSO will follow the path of 
assessment, investigation and report with the principle action taken by the 
SPSO to investigate. The Scottish Public Services Act 2002 does not provide 
the SPSO with the same freedoms as exists with OHOQ to utilise a range of 
alternative dispute resolution methods such as conciliation or mediation, 
listing only investigation as the method to be used. 
 
5.6 Complaint numbers 
 
Key numbers (all complaints) from the SPSO’s Annual Report for 2018/19 
include: 
 1707 enquiries were closed 
 The SPSO received 4,188 complaints of which 1,451 related to 
healthcare and reached decisions on 3,955 complaints of which 58% 
were ‘upheld’ in full or in part.  
 The SPSO made 1,160 recommendations to improve public services 
(SPSO 2019, pp.4-5 and pp.10-12) 
 
 
With respect to health complaints, in 2018/19, the SPSO 
 Closed 5 complaints at the enquiry stage 
 Closed 454 complaints for one of the following reasons: the SPSO 
provided advice to the complainant, on the grounds that the complaint 
had not been considered by the health body concerned or was not 
duly made or withdrawn. 
 Closed 442 complaints at an early resolution stage of which about half 
were not able to be considered by the SPSO and about half on the 
grounds of proportionality. 
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 Closed 454 complaints following a full investigation of which 162 were 
fully upheld, 98 partially upheld and 182 were not upheld. The 
remainder were not duly made, withdrawn or resolved. (SPSO 2019a) 
 
Tables 12 to 14 provide available detail on health complaints considered by 
the SPSO in 2018-19: 
 
Health Sector Number 
Health Board 1076 
General Practice 195 
Dental Service 33 
Ambulance Service 35 
Community Pharmacy 3 
Other (from five bodies) 19 
Total 1361 
Table 12 Number of complaints received by the SPSO by health sector (SPSO 2019f) 
 





Complaint handling 46 
Nursing 32 
Other (across 12 categories) 193 
Total 1,456 










Early resolution 442 
Investigation 454 
Total 1,331 
Table 14 Number of closures at the different stages of the complaints process (SPSO 2019f) 
 
5.7 The objectives of the SPSO 
 
The strap line on the cover of the SPSO’s 2018/19 Annual Report (SPSO 
2019) is ‘People Centred; Improvement Focused’ and this same strap line is 
on the 2019-20 Business Plan (SPSO 2019e). The use of this phrase 
suggests that contributing to the improvement of services is a key aim for the 
SPSO. It claims to ‘work with bodies under our jurisdiction to provide 
essential advice, guidance and training on complaints handling, share 
learning and best practice, and ultimately enable a more efficient delivery of 
Scottish public services’ (SPSO 2020m). ‘We have a very clear learning and 
improvement ethos’ (Mia). 
 
All participants were asked about the SPSO’s objectives and the first stated 
objective from each participant was the handling of individual complaints but 
they were split on further objectives, with three participants stating that a 
second objective was to learn from complaints to improve services while two 
participants said it was to improve complaint handling. One participant stated 
all three objectives. Carney et al. (2017, p.82) note that ability for health 
complaint bodies to focus on both system improvement and the resolution of 
individual complaints has proven to be challenging ‘both conceptually and in 




An important objective for the SPSO, is, thus, to contribute to the 
improvement of the healthcare system. Partly because it is a good in itself, 
but also because ‘the more improvement work you do the less pressure you 
have on the complaint, the individual complaint handling side of the business’ 
(Chloe) and that while that may not result necessarily in less complaints ‘you 
would hope that that the things that come to you are genuinely the things that 
are complex and intractable and genuinely need an independent view’ 
(Chloe). While the number of complaints received has remained effectively 
static over the last three years at 4,188, 4,125 and 4,182 respectively, the 
proportion of premature complaints13 has fallen over the last three years from 
28% of complaints (2016-17) to 24% of complaints (2017-18) and then to 
20% of complaints (2018-19) (SPSO 2019, pp.10-11). It is not clear whether 
this reduction is due to improved complaint handling or improvements to the 
overall healthcare system. If a complaint is upheld, then the SPSO will ask 
the body to ‘apologise to you and explain why things went wrong. We may 




The results of the research involving the SPSO begins with the participants’ 
views concerning the objectives of the SPSO. Following this, the results 
follow the handling of a complaint received by the SPSO. It then provides the 
results of the SPSO’s approach to system improvement before ending with a 
review of the other activities undertaken by the SPSO and which may 
contribute to improvement of the healthcare system 
 
 
                                            
13 A premature complaint is a complaint received by the SPSO before the organisation 
complained about has had an opportunity to try to resolve the issue(s) concerned. 
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5.8.1 Complaint handling process 
 
In the investigation process, the SPSO is able to consider the professional 
judgment of health practitioners and as a lay office needs to obtain clinical 
advice to enable it to do so effectively: 
I think in that area [health], we rely more heavily on professional 
advice to help us assess whether or not people, whether the service 
has delivered, has been within the requirements of the professional 
guidance within that area (Chloe). 
 
Asked how determinative was the clinical advice that was obtained there was 
a mix of views. ‘I would suggest that, by and large, the advice would be 
accepted’ (Mary) or ‘Everyone in the system is very clear that it is the 
investigators that are making the decision and it is not the clinicians’ (Chloe). 
In complaints that involve the use of clinical judgment, there is, inevitably, a 
tension between accepting advice that is received and suggesting that it is 
just one piece of evidence among others, of which investigators take 
account, before making an independent decision. Lay people may struggle to 
accurately assess the clinical evidence. If a health organisation ‘felt that the 
advice was in any way flawed or erroneous or not up-to-date or not in line 
with sound guidance, then they may ask for the decision to be reviewed and 
that is something that we would do’ (Mary). It is not clear how a lay 
complainant with no access to clinical opinion is able to challenge the 
opinion. 
 
When a complaint is upheld the SPSO will publish the case, normally as a 
decision summary or, if it meets certain public interest requirements (SPSO 
2020h), as an investigation report, although the SPSO’s website does not 
detail the criteria used. A review of the last ten published investigation reports 
of health complaints, as at 9 April 2020, was undertaken. Summaries of 
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investigation reports were selected because they, supposedly, represent the 
most important cases published by the SPSO. 
 
5.8.2 Investigation reports and decision summaries 
 
Summary investigation reports are composed of a brief description of the 
complaint and investigation, the findings that arise and the recommendations 
proposed. Attitudinally, there appears to be a different approach between the 
section detailing the complaint, investigation and summary and the section 
detailing the recommendations that result. The findings are replete with the 
language of judgment. In each case complaints are either upheld or not 
upheld while the language within the investigation summaries is of failings, 
failure, significant failings, unreasonably failed, inadequate, and serious 
failure in care. Receipt by a clinician of a report which uses language such as 
the above is unlikely to be warmly received and may prompt negative 
emotions (see 2.4 about the responses by doctors to complaints). Similar 
language and recommendations are found in a review of the SPSO decision 
reports, which are summaries of complaint decisions held not to meet the 





Where a complaint is upheld, both an apology is required and 
recommendations for system improvement are made. Apologies are required 
to meet the standards within the SPSO’s guidance on apology (SPSO 
undated). In 2018/19, the SPSO made a total of 130 recommendations 
relating to complaint handling, 386 ‘individual’ apologies and 644 
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recommendations relating to learning and improvement (SPSO 2019, p.25)14. 
Only 48% of health recommendations were completed within the timescale 
set by the SPSO, although this figure rose to 84% completed within 3 months 
of the set target date (SPSO 2019, p.25). 
 
As stated above, each recommendation will identify the outcome that the 
body is required to achieve. The outcomes required from recommendations 
tend to be that of established best practice – as identified within policies and 
guidance produced by the Board concerned or national standards and 
guidelines (see reports in SPSO 2020l). Thus, in using recommendations to 
improve healthcare services, the SPSO attempts to use normative standards 
to guide responses from Health Boards,  
If someone comes to you, us and says I think this should happen, 
what we look at is, what we look at is really what should have 
happened in line with national guidance or something. So if we are 
writing, making a recommendation, in a lot of cases what we are just 
telling the organisation is under the guidance you should be doing this, 
therefore take it away, look at it, see what the problem is, and make 
sure that in future you do act in line with the guidance (Susan). 
 
The SPSO can take a strong line when ensuring that recommendations will 
be effectively implemented:  
Although they [health boards] have the opportunity to identify and 
evidence how they will achieve the desired outcome, the ombudsman, 
the SPSO, still retains the authority to say, well that’s not quite good 
enough, or that’s not fully delivering, or that’s not you know, we don’t, 
we have not abdicated responsibility in terms of recommendations 
(Mary). 
 
The SPSO actively follows up recommendations to ensure that they have 
been implemented and will follow up if not satisfied – ‘If they then supply 
                                            
14 Unfortunately, the SPSO does not provide a breakdown of these figures by sector 
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evidence to confirm that recommendations have been carried out and we are 
not convinced by that evidence then we will go back to them’ (Ellie). 
 
5.9 System improvement 
 
While not able to undertake systemic or own-motion investigations, the 
SPSO has produced thematic reports which are reports that draw on 
common themes identified within the individual complaints. Their purpose is 
to highlight common issues and make more generalised findings and 
recommendations than can be made from individual complaints. The SPSO 
has published a total of two such reports, both in 2017; one report on the 
need for organisations to support staff through complaint processes, and a 
second on issues relating to informed consent (SPSO 2020a). The SPSO 
provides a relatively large amount of support and guidance to bodies in 
jurisdiction, the primary method by which it seeks to obtain system 
improvement arising from complaints is via the resultant recommendations, 
If you are upholding a complaint, it is because something went wrong, 
it is because you didn’t do what you were meant to, something didn’t 
go the way it should have, therefore you have upheld the complaint. 
There must be learning from that. There must be things you can 
improve at (Mary).  
 
This commitment to learning from complaints begins with the complainant. 
Complainants, 
very often start with, I don’t want this to happen to somebody else, and 
I think puts a responsibility on us [the SPSO] to ensure that we do pick 
up the service issues, we do pick up the standards issues, and we do 





At the time of the interviews with the SPSO, a new approach to making 
recommendations had recently been introduced with this drive for change 
coming from within the SPSO,  
I think it came out of a concern from CRs15 a couple of years ago that 
we were making the same recommendation to the same body about 
the same thing and that, that didn’t seem to be being particularly 
effective (Ellie). 
 
‘Before, we kind of sat there, at our desks, and tried to think what has gone 
wrong and what can fix it’ (Ellie). It was suggested that this may be possible 
for simple individual errors, but when the complaint related to ‘systems or a 
departmental issue, I think it was quite difficult to feel that we were making an 
effective recommendation because, while we had investigated one complaint, 
we had not investigated the entire process behind it’ (Ellie). In the revised 
approach ‘it is really up to the organisation to work out how they achieve that 
[the appropriate response to the upheld failing]’ (Ellie),  
So, we are putting the onus back on the organisation and saying you, 
we have noticed some mistakes but it is still your system, so you take 
ownership of it and fix it, and tell us how you fixed it (Ellie). 
 
The rationale behind this change in approach is quite clear as the following 
quotes indicate: 
I think the value from a perspective is that we may not always be best 
placed to make a recommendation that is appropriate because we 
might not know fully the extent of the organisation’s structures and 
resources and so on. So, we might make a recommendation that we 
think is quite an appropriate and straightforward recommendation and, 
but it may have quite an impact on the organisation (Mary),  
But our recommendation system now is much more we set out what 
the vision should be and it is really is up to the organisation to work 
out how they achieve that. So, we are putting the onus back on the 
organisation and saying you, we have noticed some mistakes but it is 
still your system so you take ownership of it and fix it, and tell us how 
you fixed it (Ellie), and, 
                                            
15 CRs are caseworkers  
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I think what we do now is much better where we are basically passing 
the problem back to them and saying have a look at this, you decide 
what is proportionate, find out if it is a widespread problem that needs 
something further done to it (Susan). 
 
This changing of approach was described by one participant as a journey: 
The final point about all of this is the way that we make our 
recommendations. We are on the beginning of a journey that we 
started six months ago. And that is for individual [complaints], we 
divide recommendations into three types. For the complainant so that 
is personal redress, it is if we uphold there is inevitably an apology 
required. ... The second type of recommendation is learning and 
improvement, service improvement, good practice. And the third type 
is complaint handling. And what we do with both of those is we 
explicitly state our finding, we explain what we want the outcome to be 
of whatever needs to happen, and then we ask for evidence that that 
change, that improvement, that outcome has been or will be achieved 
(Mia).  
 
In contrast with the OHOQ, the SPSO takes a different approach to making 
recommendations: 
I would never describe what we do as negotiation, ever. That is not 
appropriate to my mind. I think that everything you do has to be 
transparent, equally transparent, to the complainant. But I think that in 
a mature environment there has to be discussion and the reason I say 
that is because, erm, it will always be the case that a health board has 
more knowledge, or definitely should have more knowledge about how 
their systems operate, and we could be in a position where we make 
recommendations that have unintended consequences and that is not 
what we are trying to achieve (Chloe). 
 
and, ‘increasingly there is recognition that if what we really want is 
improvement then that has to be through dialogue, you know effective 
dialogue but without compromising our independence, our impartiality, and 
our transparency’ (Chloe). This change in approach necessitated a change in 
relationship between the SPSO and bodies in jurisdiction which, while being 
open and collaborative, did not result in negotiated settlements: 
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Now that sounds really easy in practice and it is absolutely the right 
thing to do but what I think it will lead us to do over time and it is 
already starting is that point between draft and final, there probably 
needs to be a better conversation with the public body in terms of how 
they demonstrate they have achieved the outcome. And I am 
beginning to see that creep in now. Rather than saying, here is my 
draft decision, have any comment? We are beginning to look at, in 
particular could you look at our recommendation for how the outcome 
will be achieved. The finding stands. This is not about, this is not a 
negotiation about the findings, it is about the deliverables. And it is not 
a negotiation, it is really a conversation to make sure that we do 
achieve that saving, that, that outcome, and that change (Mia). 
 
An operational member of staff described the new approach as, 
… on some complaints, particularly the more significant ones, 
particularly the ones potentially where it goes to public report, and to 
start to say okay, this is what we have found, what do you think will 
make it less likely to happen in future, or can you explore what, what 
changes you think need to be made and then come back to us and tell 
you, and tell us what you want to do. That is much more labour 
intensive for us and it is much more labour intensive for the authority 
so you have to be very careful when you might apply that kind of 
approach. But that is, with some cases, where we are starting to move 
towards. And, that can be very effective, but it is certainly, the board 
is, or the authority is much more likely to identify more things to 
change and more things to, to improve their service that way than, 
than by just saying go make sure those staff get trained. But equally, 
you have to proportionate about it and you cannot, you cannot apply 
that approach to every complaint because it would just snow the 
system under (Poppy). 
 
However, there appears to be some inconsistency in its use. On the one 
hand was a view that such conversations were taking place: 
We are beginning to look at, in particular could you [the body] look at 
our recommendation for how the outcome will be achieved. The 
finding stands. This is not about, this is not a negotiation about the 
findings, it is about the deliverables. And it is not a negotiation, it is 
really a conversation to make sure that we do achieve that saving, 
that, that outcome, and that change (Mia). 
 
And if the SPSO is challenged,  
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if a body disagrees with a recommendation or doesn’t feel that it is 
based on, that the evidence from within the case doesn’t, doesn’t 
warrant the recommendation that has flowed from it, they can ask for 
a, request a review of the complaint and that is, you know, open to 
them to do and that would be something that they could pursue with 
us and we would have a think about whether that recommendation 
was appropriate and reasonable (Poppy),  
 
and, ‘it is rare but occasionally they will come back and say that is not 
something that practically we can do and so we are kind of open to 
discussing them at that point’ (Ellie). On the other hand, there was a 
suggestion that this use of conversation was overstated: ‘really, we, we don’t 
generally speak to the organisation before we have made our decision and 
our decision includes the recommendations’ (Ellie). 
 
This change in approach was described as ‘outcome-focused, so rather than 
being prescriptive in terms of what this is what you must do, the 
recommendation will identify what the ideal outcome should be for a 
particular complainant’ (Mary). There is a suggestion that this new approach 
is welcomed by bodies, ‘the feedback, anecdotally at least, but the verbal 
feedback that we get is that the new approach to recommendations is 
welcomed’ (Mary). This is, perhaps, unsurprising, as bodies in jurisdiction will 
have some ownership of the proposed changes. As a safeguard, a 
caseworker may sense check the proposed response to the recommendation 
with a clinical adviser and ask ‘do you think this is a reasonable response to 
this recommendation?’ (Susan). 
 
The intention is that this new approach delivers recommendations that, while 
meeting the requirements of the SPSO, are driven by the practical realities 
faced by bodies:   
… if I was a body, I would much prefer that ownership and 
empowerment rather than being prescribed to this is what I must to, 
this is how I must do it, this is when I must do it by, and this is the 
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evidence you have got to give me to prove that you have done it. That 
is very tight and prescriptive and it not be not be the best approach 
(Mary). 
 
While this may suggest that the approach is not intended to be prescriptive, 
one participant stated that the SPSO ‘will set out what improvement we [the 
SPSO] will expect to take place, what evidence we want to confirm that that 
has taken place, and the implementation date’ (Susan). The review of the ten 
investigation report summaries suggests that a more prescriptive approach is 
used in practice. Each summary contains the recommendations arising from 
that complaint and an example from a recently published investigation report 
is indicated in Figure 4 below (SPSO 2020l).  
 
As can be seen from this figure, the boxes contain specific requirements that 
have to be delivered and in the key box detailing what the body is required to 
do there is use of the word ‘should’ (SPSO 2020l) and there is frequently a 
reference to guidelines and policies. The box detailing required evidence to 
indicate compliance is typically detailed about what is expected. Each 
recommendation on service improvement in recommendations uses the word 
‘should’ (SPSO 2020l) and there is frequently a reference to guidelines and 
policies. This, together with the comment from Susan, suggests a more 











Figure 4 Example recommendations from investigation report (SPSO 2020l) 
 
5.10 The Complaints Standards Authority 
 
As part of its CSA responsibilities, the SPSO has produced different model 
complaint handling procedures (model CHPs) for different sectors under its 
remit, such as higher education, local authority, social work and, importantly, 
the NHS in Scotland. The health model CHP was published in 2017 following 
What we found What should change Evidence SPSO needs to 
check that this has 
happened and deadline 
There was a failure 
to properly 
investigate Ms A 
for an underlying 
right hip infection 
over a period of 
five years in light of 
her presentation 
Patients, who have 
symptoms suggestive 
of an underlying joint 
infection, should be 
fully and appropriately 




Evidence that the findings of 
this case have been used as 
a training tool for staff and 
that this decision has been 
shared and discussed with 
relevant staff in a supportive 
manner.   This could include 
minutes of discussions at a 
staff meeting or copies of 
internal memos/emails. 
Evidence that the Board have 
prepared a local guidance 
policy, which is in line with 
recognised guidelines for 
investigating hip replacement 
infections 
  
By:  24 September 2019 
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a collaborative development process involving the NHS in Scotland and 
patient representatives. To assist bodies to comply with the model CHPs, the 
SPSO ‘produced a complaints’ improvement framework which is a self-
assessment tool’ (Chloe) and a quality assurance tool ‘looking at the journey 
of a complaint’ (Mary). In addition, ‘we do offer a, it’s almost like a help desk, 
we offer, we provide, advice, guidance and support to bodies’ (Mary). In 
2028/19, the CSA provided advice on 259 occasions, of which, around one in 
four were from health bodies (SPSO 2019, p.22). While all participants spoke 
of the CSA working with bodies to improve complaint handling, Mia states 
that ‘It’s important in the sense of it gives, putting it on a statutory footing, 
gives us more leverage to improve complaint handling’ suggesting that there 
may be an iron hand within a velvet glove. 
 
The expectation is that NHS organisations review their complaint handling 
processes and ensure that they align with the model CHP (SPSO 2020c). 
NHS organisations must monitor their compliance with the model CHP and 
report this to the SPSO (SPSO 2020d). The model CHP includes information 
on required complaint performance indicators to be used by NHS bodies and 
which the NHS bodies should report (SPSO 2017). Bodies ‘have to publish 
all of that data against set performance measures and that will include details 
of the learning that they have taken from those complaints’ (Chloe). There is 
recognition that bodies struggle with this last requirement – ‘It is difficult for 
them [bodies in jurisdiction] to demonstrate learning and improvement as a 
result of complaints’ (Mary). Despite the requirement on bodies to publish 
data on complaints including performance measures, the SPSO is clear that 
‘we are not a regulatory body and so it really should be the role of the 
regulatory bodies that already exist to pick up that complaints data’ (Chloe). 
One participant went so far as to state that the name, the Complaints 
Standard Authority could be a problem,  
because if you have the words Complaints Standards Authority then 
… the focus is on complaints standards and, I think, we need to look 
170 
 
at … how do we make it work better and that is less about authority 
and more about collaboration (Mia). 
The SPSO reports on compliance with the model CHP by bodies in 
jurisdiction in its Annual Report (see SPSO 2019, pp.22-23). The SPSO 
surveyed a sample of bodies in jurisdiction on the model CHP and reported 
high levels of satisfaction with the model CHP although there was less 
positive feedback on the performance indicators, the model CHP document 
structure and website (SPSO 2019, p.23). Since the introduction of the NHS 
model CHP, the SPSO reports that the number of complaints received by it 
concerning health organisations without the complaint having been first 
considered by the health organisation has fallen 4%, from 22% -17%16, while 
there has been no difference in the number of upheld complaints considered 
by the SPSO (SPSO 2019, p.24).   
 
5.11 Other activities undertaken by the SPSO 
 
As well as complaint handling and the complaint standards roles, the SPSO 
undertakes other activities. In 2018/19, it provided 37 face-to-face training 
events to public service bodies; made four submissions to the Scottish 
Parliament (SPSO 2019, p.4-5) and six submissions to other organisations 
such as the Government of Jersey (SPSO 2020f). Training is also available 
online and the SPSO holds an annual conference (SPSO 2020i). The SPSO 
makes significant effort to support bodies through a range of activities 
including guidance and resource material covering complaint handling, 
communication with the public, learning and governance; insights for learning 
including thematic reports, investigation reports, decision summaries, case 
studies, complaint statistics, and a quality assurance tool; training on 
complaint handling; and, its newsletter (SPSO 2020i). It makes available a 
wide range of leaflets on complaints for both the public and bodies in 
                                            




jurisdiction (SPSO 2020e) and guidance to bodies in jurisdiction on apology 
and on redress (SPSOO 2020e). The SPSO publishes its findings on its 
website (SPSO 2020g) and publishes a monthly newsletter (SPSO 2020).  
 
In 2019, the SPSO produced a ‘Support and Intervention Policy’ which details 
when and how the SPSO may undertake a support or intervention action. 
This Support and Intervention Policy appears to be a development of 
previous practice where the SPSO has,  
over the last four years met with organisations that are on, in that top 
ten to twenty to talk through with them where they think the issues are 
to try to leave them to improve practice. We, in the last year and a 
half, we have selected two bodies to work with in more detail and do 
much more targeted work. (Chloe) 
 
The objective of these meetings is to discuss ‘the sort of complaints we are 
getting from them, what they can do to try and prevent the number of 
complaints coming through to us’ (Susan). 
 
In implementing this new support and intervention policy, the SPSO commit 
to ‘supporting organisations to address issues proactively’ and, ‘engage[ing] 
openly and constructively with organisations’ (SPSO 2019c, p.5), 
A support or intervention action is action taken by SPSO to encourage 
good practice or address poor performance by an organisation under 
our jurisdiction in relation to … the organisation’s complaint handling 
… or … the organisation’s engagement with SPSO 
investigations/reviews (SPSO 2019c). 
 
Examples where the SPSO may intervene include ‘non-compliance with the 
Model Complaints Handling Procedure … evidence of poor local complaint 
handling … evidence of a lack of learning from complaints … failure to 
adequately respond to an enquiry or recommendation’ (SPSO 2019c, p.6). 
Interventions may range from discussions at casework office level for minor 
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issues to the laying of special reports before the Scottish Parliament for the 
most serious issue or where there is persistent non-compliance (SPSO 
2019c, p.7). Thus, a document which uses the language of support, 
engagement and working openly and constructively, also uses the language 
of failure and non-compliance with, what some may construe as, a 
threatening list of sanctions for bodies which fail to do what the SPSO 
requires. 
 
Each year the SPSO sends to the Chief Executives of some of the bodies in 
jurisdiction, such as health bodies, local authorities, water companies and the 
Scottish Prison Service, an annual letter detailing key data about the 
complaints that it, the SPSO, had received about the body. In addition, the 
letter provides a brief overview of the year from the perspective of the SPSO 
along with details of developments that had occurred within the SPSO 
(SPSO 2019d).  
 
5.12 Working with partners 
 
The SPSO works with a range of external regulators and, because of this, 
has a memorandum of understanding with 13 such regulators (SPSO 2020j). 
The SPSO will share its data with other relevant regulatory bodies as ‘I think 
it is right and appropriate that the data is used by the regulatory bodies that 
already exist to analyse the information that is there’ (Chloe). In pursuit of 
this, the SPSO is a member of the Healthcare Intelligence Sharing Group 
which ‘consists of all the regulators within the health field’ (Mary) which meet 
to share their data about specific health boards ‘to build up a national 
regulatory picture of that health board and that is fed back to the health board 






This chapter has presented the results of the research involving the OHOQ 
and the SPSO. Although both are health complaint entities, it is clear that 
their objectives and activities are very different, due, in large part, to their 
underpinning legislation, but also arising from decisions made by the 




















Chapter 6 Results – Scottish health boards 
 




This chapter details the results of the research involving bodies in jurisdiction 
in Scotland. The chapter, firstly, considers awareness by health board 
participants of the SPSO and their perceptions of the SPSO’s roles within the 
healthcare system, before considering how health boards respond to an 
SPSO investigation. The chapter continues by considering how bodies 
handle the resultant investigation reports and associated recommendations. 
The chapter concludes with a consideration of the awareness by participants 
of a small sample of published reports concerning their health organisation.  
The description that follows is drawn from the responses made by all 
participants.  Although each of the three health boards will have slightly 
different arrangements the commonality exceeds the differences. As was the 
case with the results from the two health ombudsman offices, the themes 
used in this analysis are identified by the section headings, in this Chapter 
starting at Section 6.3. 
 
A total of 21 staff from three Scottish health boards agreed to participate. The 







Staff category Number of participants 
Director level 7 
Nursing staff17 8 
Patient affairs/complaints staff 6 
Non-clinical operations manager 1 
Table 15 Demographics of participants from Scottish health boards 
 
6.2 Awareness and perceptions of the roles of the SPSO 
 
As would be expected, all participants were aware of the SPSO although this 
general awareness related to the SPSO’s complaint handling function. There 
was less, and mixed, awareness of the other activities undertaken by the 
SPSO. Excluding complaint handling, Table 16 provides details on nine other 
activities cited by participants together with the number of participants citing 
that activity.  
Activity 
Number of participants 
mentioning this activity 
Education and training programmes 12 
Publication of decisions 11 
Visits from the SPSO 10 
Improving complaint handling 7 
Publication of reports (not individual 
case) 
6 
Colleague was a clinical advisor 3 
SPSO Newsletter 1 
Guidance on the SPSO website 1 
Professional relationship with SPSO 
staff 
1 
Table 16 Awareness by participants of SPSO's non complaint activities 
 
Those participants who identified education and training were representative 
of the broader cohort of participants. Ironically, participants from complaint 
                                            
17 Note that all of the eight nurses had operational management responsibilities 
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offices were less likely to raise the SPSO’s activities in the improvement of 
complaint handling. Nurses were much more likely to be aware of the 
published investigation reports and decision summaries than other staff, 
while senior staff were more likely to be aware of the other reports produced 
by the SPSO and to know of visits by the SPSO to their organisation. 
 
A second way of viewing the awareness of different SPSO activities by 
participants is to consider how many activities were identified by individual 
participants and this is shown in Table 17. 
Number of SPSO non-complaint 
activities identified by participants 
Number of participants 
Six activities 1 
Four activities 5 
Three activities 5 
Two activities 6 
One activity 1 
No activity 3 
Table 17 Number of participants identifying different SPSO non complaint activities 
 
All 21 participants were aware of the role of the SPSO in complaint handling 
with 12 participants stressing the importance of the SPSO’s independence 
when investigating complaints. Twelve participants identified the SPSO’s role 
in contributing to system improvement, of whom, five participants stated that 
the recommendations made by the SPSO when upholding complaints were a 
driver of learning and improvement. Five participants suggested that the 
SPSO had a role in ‘scrutiny’ and holding bodies to account, while three 
participants suggested that the SPSO had a role in promoting learning from 
other complaints while another two participants suggested that the SPSO 
had a role in educating health boards on complaint handling and. Table 18 
provides detail on the breakdown of participants and their views on the role of 

















5 5 1 2 3 1 
Nursing  
 








0 1 1 1   
Table 18 Number of participants who identified differing SPSO roles 
 
6.3 Participants’ views on SPSO investigations 
 
All the health boards had clear processes in place to respond to 
investigations commenced by the SPSO. These would involve the collation of 
information from the clinical service about which the investigation was 
targeted, the complaints department and the health records department. In 
addition to this information, health boards may, at that time, offer additional 
comment on the case that they believe relevant. During the interviews three 
themes arose from participants relating to the way that the SPSO conducted 
its investigations: firstly, the interactions between the SPSO and health 
boards during the investigation, secondly, the ability to challenge the 




As stated above, the health boards have in place clear procedures to handle 
complaints being investigated by the SPSO. Participants from all three health 
boards stated that when handling SPSO investigations, health boards would 
ordinarily have a single point of contact, which may be an individual or a 
specific team, and which would liaise with the SPSO during the investigation. 
Accordingly, for clinical staff, although informed that an investigation is taking 
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place, they were not likely to be made aware of, or have any interaction with 
the SPSO, until the outcome of the investigation is complete. For clinicians, ‘it 
feels like it goes into the ether’ (Eleanor).  
 
Such interactions, as do take place, tend to be in writing, with little in way of 
spoken communication, with many participants bemoaning this lack of 
personal interaction between health boards and the SPSO: Rhoda described 
the relationship between health boards and the SPSO as ‘it feels like an 
administrative process. … I think it’s bureaucratic’.  For Darcie, ‘it seems to 
be just black and white. You take everything from what’s written’, Deirdre, 
‘There’s quite a lot of electronic chatter rather than face to face. … I just 
wonder if there could be some improvement around face to face discussion 
about the case’, Donna ‘but that’s what I see as missing because they’re 
there and we’re here and only the twain shall meet in writing’, Jessica, 
‘They’re not coming out to us and talking to us and interacting with us’, and, 
for Vicky ‘So it tends to be by email, and so I would say the majority of it is by 
email, but when there’s a phone call, it’s usually because they need 
something relatively quickly, or it’s a bit more complex’. This lack of 
communication can make it difficult for health board staff to respond 
appropriately to the SPSO:  
It’s as if there’s this barrier, and it’s like, why can’t we pick up the 
phone and say, “Can I just clarify, what is it you’re looking for? Can I 
just …? We were thinking of doing X, Y and Z, would that be 
sufficient? Is that what you’re looking for?” … These people are just 
doing a job the same as us, so why can’t we phone up and question 
them?’ (Emma). 
 
Some of the participants expressed concern about the lack of oral 
communication: Darcie, ‘I think for me it’s sometimes frustrating, because it’s 
a one-way process’,  
I think you can get so much more information from talking to 
somebody, so I could write anything to you and you could interpret it in 
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any way you liked, … but if you speak to me, you can ask me 
questions (Darcie), and, 
I think the more communication probably the better for both ways. For 
the ombudsman to understand more, but also for the teams here to 
actually be able to recollect some things in a different way and view 
things differently (Phoebe). 
 
6.3.2 Challenging the ombudsman 
 
It was noted earlier that, where the SPSO viewed that it was in the public 
interest to publish an investigation report, it would afford health boards the 
opportunity to comment on the draft report, but where a decision summary 
was to be published no such opportunity was afforded: Jackie ‘No. if it’s a 
decision letter we don’t get a draft, we just get a final decision letter. If it’s an 
investigation report we get a draft to check for factual accuracy’, and, 
Again, that’s where there’s a slight variance in terms of what happens. 
I think in terms of the decision letters, one of the frustrations for me 
certainly was that, unlike the published report, you didn’t get to see the 
draft decision letter. … [I] never really understood that to be honest 
(Tess). 
 
While health boards can appeal a decision letter this presents problems for 
both health boards and the complainant,  
And the difficulty with that is that you can appeal it, there’s an appeal 
period, but the decision letter has already gone to the patient. So, if we 
appeal it and win our appeal, they [the SPSO] then have to write to the 
patient and say, “Actually we’re withdrawing that decision letter based 
on this information” (Jackie).  
 
This can lead to pressure for health boards to accept the decision letter:  
Because when we get the recommendations in, almost always one of 
the recommendations is that we write a letter of apology. So, there’s 
no way I would allow a letter of apology go to a patient, then we 
appeal it, and we withdraw that letter of apology (Jackie). 
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However, one problem of doing this is, as Phoebe stated, 
Sometimes you get a very upset, angry, frustrated clinician who think 
that it’s been unfair and if that’s the case, we will contact the 
ombudsman and we will say X, Y, Z or whatever. They listen, but very 
often the letter’s been issued by then and we just need to work with 
our own teams and support them, moving forward. 
 
This difference, between decision letters and investigation reports, was of 
concern to participants, as, while many participants recognised that they 
could challenge the factual accuracy of reports, issues arose when there 
were concerns within the report, ‘actually you’re only asked to comment on 
factual inaccuracies not necessarily clinical opinion’ (Vicky) or ‘We can 
challenge the factual accuracy of it [the draft report] with evidence, but we 
can’t challenge their recommendations’ (Rhoda). 
 
There was a feeling among many participants that it was inappropriate to 
challenge the ombudsman: ‘I was always made to feel as if you shouldn’t 
question anything they ask you’ (Emma), ‘I think it’s almost a given that your 
starting point is that you don’t challenge the ombudsman (Tess), ‘I don’t think 
they like being challenged (Vicky), and, ‘I get the sense they’re [the SPSO 
are] quite directive and not really open to a challenge’. One participant 
described a particularly difficult case where  
‘actually, the process to go through in terms of challenging it [the 
report], and sometimes the response you get from the Ombudsman’s 
office isn’t really worth it. We challenged once and the Ombudsman 
came back and chastised us for challenging it. … It felt quite punitive’ 
(Rhoda). 
 
Many participants questioned the utility of challenging the ombudsman: 
‘Generally speaking, in my experience, the ombudsman very, very, very, very 
rarely amends the report unless it’s factual accuracy’ (Phoebe). 
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I don’t know that there’s been anything that they’ve ever challenged … 
that actually the Ombudsman’s said “Okay I agree with you. That 
actually we’ll change that”. Any that I’ve been involved in where we’ve 
challenged them, the Ombudsman has basically come back and said, 
“No, that’s our decision, and we’re not going to …” (Emma), 
The way that I seem to see it is, it’s almost a done deal and they’ll only 
change something if it’s factually incorrect … but if I think there are 
things that people are disagreeing with, and it’s not factually incorrect, 
it’s just that they disagree that’s not how we do it here or whatever, 
there seems to be – you seem to come up against a stone wall’ 
(Jessica), and, 
… my perception from thinking about it, just as a gut reaction, is that 
where we will go back and perhaps offer some further information or 
try and illustrate why we feel like that’s not the case, I’m not sure that 
many will change. I don’t have a feel that that has much influence. I 
don’t ever have the sense that actually there’s a significant change in 
their findings (Millie). 
 
An interesting story was provided from one participant who described a 
meeting with the ombudsman office. The health board felt strongly that the 
SPSO had made an error in their investigation and decision as the health 
board disagreed with what the SPSO’s external clinical advisor had opined, 
believing that the external clinical adviser was unaware of the context and 
pathway of care for the condition concerned. The health board felt especially 
aggrieved as its clinician was a recognised clinical leader in this area. As a 
result, a meeting was held between board representatives and the 
ombudsman. The meeting, and its outcome, was described thus: 
While the ombudsman is always very willing to come and talk to us 
about things, they talk at us. And it’s not a genuine dialogue. I felt that 
a little bit when X and I went across to talk to the ombudsman and the 
team. I did feel it was … it was a very interesting initial conversation 
about the needs to have dialogue and then the dialogue, but I didn’t 
feel there was any real intention to take our points of view on board 
(Donna). 
 
Donna concluded, the health board is left asking, ‘Why exactly did the 
reviewer take that view when, actually, our clinician’s one of the speciality 
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advisors to the Chief Medical officer [of Scotland] and he’s one of the lead 
clinician’s in the field?’ 
 
One participant did report some success in challenging the ombudsman, it 
‘Sometimes depends on who the reviewer is. You get ones that are a lot 
more reasonable than others. Some that get it and some that don’t’ (Jackie).  
 
6.3.3 Clinical Advice 
 
The SPSO is able to consider complaints of a clinical nature and in 2018/19, 
complaints about clinical treatment or diagnosis amounted to approximately 
two-thirds of all health complaints (SPSO 2019b). Medicine is renowned for 
the fact that there can be differences in clinical judgment as to the diagnosis 
and management of patients. This difference in clinical judgment was picked 
up by participants. ‘There’s always the potential that they may be an expert in 
their field but there are lots of experts in the field [that] may have a different 
view’ (Fiona), ‘Sometimes there’s no right and wrong answer. It’s about 
clinical opinion at that point in time’ (Emma), and, ‘I think the experts they 
have engaged have given us their professional opinion. But they’re one 
person, they’re not sense testing with others’ (Meg). 
 
When health boards receive the draft investigation report or decision letters, 
they may disagree with the clinical advice provided to the SPSO and upon 
which the SPSO relies to reach its judgment. At that point health boards may 
try to challenge the clinical opinion, normally with little success: ‘But you’ve 
not got much grounds if you’ve got “I disagree with your clinical advisors”. 
They’ll [the SPSO] go “Tough”’ (Jackie), ‘The bits we have queried have all 
been around clinical opinion and their expert’s view. And even when we’ve 
gone back with guidelines … we didn’t get anywhere’ (Isobel), and, ‘We have 
gone back. We have challenged it [clinical advice] and we’ve been told, this 
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is the clinical advisor for the panel, and this is the outcome, so, therefore, 
there you go’ (Rhoda). For Rhoda there can be particular concerns as ‘some 
of their [the clinical advisors] assumptions are wildly wrong’. Isobel provided 
an example where a complaint was received about a consultant physician 
and her health board commissioned an independent review of the physician’s 
actions. This, second, physician supported the actions of the original 
physician. To be confident, the health board then obtained a third clinical 
opinion from a totally independent physician. This person also agreed that,  
the care that we had given was absolutely entirely appropriate and 
correct. So, we fed it into the system to say that we didn’t think it [the 
SPSO’s clinical opinion] was correct but we didn’t really get anywhere 
because the specialist that they [the SPSO] had brought in agreed 
with the person complaining. And that left, probably, a consultant who 
was a very, very good, very cautious, good clinician, feeling 
undervalued (Isobel). 
 
The SPSO does not name the clinical advisors that they have used. ‘They 
don’t tell you. They don’t even tell you who they are’ (Donna), and,  
I guess it would come back to what the parameters are of their 
recruitment of their external advisors. How current are they in their 
speciality? How senior are they in their speciality and, how, if you like, 
well respected are they in the patch?’ (Donna).  
 
This lack of transparency and the inability to discuss the case with the clinical 
advisor, leads to concerns about the quality of advice either due to concerns 
about the expertise of the advisor in a particular clinical area, ‘I think the two 
[health board] clinicians that were involved are having conversations with the 
CMO18 about it because they are particularly concerned that the individual 
[clinical advisor] takes a very specific view on things’ (Donna), ‘the fact that 
the advisor said one thing from one particular perspective, whereas, actually, 
the majority of the clinicians in the field would not have done that and we 
checked that out’ (Donna), or because the health boards doubted that the 
                                            
18 Chief Medical Officer for Scotland 
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expert advisors had sufficient understanding of the context in which they 
operated,  
we’ve had some where medical staff have been really quite exercised 
about some of the things that have been said, because at the end of 
the day, we’re a district hospital and maybe the advisor – I don’t know 
where they came from (Jessica), 
So, their expert, their advisor has almost said is … it just doesn’t fit 
with the footprint of our hospital. I think because, it seems to me, and I 
might be wrong about this … you think, “You’re just not getting that. 
We don’t have whatever it is you say is on tap as you say because 
we’re not a tertiary hospital full of lots of different specialities” (Trish), 
and,  
because there’s an issue as well about the cohort of advisors that they 
use. You know? So, for particular cases, we might have a clinician 
that’s saying that’s not the right person to advise on that because 
although they’re a specialist in this, they might not know about X, Y 
and Z (Vicky). 
 
There was some sympathy expressed from participants for the challenges 
involved in providing clinical advice. ‘The expert practitioners have been 
given this [the casefile], and I could make a judgment on that, but reading 
notes and that doesn’t tell me much’ (Fiona), and, ‘they’re looking at the 
written documentation, which doesn’t always tell the whole story’ (Eleanor). 
As a result, there were comments that there could be better communication 
between the health board and clinical advisor: ‘And sometimes you think it 
would be nice to sit down with their expert and say “Can you talk me through 
how you came to this decision”’ (Eleanor),  
I think sometimes it’s a shame that you can’t have a little bit more of a 
discussion or they couldn’t speak to the person challenging that to get 
an understanding of why Doctor X is so keen that that’s not the way it 
should be (Jessica), and,  
The Ombudsman won’t allow us to speak to any of their advisors 
because they say that they have to keep it anonymous and things. 
But, actually, sometimes it would be helpful if there could be a clinician 




Negative clinical reactions can be caused by disagreements between health 
board clinicians and the SPSO’s clinical advisors, ‘So, there are occasions 
where they proceed to print things that our clinicians don’t agree with. Which 
gives us a challenge back from the board then, how do we deliver the action 
plan for improvement?’ (Meg). 
There’ll be differences of opinion. And, I suppose, maybe more so for 
your nursing and medical staff. That’s where it’s maybe difficult. 
Because they [the SPSO] bring in advisors to the Ombudsman a lot of 
the time and, sometimes they don’t necessarily agree with their [the 
SPSO’s advisors] opinion’ (Emma), 
And, I think, relationships, they can become quite tense. In particular, I 
think, for medical staff and [the SPSO’s] independent reviewers. So, 
there may well be a question of that person’s [the independent 
reviewer’s] ability, or do they know better than sort of thing’ (Deirdre), 
and,  
We have made challenges and they just haven’t been taken forward 
and staff get really quite, we’ve had some where medical staff have 
been really quite exercised about some of the things that have been 
said, because at the end of the day, we’re a district hospital and 
maybe the advisor – I don’t know where they came from (Jessica). 
 
6.3.4 How bodies handle SPSO investigation reports and decision letters 
 
The report or letter (hereinafter the report) issued by the SPSO will be sent to 
the chief executive of the health board. From here, the report will be sent to a 
lead director, the choice of which will be determined by the nature of the 
complaint. For example, if the complaint is about the care provided by a 
hospital it will be sent to the management team of that hospital, or, if the 
complaint is about a community service it may go to the clinical lead or 
geographical sector lead. It is the responsibility of that individual to determine 
how best the health board should respond and who should be involved in that 
response. This person will also decide who should see the report and 
arrange for it to be cascaded through the management chain: ‘it’s then 
getting it [ombudsman reports] cascaded down. And, I think sometimes, 
that’s where there’s occasions where it works brilliantly and there’s other 
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occasions where, maybe, it hasn’t worked so well’ (Emma), and, ‘I think … 
we’ve got mechanisms to perhaps share in a way that’s quite quick, 
consistent, one-pagers’ (Deirdre). In all boards this cascade would stop at the 
level of senior charge nurse or equivalent. ‘We keep it at a certain senior 
level, and then it’s up to the service to disseminate that: ‘That’s why when it 
comes in, it only goes to a finite group of people’ (Sally), ‘the lead nurses 
take my agenda and then replicate it with their senior charge nurses, so it’s 
cascaded down that way’ (Rhoda) and, ‘if we get a report, a published report, 
that’s cascaded across all of them [the organisation]’ (Meg). Those who have 
been involved in the complaint will also receive a copy of the report. 
 
It is the responsibility of the senior charge nurse to then cascade the report to 
other members of staff. It is that this point that the cascade becomes more 
difficult. A senior charge nurse may be responsible for a staff of 60-70 
persons, who work shifts and rotas. This means that the cascade to those 
members of staff tends to be by email. However, whether the emails are read 
was seen by some to be unlikely, ‘If you’ve received a complaint about X 
hospital, you might sit here in Y hospital going, “Nothing to do with me”’ 
(Millie), ‘You know what it’s like. If you send it on email, people will open a 
document and they’ll read the first couple of lines and think “I can’t be …”’ 
(Darcie), due in significant part by ‘because, increasingly our clinical staff 
have not got a lot of free time and, therefore, we rely on our managers and 
others prodding to get things from clinicians’ (Donna). As a result,  
for so many people it will depend on the communication of individuals. 
So, there’ll be some that are really slick at it, and there’ll be some 
where I bet a nurse on a ward wouldn’t even know who the 
ombudsman was (Jackie).  
 
In addition to emails, and again dependent on the senior charge nurse and 
the report, there may be debriefs where  
we’ll go back and we’ll talk through the issues that the complainant or 
that were raised in the complaint to see what learning  we can take out 
187 
 
of that …so that’s what will do if there have been significant issues, we 
don’t do it with every complaint (Jessica).  
 
The lead manager will identify who needs to be involved in drawing up the 
action plan, its implementation and the subsequent reporting on delivery. The 
membership of these ad hoc groups will tend to be determined by the subject 
of the complaint and the findings in the report. There will be communication 
up and down the management chain as the group produces a draft action 
plan, it is approved or amended and then implemented.  
 
Reports will be sent to the relevant managerial meetings and to board 
committees with responsibility for clinical governance which will have 
oversight in ensuring that learning from the reports is secured. The formal 
board of management in each of the three participating health boards will not 
receive the actual report but will receive high level detail on its contents and 
updates on implementation of the associated action plan. 
 
The approach adopted by health boards is configured to try and ensure an 
appropriate response to the report but it does not necessarily ensure that the 
reports and the issues contained within them is passed between clinical or 
geographical areas. Even within a hospital the information may not be 
shared: ‘[It] depends on what it’s about. … So that’s where I think the 
organisation, probably, we need to get better at’ (Emma), and, ‘so, my 
background is in acute medicine, … so I can absolutely tell you what I would 
expect to happen here but surgery, orthopaedics and urology, I couldn’t. I 
don’t have that assurance’ (Eleanor). 
 
Generally speaking, health boards took ombudsman reports very seriously: ‘If 
the ombudsman is involved we need, obviously we take them seriously 
anyway but we need to reflect on what the ombudsman has said’ (Trish), 
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‘What we’ve got here is an independent looking at facts as they see it, from 
complainants and from the service and forming a view’ (Fiona), ‘we 
understand it’s [the complaint is] thoroughly investigated. … Something along 
the line has failed there but at the end of the day we always want to improve 
and we always want to make it better for somebody else’ (Justine), ‘I think we 
try to be on the positive side’ (Eleanor), and, ‘we’re missing the most 
important thing, which is actually to make the patient, the complainant, 
whoever it may be, feel better and feel that we’ve properly listened to the 
recommendations and are acting upon them’ (Jackie). When a complaint was 
upheld by the SPSO, it ‘was a big shock, but probably a good shock. It was 
something that you need to have – it was sad for the people involved in it, but 
for us as an organisation, that’s how we keep learning’ (Jessica), ‘I look at it 
as a gift. You sometimes can’t see the wood for the trees in your own 
environment, so getting feedback from them on what they think we could 
have done differently is always helpful’ (Meg), ‘We take the ombudsman 
very, very seriously. We do see the ombudsman as an external reviewer if 
you like’ (Phoebe), ‘I think, generally, we saw the ombudsman as having a 
role in terms of driving improvement’ (Tess), ‘So, actually you can really learn 
a lot, although they are really sore to get’ (Trish), and, ‘I think we do take 
them [the SPSO] seriously and do look to them to learn from them’ (Trish). 
 
However, some participants took a different view, where they felt that health 
boards were obligated to comply for fear of sanction: ‘We don’t see it as an 
opportunity, we see it as a threat’ (Vicky), ‘And there’s other people who, if 
you say, “I need it for this or this”, they literally jump because they’ve got this 
fear factor’ (Vicky), ‘From our point … we’re saying “I don’t think that 
recommendation is right” but we have been told by our bosses you just have 
to accept it’ (Darcie), ‘from what I’m told from my seniors, if the ombudsman 
makes a recommendation, it’s sort of suck it and go with it’ (Darcie), 
‘everyone says, “the Ombudsman”, it’s like the grim reaper’ (Darcie), ‘I think 
there’s still a fear factor. There’s definitely a sort of fear, that, as an 
organisation we’re going to be seen in a bad light, and, that at all costs, try 
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and stop the ombudsman from upholding something’ (Darcie), ‘I think it was 
always seen as  they [the SPSO] were there to put a sanction so the minute 
you hear the ombudsman you think, “Ugh”’ (Isobel), and,  ‘generally, I think 
we’re sitting in the camp of defensiveness, we’re doing it because we think 
we’re going to get into trouble, and, therefore, the commitment is lacking’ 
(Yvonne). 
 
Several participants talked of negative behaviours from the SPSO. ‘I think 
their view would be [that] it [the SPSO] is collaborative, but from a services 
point of view I would say it’s pretty remote’ (Fiona), ‘We challenged once and 
the Ombudsman came back and chastised us for challenging it. … So, you 
wouldn’t want to challenge if you’re going to get something publicly like that’ 
(Rhoda), ‘so, there’s  not an engagement and dialogue with us around that in 
any shape or form’ (Meg), ‘I’m not sure the relationship between the SPSO 
and the health board is collaborative enough. They are very separate …’ 
(Yvonne), ‘it’s very much a kind of stick approach as opposed to 
engagement, working collaboratively, coming up with solutions’ (Fiona), 
‘They tell us. And it’s not a communication, it’s not collaborative. It’s a shame 
actually’ (Jackie), and, ‘Collaboration involves discussion and explanation 
and negotiation. I don’t get a sense that happens a lot with the ombudsman’ 
(Yvonne).  
 
A sense of disengagement was also voiced, ‘And, then other things we think, 
“Really?”. It’s almost making recommendations for the sake of it rather than 
genuinely understanding what happens in the system’ (Donna), and, ‘There 
are some who are probably, like, “the SPSO, who? I don’t really care what 
they [say] you know?’ (Vicky). 
 
Finally, there were those participants who took, what may be described as, a 
pragmatic view: ‘I suppose it depends what the recommendation or what it is 
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they’ve upheld as to what we need to change or potentially change’ 
(Jessica), ‘It will vary, I suppose, on what the recommendations are’ (Emma), 
and, ‘I think respect and doing everything that say are two different things 
though’ (Jackie). 
 
This problem in the relationship between the SPSO and health boards led to 
some interesting characterisations of the SPSO. ‘I think they’re quite directive 
and not really open to a challenge’ and ‘I think they’re more dictatorial’ (both 
Jackie), ‘I suppose they almost seem to be in a place where they’re 
untouchable’ (Jessica), ‘They’re seen as scrutiny’ (Meg),’It actually feels 
really aggressive, but you have to think from their perception was that … it’s 
a two way thing isn’t it? But it feels really persecutory at times’ (Rhoda) and, 
‘I suppose they almost seem to be in a place where they’re untouchable. 
That’s the way it feels. They’re not very approachable really, they’re sort of in 




The key approach from the SPSO towards contributing to the improvement of 
the healthcare system, is through the recommendations made by the SPSO 
in each of its upheld complaints. Stuhmcke (2006) suggested that 
ombudsman can make recommendations for two types of changes – large 
policy changes or smaller process type changes. Several participants 
indicated that the type of recommendations made by the SPSO varied in 
scope: ‘I would say it varies to be honest’ (Emma), and, 
so, we’ve had a couple that have said that the board should look at its 
policy carefully … but some of it, where it says, you know, “This 
should be fed back in a meaningful and supportive way”, it’s dead 




Participants recognised that it was easier to make simpler process changes 
rather than bigger policy changes, ‘for us to change a policy, … there is a 
process that we need to go through, one that involves partnership and 
engagement and all of that’ (Fiona), ‘To some extent, policy changes can be 
reasonably easy, providing it’s not, you know, a complete rewrite. It 
sometimes just requires a tweak’ (Millie). There are ‘recommendations that 
have a system-wide, organisation-wide, maybe national policy impact’ 
(Phoebe), and, ‘I can think of one or two big changes’ (Beatrice) but, mainly, 
participants were of the view that the changes were principally small-scale in 
nature: ‘I haven’t seen the big, wider organisational changes, I must say’ 
(Fiona), ‘Generally speaking, … it’s the more local conditions specific or 
client specific things’ (Phoebe), ‘I would say most of them are manageable. 
None of them … have been reflective of organisational change across the 
whole of the board’ (Sally), ‘For our system, most of it has been small-scale 
things’ (Donna), ‘our recommendations are fairly small’ (Jackie), and, ‘I think 
maybe from my experience, I think maybe more on the procedures rather 
than the policy’ (Jessica). Although many changes are viewed as small, 
some participants suggested that they may have a big impact: ‘The ones that 
I’ve seen are very manageable. … it’s just smarter thinking, how we do things 
and very small things, but actually would make a huge impact’ (Yvonne), and, 
we know sometimes we have to start small. We don’t set our goals too 
far because we want to achieve small changes to make the big 
changes … but the small changes can have a big effect on somebody 
and a big effect on what we do (Justine) 
 
During the interviews three broad themes emerged relating to 
recommendations: the clarity of the recommendations and the evidence 
required to demonstrate compliance with the recommendation, the 





6.3.5.1 Clarity of the recommendations 
 
While some described the recommendations positively, such as ‘generally 
sensible’ (Fiona), ‘most of them in the circumstances seem reasonable’ 
(Donna), ‘I would say on the whole they’re probably quite measured and 
realistic’ (Vicky), many participants were critical of the clarity of the 
recommendations. Indeed, six different participants used the term ‘woolly’ to 
describe the recommendations that had been made by the SPSO. Typical 
comments include: ‘I don’t even understand that. I don’t know what … it is not 
clear what they’re looking for’ (Emma), ‘Some of the ones that come back 
and you kind of think, “That’s a bit woolly. What does that mean?”’ (Isobel), 
‘sometimes you have to read it a few times to figure out what it is that they’re 
getting at’ (Trish), ‘some of them will be very, very generic. And the generic 
ones are the ones that are harder for us’ (Isobel), 
Some of these things you think, “Well we’ve sent them the policy, so 
what’s wrong with the policy? … If we’ve to review, what is it in the 
policy that you think needs reviewed? That’s not clear. It just maybe 
says, “Policy should be reviewed?” (Jill), and, 
You’d love to see them in the boardroom to say “What do you mean 
by that? Explain what you actually want us to do, because again in 
black and white, I can read that and think “I don’t know how I can 
deliver that …? (Darcie), 
 
This lack of clarity in the reports and recommendations can be a challenge 
for participants, ‘I think sometimes, even the way it’s written from the 
commentary, it would be, and this is probably, I don’t mean to be lazy, but 
you have to read the whole thing to sort of get sometimes to the point’ 
(Darcie), ‘they pass it to us on site and I’m going, I don’t even understand 
that, I don’t know, it is not clear what they’re looking for (Emma), ‘sometimes 
they’re a little bit difficult to interpret sometimes, what they’re actually asking 
us to do’ (Jessica), and, ‘It’s very difficult to know, sometimes, what she’s 
expecting of us. It would be good to have a clearer picture of what he or she 
feels we should be doing differently’ (Jill). 
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In addition to a lack of clarity about the proposed recommendation, there was 
also concern from a small number of participants about the lack of clarity 
about the evidence required from health boards to demonstrate compliance 
with the recommendation: ‘And sometimes what’ll happen is, you’ll go back to 
the Ombudsman with what you’ve done. And sometimes they’ll [the SPSO] 
come back and say, “Well, that’s not what I’m looking for. I’m looking for this’ 
(Emma), ‘Staff at different levels within the organisation get themselves 
worked up because what do they mean by evidence’ (Tess), and, ‘That’s the 
question I’ve been asked I don’t know how many times, “What do they mean 
by evidence?”’ (Vicky). 
 
However, where there was a lack of clarity about the meaning of a 
recommendation, a number of participants felt comfortable about seeking 
clarity from the Ombudsman’s office: ‘I can think of one recommendation that 
went back to them and they did listen and agreed that they should get a 
different opinion’ (Fiona), ‘very occasionally the recommendation may not be 
clear and that’s where we tend to have the dialogue with them’ (Donna), ‘I 
would pick up the phone and have a conversation’ (Jackie), and, ‘we would 
go back if we thought a recommendation was inappropriate and we’d give 
them the rationale for why we thought it would work better if it was different, 
or worded differently’ (Meg). 
 
6.3.5.2 Achievability of recommendations 
 
Participants raised the issue of the achievability of some of the 
recommendations: ‘You can write one sentence [in an action plan], but that 
sentence actually could be months and months and months of work’ (Darcie), 
‘part of the challenge we’ve got is, … they’ll give us local recommendations 
and we’ll go away and work things up, but sometimes there are bits that they 
come back with, that you think, “This is completely unrealistic.”’ (Isobel).  
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Concerns about the achievability of some of the recommendations was 
increased by anxieties that the SPSO did not have a full understanding of the 
implications arising from their recommendations:  
It wasn’t clear how we would actually make the change because we 
already have our regional multidisciplinary team for cancer patients 
and, therefore, that was already happening. And that’s the bit where I 
think that lack of general understanding about how the system works 
these days. (Donna), 
But sometimes they do come back and they come out with wild stuff 
about “See everybody within 12 weeks and make sure that somebody 
doesn’t have to travel from A down to B for a scan. And you think 
“Okay. Right. Move on.” (Isobel), and, 
We’re having discussions around, “well how do we do that?” Because 
one has gone back to [X] and if they implement it, then we need to do 
it across the board, and it doesn’t quite fit. So, I think that some of the 
complexities of what we have to deal with is quite difficult. (Isobel) 
 
There was a common second criticism about the recommendations that they 
were exercises in box-ticking: ‘You can sometimes feel a lot of their 
recommendations are about ticking boxes’ (Eleanor), ‘It’s about what you 
need to discuss at a meeting. Tick the box’ (Isobel), ‘But some of it where it 
says, you know, “This should be fed back in a meaningful and supportive 
way”. It’s dead easy just to bash out a memo and send it and not follow it up’ 
(Rhoda), ‘We’ll submit minutes or an agenda or an email from the clinical 
director saying I’ve discussed it with the person. Is that evidence or is that 
just ticking the big box to say “Oh, we said we’ve done it’ (Vicky), and, ‘I think 
from an operational perspective, it’s a bit of a tick box exercise’ (Vicky). 
 
6.3.6 Learning  
 
The importance of a receptive organisational culture which promotes learning 
from ombudsman reports and other sources was seen as important. ‘I think 
the culture now is a lot better to make changes. We’re very encouraged to do 
improvement all the time and always learn from the many issues that we’ve 
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had, any errors that have occurred’ (Beatrice), ‘You look for more learning, 
actually you look for … because we’re all in a quality improvement 
environment’ (Eleanor),  
I think it’s the philosophy of the way that you work. … But actually, we 
start our day with a huddle but we start with a safety focus. So, if 
you’re listening about safety, and the ombudsman’s telling you that 
your systems are not safe, it is negligent for me not to do something 
about it. So, it’s about how you embed safety and improvement in your 
culture (Isobel), and,  
So, we get a huge amount of feedback from various sources, but it’s 
how we actually create a learning system that can take some of those 
recommendations and ensure that we’ve got widespread change 
across the system. So, that’s the hard bit (Deirdre) 
 
Identifying learning and improvements would be the task of those involved in 
the complaint: ‘this would go to the general manager, and the lead nurse for 
medicine, who would then be charged with agreeing an action plan in relation 
to specific objectives’ (Fiona),and,  ‘so we would say, “Ward 27, this has 
come back. You need to go away and you need to address it”’ (Isobel). 
 
However, these messages were not felt to be accepted by all staff, ‘I also 
don’t think that the staff within the NHS organisation … I think they still 
believe that improvement is very separate to the day job and, in actual fact, it 
should be their daily language’ (Yvonne), ‘So, they’ll see the quality piece as 
an extra, rather than the urgency of the day to day work’ (Deirdre), ‘And, I 
think you can pay lip service too, then if you do a wee bit here and a wee bit 
there because there are competing demands’ (Laura). 
 
Although all health boards will produce and implement an action plan in 
response to the SPSO recommendations, there are issues about the depth, 
breadth and sustainability of the resulting learning.  
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Reports received from the ombudsman are shared across the organisation: 
‘There’s a couple of forums that we include critical incidents or complaints … 
so there’s an inter-speciality event which is open to all professions’ (Millie), 
‘We do a lot of shared learning, absolutely’ (Beatrice), ‘acute colleagues 
organise something called an inter-speciality clinical governance meeting … 
this is our learning, this is what we did, this is what we changed and this is 
how we’ve tried to ensure it won’t happen again’ (Donna),’we will do a debrief 
with the ward staff’ (Jessica), and,  
part of it would be sharing that [ombudsman reports] with the staff on 
the wards … everything that comes in from the Ombudsman, if it’s 
about a ward, we’ll share it with the senior nurse on the ward, and it 
would be their responsibility to share it with their staff (Emma), 
 
Health boards do try to share learning across their organisation, especially 
where it is seen to be of particular importance:  
I think that’s the kind of thing we talk about at our Q and P19, so all the 
service managers are there and they will be told, “Actually, everybody 
needs to do this”, and that’s how we try to get it through (Isobel),  
So, every year, if we get a formal [investigation] report, a published 
report, that’s cascaded across all of them [the organisation]. If it’s a 
standard review letter, with recommendations and the action plan, that 
goes to the site, and unless it’s a speciality them, they would share it 
across the speciality (Meg), 
But I think, if we don’t share it, we’ve not learned enough. I would say 
that more than anything, if you’ve only had local sharing and it’s only 
that one team, then the learning is only here and now, for the most 
part (Meg), 
So yes, although this one would be a good example of a local solution 
to ensuring staff were informed about their practice, I could probably 
show you another two or three complaints that have happened on this 
site, and other sites since, with the same kind of themes. So that’s the 
organisational learning bit (Meg), 
It’s hugely challenging. There’s a couple of forums that we could 
include critical incidents or complaints, and actually, oftentimes, it’s a 
number of these things and all part of the same thing, so there’s an 
inter-speciality event, which is open to all professions. … In actual 
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fact, it’s a crucial point in terms of how we more systematically share, 
because the themes are very similar although the context may be 
different (Millie), and,  
Okay, if it’s something that’s got significant learning, quite often we’ll 
work with our clinical governance team and [produce] a learning 
summary. There’s not an awful lot of those, but sometimes significant 
learning will go out in that format, for sure (Rhoda). 
 
Sharing learning across individual health boards was seen as a challenge by 
many: Confirming that if a ward involved in an SPSO report would be aware 
of the learning arising from an SPSO report, Fiona acknowledged that ‘how 
the [wards] in another hospital find out about it, that’s where we fall short’ as 
‘I suppose if it directly relates to your area you’re much more responsible. 
The wider learning, it’s just in the context of, “Well, there’s hundreds of 
learning out there for us”’, 
But that ultimate bit, about organisational learning, I think we’ve still 
got the most to do. Because I think it’s clear that we don’t know. The 
site might know, the patch might know, but we’ve not got a systematic 
process for sharing that’s robust enough yet (Meg), and, 
I think the delivering of them [action plans] locally, I could categorically 
say, that there is an action plan and they work it to the end. Whether 
it’s shared where it should be, or to the extent that it should be, is the 
bit we’ve still not got right (Meg). 
 
The limitation of these approaches were recognised: ‘Just telling someone to 
just do something, it doesn’t make a difference’ (Rhoda), ‘I would say that 
more than anything, if you’ve only had local sharing, and, it’s only that one 
team, then the learning you have is only here and now’ (Meg), ‘It depends 
which meetings you go to as to whether you’ve seen them [ombudsman 
reports]’ (Jessica), ‘I don’t know that we’re as robust as we could be in 
making sure everyone’s absolutely aware’ (Millie), ‘I think we’re mindful about 
how we share learning’ (Deirdre), ‘In a busy environment that can sometimes 
be difficult’ (Deirdre), and, ‘I think the learning side is where you can always 
make improvement’ (Emma). 
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A second approach to try to secure learning from ombudsman reports were 
the clinical governance and other quality improvement mechanisms instituted 
by health boards: ‘it also goes immediately through local clinical governance 
groups’ (Phoebe), ‘if it’s something that’s got significant learning, quite often 
we’ll work with our clinical governance team and [produce] a learning 
summary’ (Rhoda), 
So, I think what the plan is, is to use our quality department. … So, I 
think it would be their remit to go out to assist the acute sites, primary 
care sites, and contractor groups and drive up quality’ (Vicky), and, 
We will talk about ombudsman cases. I have a monthly quality and 
performance meeting and the first half of that is looking at complaints, 
ombudsmans and action plans … so all the service managers will be 
there and there they will be told “Actually, everybody needs to do 
this”’(Isobel) 
 
This approach was not always seen to be successful: ‘So, we don’t, I would 
have to say, I don’t know, we probably don’t learn, … we don’t use the 
information, from a QI20 perspective, to the level that we should’ (Fiona), ‘You 
just do a wee bit of everything not particularly well’ (Deirdre), ‘And that’s as 
you know, just telling someone to just do something, it doesn’t make a 
difference. A policy doesn’t make a difference because the words don’t 
change anything’ (Rhoda),  
I would say, that in my experience over the last 18 months of being in 
the complaints department, and looking at those SPSO letters that do 
come through and action plans, from the improvement side, I see no 
improvement (Yvonne), 
You may find that, because so few people are involved in the 
ombudsman, when they are involved and they’ve got a specific 
recommendation, they, as an individual, may say, “Well that’s 
happened to me and it’s not going to happen to me again”, (Fiona), 
and, 
I don’t know what your email box is like, but if you think about the 
enormous amount of emails and things that come through. So, one 
email about, “This decision letter came in, it was highlighted that blah, 
please can you make sure that your staff are aware of it”, then that’s 
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filtered on. And people say, “Yeah that’s really good”, They remember 
it for about five minutes, they file it away, and … I’m not saying that 
does happen, but it wouldn’t surprise me if it did (Jackie). 
 
There was a plea that the SPSO could do more to make learning from its 
work more accessible:  
I think if the Ombudsman’s picking up something that boards are 
constantly doing, … I think there maybe should be some sort of annual 
report, where, on so many occasions we fail to follow policies, or we 
fail to do this or adhere to that, or whatever, … If they [the SPSO] are 
coming across trends that we are not doing through our process, then 
they should be letting us know that we need to change our process 
(Jill), and, 
The information coming in, you can deal with information coming in, 
but it takes quite a lot to remember to go seek the information to bring 
it in. … Maybe that’s something that would make a difference, actually. 
If there something meaningful that just got posted out to us. (Rhoda). 
 
Wariness over external scrutiny on high profile issues was also a driver for 
action. ‘It’s keeping the wolf away from the door sometimes as well’ 
(Eleanor), ‘We have to deliver on the recommendations. And, if we don’t, 
they [the SPSO] don’t close the case, and they write to our Chief Executive, 
and that comes back to the reputational issues’ (Jackie), ‘We probably risk 
assess it [the SPSO report]. What’s going to have the biggest impact for us, 
because you don’t want to end up on the front page of the Daily Record, and 
things like that’ (Jill), and, ‘I guess the thing is, there’s a pretty clear message 
around these kind of … there’s that whole bit around reputational risk’ (Tess). 
 
There was concern raised about the sustainability of the changes arising 
from the recommendations. Rhoda said, ‘Just telling someone to just do 
something. It doesn’t make a difference. A policy doesn’t make a change 
because the words don’t change anything’. Asked about the sustainability of 
the changes that arise, Fiona replied ‘No. Unless we are constantly following 
up to see …But how do we continue to monitor performance against the 
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policy’, while Jackie said, ‘No, probably not. It depends on the circumstances 
and, again, on the individuals involved. You would like to think so but 
probably not as much as it should’, ‘The bit, I say, that we’ve not got good at 
is the organisational learning’ (Meg), ‘Possibly not in isolation, if I’m being 
very honest …If I’m being really, really honest, you can respond to the 
Ombudsman with a piece of paper in an isolated case’ (Rhoda) 
Do you know, I suppose for me the challenge is more about 
sustaining, or making sure it’s an embedded action. I think in the main 
you can actually get out there and, if you put a bit of drive behind it, 
you can complete an action plan. Does that lead to improvement? 
Does that lead to change? Not necessarily, because without the work 
that has to go in the back of it, then it’ll be a moment in time (Millie), 
and, 
So, I, perhaps cynically, think that it’s a paper exercise that health 
boards get given. We will provide assurance in terms of policy or 
whatever’s required to say we’ve done that, but, in actual fact, the 
sustainability of those changes are [sic] not evident … I suppose, the 
thing is, if those recommendations were put in place and we saw them 
being sustained, why do we keep getting the same type of complaints, 
and with the same themes? And, why are they not working? (Yvonne). 
 
One of the issues raised by several participants was a feeling that staff at the 
SPSO did not fully understand the realities involved in making changes to the 
delivery of healthcare.  ‘So, we’ve tried to make it straightforward and, the 
problem is, all these things generate an industry and, therefore, you’ve got 
industries around the SPSO, you’ve got industries around the complaints 
process’ (Darcie), ‘because it can be an industry, complaints, and I think it’s 
trying to get the learning across the sites’ (Laura), ‘Because, in an ideal 
world, you want to fix everything as soon as it happened, but, sometimes, 
with the pressure on the business, we can’t do everything at the timescale, 
pace and scale that we need to’ and, the other thing, as well, is you get so 
busy, don’t you? Caught up in delivering what’s happening today’ (both 
Rhoda), 
So, I suppose the things that make it challenging … the number of 
staff, the movement of staff, the high level of activity that’s ongoing 
every minute of the day. We were talking yesterday about just trying to 
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find five minutes head space to stop and think about something, and I 
think that’s for everybody in the organisation, no matter what your role 
is. So, in that moment in time, you think, “oh God, that is awful, and we 
must do something about that and we must change”, and it’s there in 
that minute and committed to doing it. Then within five minutes there’s 
all these emerging priorities that continue and continue and continue 
(Millie), and, 
Resources to get something done is very rare. For me, one of the 
actions I’ve got is sharing learning  of sepsis on a ward that I don’t 
cover, … and I’ve no resource to do this, so this just has to be done 
within my day job, into another ward that I don’t work with, which is not 
an issue. That is quite hard. (Darcie) 
 
This issue of the SPSO failing to understand the complexity of healthcare 
was raised by several other participants.  
For me, there’s been a couple of complaints that have been upheld by 
the ombudsman, or issues in a complaint, that, for us as an 
organisation, I don’t feel as if they’ve looked at the actual big picture. 
… I sometimes feel as if it’s very much they’re only looking at a small 
factor of the issue, not looking at the bigger issue (Darcie). 
I suppose, and this is again, goes back to maybe the ombudsman not 
appreciating the mechanics of how it works, but, for us to change a 
policy, it’s not just a question, because there is that process what we 
need to go through, one that involves partnership and engagement 
and all of that (Fiona). 
I suppose it’s like saying, “A health service is a health service is a 
health service”. It is to a certain degree, but local context is really 
important. How things happen and why they happen, and [their] level 
of understanding (Meg). 
I think that there’s that aspect of, we try to understand what the 
ombudsman’s all about and probably don’t get it completely yet. But 
I’m not sure how much the ombudsman really tries to understand the 
context within which we are working and trying to deliver care these 
days (Donna).  
We’re not really convinced that they really listen to the service 
perspective on issues. Because we have a very complex system now, 
we’ve got an aging population and patients very rarely come in with a 
single thing. Therefore, the understanding of that complexity and how 
it manifests itself then in terms of what we’re meant to be trying to deal 




6.3.7 Prioritising recommendations 
 
Despite the pressures being experienced within the health service there was 
a feeling from participants that they just had to deliver on the 
recommendations: ‘You’ve just got to pick yourself up and go on and do it. 
And you do your work, whatever hours it takes to do what you need to do’ 
(Eleanor), and, ’Well, it’s just part of the systems and structures … That’s just 
part and parcel of what we would see in part of our improvement, our 
feedback and improvement approach’ (Phoebe). Recognising the pressure, 
there was recognition of the need to prioritise, ‘So we get hit by competing 
priorities, locally, nationally …’ (Deirdre), ‘there’s just not enough hours in the 
day or resources in an organisation to deal with every single item that you’re 
asked to do, so you have to prioritise’ (Rhoda), and ‘I think we often try to do 
too many things and we do them all badly. Whereas if we took on a few 
things, we could do them well and make that bigger impact on safety and 
care’ (Isobel). However, there can be times when there are so many priorities 
‘we end up prioritising our priorities because it’s constantly on the go’ 
(Eleanor), and, ‘I think we need to get better at that. I think we tend to knee-
jerk respond and react and I’m not sure that we do that correctly’ (Millie). 
 
Approaches to prioritising include, ‘it just gets set against the deadlines’ 
(Fiona), ‘I know that my senior manager would expect that we were meeting 
the deadlines for them all’ (Tess) ‘I think it depends very much on the nature 
and scale of the reports’ (Phoebe), ‘patient safety is at the core of everything 
we do. We generally, the outcome, the complaints, feedback, ombudsman 
reports are all linked to patient safety and quality of care. So, that’s our bread 
and butter’ (Phoebe). Where a formal approach is adopted, it is often on the 
basis of clinical importance, ‘Clinical importance, as in harm to patients, and 
then thematic stuff, probably. It goes back to that matrix, that high-risk, low-
risk importance, impact’ (Rhoda). However, there was a recognition that 
people took risks, 
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There’s a real risk that people are, because of the amount in the 
system, I think there is a risk that people are, I think probably that is 
happening all the time, people are taking risks. I’m mot singling myself 
out as somebody who’s not, I guess that the thing is that I might be 
taking a shortcut with something that I hope is not as high profile or 
priority. So, I think, I can afford to miss that, and then get my fingers 
slapped or whatever. I’ll live with that. And there will be something 
about that high-profile stuff that you’re less likely to take a risk on 
(Tess). 
 
6.3.8 Obstacles to change 
 
Participants noted some obstacles to implementing changes recommended 
by the SPSO. Two common themes were identified by participants, those of 
time and resources, particularly time availability: ‘I suppose time will be there 
… When I say time, I mean in the round, I mean capacity’ (Fiona), ‘Time and 
resource capacity’ (Donna), ‘I suppose if it was to involve money, staff, and 
money again’ (Jessica), ‘I sometimes feel that the pressures are not taken 
into account’ (Vicky), ‘I don’t know where you would get the resources from, 
because it’s usually time’ (Darcie), and, 
Just time. We’re so squeezed all the time now. I mean, if I had a 
pound for every time I had to chase somebody, hunt them down, and, 
you know, contact a service …I mean I get that these people are trying 
to see patients, they’re trying to do research or trying to do admin, 
they’ve only got a certain amount of time. … You’re putting that extra 
additional stress and pressure on them, and, it’s on top of their job and 
I’m not quite sure that they’re given enough time to do that. (Vicky) 
 
A particular problem was around staffing: ‘I mean staffing can be an issue’ 
(Jill), ‘I don’t know what other battles clinicians are dealing with. They could 
be having all sorts of operational issues that I’m unaware of’ (Vicky), and,  
We’ve got people that will be on shift rotas, there are people that are 
on annual leave. So very often it can take us a bit of time to track 
somebody down. Plus, you’ll have doctors in training that maybe pop 
in, and they’re in, and then away over at X Health Board for the next 
three months (Fiona) 
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Despite the challenges, there was one view that 
Because you could mitigate anything by saying, “We’re busy, we’re 
underfunded, we’ve got increasing people. It’s awfully tricky because 
there’s lots of new things happening”. But the fundamental principle is, 
that it’s why you come into work today, every day, isn’t it? It’s your 
belief that people should be getting the best from the service, and we 
should always be striving to do better and learn more (Rhoda). 
 
Defensive behaviours from clinicians and other staff was seen to be a 
potential problem, ‘we can all be quite defensive when we’re responding to 
complaints’ (Eleanor), ‘I have witnessed other folk, so other members I’ve 
seen, perhaps, getting quite defensive and feeling that some of the 
recommendations or commentary is personal’ (Deirdre), ‘I think there’s a 
culture within some organisations like this one, whereby, people, there’s 
defensiveness’ (Vicky), ‘nobody wants their care criticised at all, which is very 
difficult’ (Isobel), ‘I’m quite saddened sometimes to get the reaction from, 
particularly, clinical staff  who feel very aggrieved’ (Vicky), and, 
I suppose it depends how that person, who is going to be responsible 
for that change, feels about the report themselves, … if it was one 
where they weren’t happy … then they’re probably not too keen on a 
recommendation that comes out’ (Jessica) 
 
6.3.9 Analysis of reported cases 
 
As part of the research, it was proposed that for each of the three Scottish 
health boards, the five most recently upheld investigation reports issued by 
the SPSO at the time of the interviews would be used to ask participants 
about their recall of the reports and actions subsequently taken to improve 
the healthcare system. In the end, only two health boards (sixteen 
participants) agreed to participate in this aspect of the research. Investigation 
reports are issued relatively infrequently but relate to the more significant 




It should be recalled that health boards are complex organisations, usually 
with multiple acute hospital sites along with primary, community and mental 
health services. The health boards are typically comprised of ‘units’ which 
may consist of an acute hospital or a speciality based such as community or 
mental health services. Each unit will have its own unit management team. 
 
In relation to the response by participants to the five published investigation 
reports it was found that: if the investigation report was issued prior to the 
participant joining the health board then they would be unaware of the report 
and could not explain what happened as a consequence of the report. Where 
a report related to another unit within their health board but not their own, 
then, in the majority of cases, partcipants were likely to have an awareness 
of the report but could not speak informedly to the report and had only vague 
recollections of what had happened as a result of the report. Where a report 
was issued when a participant was employed by the health board and 
working in the unit at the centre of the report, then they had greater 
recollection of the issue and could speak more informedly of the actions 
taken. However, even then, in the majority of cases memories were vague. 
There was one report which had widespread recollection from the unit 
involved and this report was atypical. Not only was it a recently published 
report there had been widespread coverage of the report in the media. It will 
be recalled that a significant fear for participants was adverse publicity to the 
health board relating to the publication of reports and this combination 
appears to have created a set of circumstances which made the report have 
greater resonance to participants. 
 
This aspect of the research was disappointing due principally to two factors 
affecting the method used. Selecting investigation reports and not decision 
letters meant that many reports were several years old by the time the 
interviews took place. The inability to recall cases was likely to increase due 
to the time lag. Secondly, the researcher is unaware if any of the participants 
206 
 
had been involved in incident central to the complaint or the subsequent 
attempt at complaint resolution but for the majority, if not all, of the 
investigation reports the researcher believes that this would not have been 
the case. As many respondents indicated that due to the pressures of work 
and the lack of available time, keeping oneself informed of SPSO reports was 
always found to be challenging. As a result of the weaknesses in this 
method, in Section 8.4 a recommendation for further research which 
addresses these weaknesses is made. 
 
From this the following was established: if a report predated the participant 
joining the health board then the participant would not be familiar with the 
report; if a participant worked in a particular hospital, care sector or setting 
then they were likely to be familiar with the report. However, they were 
unlikely to remember detail and any specific actions and changes that 
resulted; if a report was not applicable to their position it was unlikely that 
they remembered anything more than the vaguest of details about the 
complaint; and, even those participants with health board wide 




In this chapter the results of the research into the three Scottish health 
boards are presented.  Participants highlighted concerns about the nature 
and degree of interaction and communication that takes place between 
health boards and the SPSO when the SPSO was investigating complaints. 
These concerns were heightened when they related to issues concerning the 
clinical advice received by the SPSO. Participants also had concerns about 
the clarity and achievability of the recommendations made by the SPSO 
following an upheld complaint. The difficulties, noted by participants, in 
learning from SPSO investigations and recommendations was also detailed. 
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This chapter discusses the research findings in the context of the wider 
literature. The purpose of the chapter is to consider the three research 
questions that were set at the beginning of the research. For each of these 
questions, the conclusion reached by the researcher is presented first and is 
followed by the arguments to justify that conclusion. The research questions 
are: 
1. What approaches do the OHOQ and the SPSO take to administrative 
justice? 
2. What approaches do the OHOQ and the SPSO, with their differing 
statutory functions, use as they seek to secure system improvement? 
3. How do those in the healthcare system receive and respond to these 
approaches? 
 
This chapter begins, however, by considering a prior-order issue that arises 
as a result of the research findings, and which is important to this work, and 
relates to the status of both the OHOQ and the SPSO as ombudsman. It is 
the view of the researcher that, while the SPSO is an ombudsman, the 
OHOQ is not an ombudsman but, to use a term used by Carney et al. (2017), 
is, in fact, a health complaint entity. This is an important conclusion that has 
not been reached previously by researchers. 
 
Internationally, there is little consensus concerning what is an ombudsman. 
As Gulland (2010, pp.470-471) states ‘defining an ombudsman is difficult, as 
the name means different things in different countries and, even within the 
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United Kingdom, there is a variety of different definitions’, with Buck et al. 
(2011, p.13) stating that it would be a mistake to think of ombudsman ‘as 
neatly fitting into any standard and fixed model’. The IOI excludes private 
sector ombudsman schemes, while other ombudsman umbrella bodies such 
as the Ombudsman Association and the Australia and New Zealand 
Ombudsman Association (ANZOA) include both public sector and private 
sector ombudsman schemes as members, but, even then, do not include all 
local schemes with ombudsman in their title, and do not include 
organisational ombudsman. There is also an International Ombudsman 
Association, comprised principally of North American organisational 
ombudsman, bodies which would not the meet the membership requirements 
of any other international ombudsman umbrella organisation. The 
International Ombudsman Association is, thus, the ombudsman equivalent of 
the World Series. Academics have also contributed to the debate, with, for 
example, Buck et al. (2011) indicating their agreement with the inclusion of 
private sector ombudsman within the ombudsman family. Overall, however, 
there is little consensus about what is an ombudsman. 
 
This discussion on what is an ombudsman appears to depend upon one’s 
standpoint. Shakespeare (1594, 2000) wrote that ‘a rose by any other name 
would smell as sweet’ suggesting that the name of an object is unimportant 
while, Nietzsche (1882, cited in Kaufman 1974, p.58) wrote, conversely, 
‘what things are called is incomparably more important than what they are’. 
Nonetheless, it does appear that, with the expansion and changes in the 
nature of the ombudsman institution, the meaning of the word ‘ombudsman’ 
is in danger of becoming whatever anyone wishes it to be: ‘When I use a 
word’, said Humpty Dumpty in rather a scornful voice, ‘it means just what I 
choose it to mean’. ‘The question is’ said Alice, ‘whether you can make words 





7.1.1 The OHOQ 
 
The OHOQ refers almost all of the complaints that it receives back to the 
body concerned or to an external body. The OHOQ casework figures (section 
5.3), not only suggest a focus on the conduct of individual practitioners, but 
also suggest that complaints about health organisations are unlikely to be 
considered, unless there is evidence of criminal or other inappropriate 
behaviour which would justify referral to the police or other regulatory body. 
 
While the OHOQ receives, confidentially, complaints about the activities of 
bodies and people in jurisdiction, which meets the first requirement of the 
American Bar Association (ABA)’s definition of an ombudsman (see section 
2.8), it is harder to argue that the OHOQ fully meets the second part of the 
definition which is to ‘address, investigate, or otherwise examine these issues 
independently and impartially’ (American Bar Association 2001), as this 
would necessitate accepting that, by referring the vast majority of complaints 
back to bodies in jurisdiction or to external organisations, the OHOQ is, by 
doing so, actually addressing, investigating or examining the issues 
independently and impartially.  
 
The primary focus of the OHOQ is, instead, to investigate and prosecute 
serious complaints about health professionals which means that it is neither a 
reactive ombudsman, with a primary focus on complaint resolution, nor a 
proactive ombudsman21, with a primary focus on system improvement. It is of 
note that the OHOQ is not a member of the Australian and New Zealand 
Ombudsman Association. ANZOA is concerned about the misuse of the term 
ombudsman, stating, ‘Using the term Ombudsman to describe an office with 
regulatory, disciplinary and/or prosecutorial functions confuses the role of 
Ombudsman with that of a regulatory body’ (ANZOA undated). Adopting this 
                                            
21 For a reminder on the models of ombudsmanry see section 2.8 
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stance, together with its disposition of complaints received, indicates that the 
OHOQ is not an ombudsman as it holds both regulatory and prosecutorial 
functions.  
 
Does it matter that the OHOQ is called an ombudsman but is not an 
ombudsman? In New Zealand the term ’ombudsman’ is protected by 
legislation. Restricting the use of the term ombudsman is viewed to be of 
benefit to the New Zealand public as it will reduce public confusion about the 
role of the ombudsman, which should, in turn, promote public confidence in 
the government (New Zealand Ministry of Justice 2018). Use of the term 
‘ombudsman’ is seen to confer legitimacy to the organisation using the term, 
and explains why international ombudsman associations, such as the 
Ombudsman Association and ANZOA, place conditions on potential 
members which those potential members must meet. The argument is that 
complainants who use an ombudsman should have clear expectations about 
the independence of the body, it’s roles, the approaches it uses when 
handling a complaint, and the public accountability of the ombudsman office 
(Ombudsman Association undated). There are fears that unfettered use of 
the term ‘ombudsman’ by organisations which do not meet these expected 
criteria could cause a public loss of confidence in the whole ombudsman 
institution.  
 
Instead of being a health ombudsman, the OHOQ appears to be a curious 
amalgam of, firstly, a complaint triager and referral agent for undifferentiated 
health complaints, secondly, a complainant advisor, providing advice to 
complainants who may undertake local resolution, thirdly, a regulator, 
prosecuting complaints concerning serious issues, and, fourthly, an auditor, 
through its systemic investigations. Carney et al.’s (2017) ‘health complaint 
entity’ is a more appropriate term to describe the OHOQ. Despite not being a 
health ombudsman, the OHOQ plays an important role in the management of 
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health complaints in Queensland and deserves consideration as argued by 




The SPSO focuses its activities mainly upon the investigation and 
adjudication of individual complaints, although it also delivers a significant 
number of activities aimed at system improvement in both complaint handling 
by bodies in jurisdiction through the CSA as well as through its use of 
recommendations. The activities of the CSA are within the remit of classical 
reactive ombudsman, as they focus on standard setting, and the provision of 
advice and guidance on good complaint handling, particularly through its 
model CHPs. The SPSO also acts as the Scottish Welfare Fund Independent 
Review Service, which carries ‘out independent reviews of decisions the 
councils make on community care and crisis grant applications’ (SPSO 
2020o), and, as the Independent National Whistleblowing Officer for the NHS 
in Scotland, where it is able to investigate concerns raised by whistleblowers 
concerning the NHS in Scotland (SPSO 2020p). While these roles, provide 
the ombudsman with additional activities, the functions, themselves, are, 
nonetheless, very similar to those undertaken by classical reactive 
ombudsman. However, the SPSO additionally provides significant 
educational activities to bodies in jurisdiction on good complaint handling and 
how bodies in jurisdiction can learn from complaints. For Stuhmcke (2012), 
this would be enough to categorise the SPSO as a variegated ombudsman. 






7.2 Research Question One: What approaches do health ombudsman 
take to administrative justice? 
 
The research found that the dominant administrative justice model within the 
OHOQ is the legal model demonstrated by the OHOQ’s emphasis on 
collecting the correct evidence indicative of professional misconduct in order 
to be able to mount successfully a prosecution at the QCAT. In contrast, the 
dominant model of administrative justice exhibited by the SPSO is that of 
bureaucratic rationality. The approach of the SPSO is one based upon 
complaint resolution and feedback, with complaints either upheld or not 
upheld, and decisions based upon normative standards.  
 
Mashaw (1974) identified three models of administrative justice: bureaucratic 
rationality, professional treatment and moral judgment. The bureaucratic 
rationality model is concerned with the efficient and accurate implementation 
of decisions which reflect the legislature’s will; the professional model is 
dominated by a professional culture which takes account of the 
incompleteness of information, the fact that no two cases are alike, and 
therefore professional judgment is required to make decisions; and, a moral 
judgment model which is concerned with determining which side is to be 
supported when the interests and values of two sides are in conflict (Mashaw 
1983, pp.26-30). Later work by Adler (2003) developed thinking around these 
three models and, Adler, firstly, recast Mashaw’s moral judgment model as a 
legal model, as he suggested that Mashaw’s moral judgment model, which 
was legitimated by ‘fairness’ was unhelpful as he said it implied that the other 
models were ‘unfair’ (Adler 2003, p.329). Instead, Adler felt that the 
legitimating value was the assertion of legal rights. Secondly, Adler identified 
three additional models: a managerial model, a consumerist model, and, a 
market model. Both Mashaw (1983) and Adler (2003) argued that the models 
were in competition with each other for dominance and, as one gained 
strength, the other models diminished in power.  
213 
 
7.2.1 OHOQ and administrative justice 
 
Carney et al. (2017) applied Mashaw’s and Adler’s models to health 
complaint entities in Australia and suggest that most Australian health 
complaint entities, with their emphasis on complaint resolution and feedback, 
are most associated with the bureaucratic rationality model although they do 
recognise that there also exists elements of both the professional judgment 
and legal models. However, Carney et al. (2017, p.76) continue that when 
linked with health regulation, the professional model becomes more 
dominant, before noting that the New South Wales Health Care Complaints 
Commission (NSW HCCC), with its prosecutorial responsibilities, has 
‘strengthened the legalist elements’. As with the NSW HCCC, the OHOQ has 
prosecutorial responsibility for professional misconduct.  
 
In the results section it was identified that all participants from the OHOQ 
stated that the OHOQ’s primary objective was to protect the health and 
safety of the Queensland public, and, that the risks to health and safety were 
described in terms such as ‘professional sexual boundary violations’, criminal 
matters, the financial exploitation of patients and the verbal abuse of patients, 
all of which are potentially criminal acts. Lydia’s comment that, ‘We’re here to 
make sure that those rogues are dealt with’ is very much the principal logic of 
the OHOQ.  
 
The great majority of the OHOQ complaint investigations only take place 
where the issue is thought to be of a serious nature and which may result in 
the suspension or cancellation of a health professional’s registration. While 
the OHOQ is able to, and does, conduct investigations into health services 
they are relatively small in number, amounting to only 19 out of 197 
investigations concluded in 2018/19 (OHOQ 2019, p.43). Such investigations 
are conducted with a view to enabling the Director of Proceedings to be able 
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to prosecute the health professional at the QCAT. There is very much a legal 
focus to these activities as there is a need to present a legal defensible case 
at the QCAT. Inevitably in these investigations, there are elements of the 
professional judgment model as the OHOQ does obtain clinical opinions as 
part of its evidence gathering activities to help inform any prosecution. 
However, the professional judgment model is clearly second to the legal 
model. 
 
The very limited amount of systemic investigation work that the OHOQ 
undertakes demonstrates an alternative approach. Here, the OHOQ works 
with bodies, facilitating improvements in services and, in adopting this 
approach through which bodies have a dominant role in identifying solutions, 
the OHOQ adopts an approach in keeping with professional judgment. 
However, as the OHOQ’s systemic work is minor compared to its work on 
prosecuting health professionals, the dominant model of administrative 
justice remains the legal model. 
 
There may be two reasons which account for the legal model being the 
dominant administrative justice model within the OHOQ. Firstly, there is the 
OHOQ’s underpinning legislation. Although generally permissive in nature, in 
that it empowers the OHOQ to undertake a variety of actions in relation to the 
complaints that it receives, the OHOQ is subject to two obligatory 
responsibilities. The first relates to the main objective of the OHOQ, which is 
the obligation to promote the health and safety of the public (Health 
Ombudsman Act 2013 S3(1)). Secondly, there is the requirement for the 
OHOQ to undertake investigations where the issue may result in the 
suspension or cancellation of a health professional’s registration (Health 
Ombudsman Act 2013 S91(1)). A need to focus on serious issues was 
emphasised by the example made of the first Ombudsman, Leon Atkinson-
McEwan, who was suspended by the Queensland Minister for Health for not 
taking immediate action against a health worker accused of stealing drugs 
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(Crockford 2017). Lily confirmed to the researcher that the OHOQ’s 
underpinning legislation focused principally upon individual complaints with 
less focus on systemic investigations.   
A second reason that may influence the adoption of the legal model by the 
OHOQ is the membership of the its Executive Leadership Forum. Composed 
of six members, four of the team are lawyers all of whom have experience in 
professional regulation and/or discipline. Of the two non-lawyer members of 
the Executive Leadership Forum one also has a background in the 
professional regulation of doctors (OHOQ 2019, pp.70-71). While the team 
may have been appointed because the orientation of the office was already 
focused on disciplinary matters, given that the OHOQ is a young office, it is 
also possible that the team, collectively, determined the approach of the 
office. 
 
Taking together an executive team dominated by persons with experience in 
professional regulation and the OHOQ’s underpinning legislation with its 
focus on public safety and professional misconduct creates an environment 
where a legal model of administrative justice dominates. 
 
7.2.2 SPSO and administrative justice 
 
The SPSO is in a different place regarding administrative justice models. It 
does not have any regulatory responsibility. The primary purpose of the 
SPSO is complaint resolution with feedback and guidance to support service 
improvement. Recommendations that arise from individual complaints are the 
key mechanism by which the SPSO attempts to secure improvements within 
the healthcare system. Such recommendations are generally normative in 
nature, with a focus on securing ‘the ideal outcome for a particular 
complainant’ (Mary). The approach of the SPSO is one based upon the 
investigation of individual complaints which conclude with adjudicative 
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decisions based upon normative standards such as national or local 
guidelines. With the need for clinical opinions, there is also a strong, but 
secondary, professional judgment element.  
 
The historical contingency of the SPSO helps explain its approach. The 
SPSO’s origins lay in the United Kingdom’s PHSO which previously had 
responsibility for the actions of government agencies in Scotland. The PHSO 
was established in 1967 as the Parliamentary Commissioner for 
Administration, to consider complaints against the actions of United Kingdom 
government agencies but this did not include the National Health Service 
(NHS). The NHS did not become subject to ombudsman oversight until 1973 
with the establishment of the Health Service Commissioner, a post held 
jointly with the Parliamentary Commissioner for Administration, thus creating 
the PHSO (Gregory and Giddings 2002). However, even then clinical issues 
were excluded from consideration by the PHSO, a situation unremedied until 
1997 (Gregory and Giddings 2002). For the first 30 years of its existence the 
PHSO was unable to consider clinical issues but was restricted to 
considering the correctness of bureaucratic decisions made, firstly by 
government agencies, and then also by the NHS. Given this history it is 
unsurprising that a bureaucratic model of administrative justice was adopted 
by the PHSO. However, this history and culture persisted into the approach 
to considering all health service complaints.  
 
The SPSO was created in 2002 as a consequence of the establishment of 
the Scottish parliament and government. The underpinning legislation of the 
SPSO is the Scottish Public Services Ombudsman Act 2002. This legislation 
allows, but does not require the ombudsman to investigate appropriate 
complaints involving service failure or failure to provide a service where the 
complainant claims to have suffered an adverse consequence, but does 
require the ombudsman to produce a report should the ombudsman conduct 
an investigation. The history and legislation of the SPSO manifest 
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themselves in a bureaucratic rationality approach to administrative justice. 
Overall, there is broad alignment between the SPSO’s dominant bureaucratic 
rationality model of administrative justice and that identified in most 
Australian health complaint entities (Carney et al. 2017) and in other UK 
ombudsman (see PHSO 2009).  
 
7.3 Research Question Two: What approaches do the OHOQ and the 
SPSO, with their differing statutory functions, use as they seek to 
secure system improvement?  
 
The research found that the OHOQ uses two main approaches to contribute 
to system improvement, those of prosecuting health professionals and 
conducting systemic investigations. However, the researcher found the ability 
of these approaches to make a significant contribution to system 
improvement was limited. Of the nearly nine thousand complaints received 
by the OHOQ in 2018-19, in only around 60 cases were health professionals 
prosecuted by the OHOQ. In addition, the OHOQ conducts only a small 
number of systemic investigations each year. In the case of the SPSO, the 
researcher found that the principle approach to system improvement was its 
use of recommendations in upheld individual complaints. Although the SPSO 
conducts a sizeable number of health complaint investigations each year, 
using recommendations to contribute to system improvement was found to 
have significant limitations in practice and contributes to an informational 
learning approach. 
 
It was noted earlier that Stuhmcke (2012) and Buck et al. (2011) had 
identified a range of activities undertaken by ombudsman aimed to 
contributing to the improvement of the system over which they have oversight 
(see section 2.9). During this research, the activities undertaken by both the 
OHOQ and the SPSO which could be used to contribute towards system 
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improvement were identified and are compared in Table 19 overleaf. In 
addition to the range of activities identified by Stuhmcke and Buck et al., 
Table 19 lists two additional activities that were identified by the researcher, 
one from the OHOQ and one from the SPSO. The OHOQ prosecutes health 
professionals where it believes that professional misconduct has occurred, 
while the SPSO has responsibility for setting the standards for complaint 
handling by bodies in jurisdiction. An important point to note is that although 
Table 19 provides details on the breadth of activities undertaken by the 
OHOQ and the SPSO, it is silent as to the depth of undertaking of these 
activities. It is here where the researcher identified that there were very 
significant differences between the two ombudsman.  
Ombudsman activities 







Complaint handling   
Systemic investigations   
Own-motion investigations   
Production of reports   
Production of guidance   
Submissions   
Training   
Audit, inspection, monitoring   




Setting complaint standards   
Table 19 Comparison of activities undertaken by the OHOQ and the SPSO 
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7.4 Approaches used by the OHOQ to improve the healthcare system 
 
The researcher found that the OHOQ uses two main approaches in its 
contribution to system improvement, one of which can be considered a 
negative approach to system improvement, namely the ability to prosecute 
health professionals, while the second would be considered a positive 
approach towards system improvement, namely the use of systemic 
investigations. There is, however, greater focus on prosecuting individual 
health professionals and less on systemic investigations, a balance, 
attributed by Lily, to the OHOQ’s underpinning legislation, which she stated 
placed a large degree of emphasis on individual complaints and less on 
systemic activity.  The researcher found that the OHOQ also uses two 
indirect approaches to system improvement, namely those of local resolution 
and conciliation.  
 
7.4.1 Prosecuting health professionals 
 
It was found by the researcher that there is an internalised view within the 
senior management of the OHOQ as occupying a regulatory position and 
role. Four of the eight OHOQ participants described the OHOQ as being a 
regulator or as part of the co-regulatory landscape for healthcare in 
Queensland, using expressions such as: ‘we don’t have, like a lot of other 
regulators …, and, we’re coregulators with the Boards and AHPRA’ (Lydia). 
All the OHOQ participants discussed the OHOQ’s role as focusing upon 
serious matters relating to professional misconduct. This emphasis on 
complaints about professional misconduct, the term used by all participants, 
was best exemplified by Lydia, 
But this agency deals with the more serious matters. Anything that 
doesn’t hit the threshold of professional misconduct or other conduct 
or performance, that would result in cancellation or suspension of 
registration. Then that usually gets sent to AHPRA to deal with … 
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In addition, every participant from the OHOQ stated that the overarching 
objective of the OHOQ was, ‘to protect the health and safety of the public’ or 
some variant thereof. This focus by all participants on the health and safety 
of the public and on investigating only serious complaints about individual 
health professionals suggests that the office is focused upon the safety of the 
public from health professionals. This view is supported by participants’ 
explanation of how complaints are identified for potential investigation by the 
OHOQ with the focus on criminal, and, in particular, sexually criminal, 
offences or cases where a health professional may exploit their relationship 
with the patient (see section 5.4.1). The assessment made by the OHOQ is 
based on conduct issues rather than performance issues and this approach 
will focus, necessarily, upon individuals rather than organisations as conduct 
issues are related to the behaviours of individuals. While the OHOQ has the 
powers to attempt to resolve the majority of complaints that it receives, it 
chooses not to do so, and this decision will be influenced by the fact that the 
senior management of the OHOQ views the OHOQ as a regulator and not as 
a body with a primary focus on complaint resolution. 
 
The argument for using disciplinary action against health professionals as a 
system improvement measure, is that by sanctioning incompetent doctors, or 
doctors who endanger patients through professional misconduct, then the 
overall quality of care will be raised. If a health professional is replaced by 
someone who is more competent or less dangerous then this argument has 
validity. The risk of facing regulatory action may also act as a disincentive for 
professional misconduct. In this situation, disciplinary action acts pour 
encourager les autres. 
 
However, this approach is not without its downside. There was a discussion 
earlier about the effects on doctors of being complained about (see section 
2.4). It is quite clear that being the subject of a complaint is not something 
easily shrugged off by the majority of doctors, particularly where the 
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complaint is being considered by the professional regulator. There is a 
significant and long-lasting negative impact upon the quality of their work 
post-complaint, including significant psychological morbidity leading to idea of 
the health professional as a second-victim. This translates into negative 
consequences for professional practice, including defensive behaviours such 
as the over-treatment of patients or the avoidance of patients or clinical 
situations perceived to be difficult. This response by health professionals to 
complaints and professional regulation will have a significant, but unknown 
and unknowable, adverse impact on the quality of care. This is not an 
argument to decrease the accountability of health professionals but rather an 
argument that such activity, while necessary, has a significant downside that 
needs to be taken into account.  
 
This is particularly the case when it is recalled that in 2018-19, the OHOQ 
conducted 178 investigations concerning health professions of which only 87 
resulted in a referral to the Director of Proceedings. The Director of 
Proceedings then reviews the case and, in 2018-19, prosecuted only two in 
three cases referred to him by the ombudsman. In broad terms this means 
that only one in three investigations commenced by the OHOQ into 
professional misconduct will result in a prosecution, while research suggests 
that it is likely that many of the 178 health professionals involved in the 
investigations will have suffered significant psychological harm and possibly 
conducted defensive medicine thereafter. 
 
One potential reason why only one in three cases investigated by the OHOQ 
results in a prosecution at the QCAT, may lie in the behaviours of the health 
professionals named in the complaint and their legal representatives. Lydia 
found that ‘civil lawyers are anything but civil’ and indemnity organisations 
had no incentive to co-operate. Even when the OHOQ has clear ‘overt’ 
evidence of misconduct, the health professional’s legal representative will 
‘still want to have a fight about it’. This behaviour may seem unreasonable to 
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the OHOQ, but it is important to remember that successful prosecutions are 
likely to have significant negative consequences for a health professional’s 
professional standing and livelihood as well as the potential negative 
psychological responses discussed previously. From the health 
professional’s perspective this behaviour may seem entirely rational. 
 
7.4.2 Systemic investigations 
 
Systemic investigations are a recognised method by which ombudsman can 
contribute to system improvement and are seen by academics as an 
important function for ombudsman (see Kirkham 2005, 2012, Stuhmcke 
2010), and were memorably described as fire-watching by Harlow and 
Rawlings (2009). The support for ombudsman to have own-initiative and 
systemic investigation powers is due to the track record of success arising 
from systemic investigations conducted by the public service ombudsman 
such as the Ontario Ombudsman, Commonwealth Ombudsman and the New 
South Wales Ombudsman. However, although the OHOQ has established a 
systemic investigations team, it conducts a relatively small number of 
systemic investigations each year which reduces its ability to contribute 
towards system improvement.  
 
In 2018-19, the OHOQ commenced only ten systemic investigations (OHOQ 
2019), and in its four years of existence is yet to conduct a single inquiry. 
This is despite the fact that systemic investigations were viewed positively by 
participants from OHOQ, partly for their alleged value for money (Rachel, 
Aisha), but also because of their perceived ability to bring about changes to 
the healthcare system. Systemic investigations are believed by the OHOQ to 
be able to bring about a greater impact to a broader area while also having 




There was recognition from the OHOQ participants that successful systemic 
investigations necessitated new ways of investigating and working with 
bodies in jurisdiction. This new approach was to work more collaboratively 
with bodies, where the OHOQ highlighted the concerns that it held, and 
facilitated bodies to work together to create solutions. This was particularly 
the case when it came to the making of recommendations. Here, participants 
from the OHOQ were open about negotiating with bodies on the final 
recommendations that would be made. The reason for this change was due 
to the recognition that bodies were better placed to understand the 
complexities of delivering healthcare, including the potential unforeseen 
consequences of recommendation implementation. The aim was to make 
recommendations as meaningful as possible (Jasmine). This finding is in 
keeping with Hertogh’s (2001) and Smith-Merry et al.’s (2014) view that 
working with bodies to identify the best solution to recognised problems was 
most likely to bring about successful change. 
 
The other two, more minor, methods used by the OHOQ to contribute to 
system improvement are local resolution and conciliation. This research 
indicates that the view, held by the OHOQ, that they contribute to system 
improvement may be over-optimistic in practice.  
 
7.4.3 Local resolution 
 
Participants from the OHOQ were hopeful that local resolution may bring 
about system improvement (see also OHOQ 2020j). The OHOQ may play an 
active role in local resolution by supporting complainants through analysing 
information provided by both parties, facilitating meetings between the parties 




It is hard to assess how successful local resolution is at securing 
improvements in the Queensland healthcare system. Outcomes are not 
published by the health organisation involved or by the OHOQ and it is noted 
that 8% of complaints sent for local resolution by the OHOQ are 
subsequently withdrawn by the complainant (OHOQ 2309, p.30). This high 
rate of withdrawal of a complaint may be indicative of the complainants’ 
unhappiness with the OHOQ for not accepting the complaint for independent 
consideration. In addition, 20% of complaints closed at local resolution are 
closed as unresolved. As 1,196 complaints were closed at local resolution 
stage in 2018-19 (OHOQ 2019), and assuming that this is a typical proportion 
of unresolved complaints, this is likely to leave a large number of 
complainants dissatisfied. The limitations of what can be achieved at local 
resolution was noted by Betty who felt that conciliation offered greater 
opportunity as ‘you can probably pull and stretch system improvement in the 




The second indirect approach used by the OHOQ is that of conciliation. The 
role adopted by the OHOQ in conciliation is active. Before conciliation is 
offered, the OHOQ will undertake an initial assessment of the case where 
they can obtain relevant documents from the health organisation and, if 
considered appropriate, also obtain an independent clinical opinion (OHOQ 
2020k). OHOQ will also employ specialist conciliators to facilitate the 
conciliation. The approach to conciliation used by the OHOQ is evaluative 
rather than facilitative. This allows the conciliators to challenge both parties 
and ‘reality test them on their views’ (Betty). 
Participants from the OHOQ expressed confidence in the ability of 
conciliation to deliver results as discussions are legally privileged which can 
allow for more honest discussions and potential solutions explored without 
risk that what is said can be interpreted as an admission of liability (Betty). 
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One problem faced by the OHOQ is that there is no obligation upon health 
organisations to participate, and a large proportion of complaints suitable for 
potential conciliation are not advanced due to the unwillingness of health 
organisations to participate (Betty). This may be due, in part, to the fact that, 
as the initial assessment of the complaint undertaken by the OHOQ did not 
reveal any significant issue of concern, then the health organisation may 
think that there is no reason for them to participate (Betty).  
 
In 2018-19, only 59 complaints were closed after conciliation indicating that 
the successful use of conciliation is very limited. The other problem relating 
to conciliation is that, due to the confidential nature of the conciliation 
process, the recommendations agreed at conciliation are not able to be 
followed up by the OHOQ. In summary, very few cases are closed at 
conciliation, the OHOQ is unaware of the outcome and agreements, and 
there is no ability to follow up the complaint to ensure that any agreed 
change has taken place. 
 
Taking these four approaches to system improvement together, it was found 
that the effects of the OHOQ on system improvement are likely to be limited 
in scope. 
  
7.5 SPSO and system improvement 
 
Unlike the OHOQ which has a statutory duty to identify and report on 
systemic issues (see above), the responsibilities of the SPSO in this regard 
are much more limited: to investigate appropriate complaints received about 
bodies or persons in jurisdiction (Scottish Public Services Ombudsman Act 
2002). With the exception of section 16G of the Scottish Public Services 
Ombudsman Act 2002 which requires the SPSO to promote best practice in 
complaint handling, there is no requirement within the Act to the ombudsman 
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to contribute towards system improvement. In practice the legislation has 
been internalised to mean that,  
So, in respect of our complaints function, we have three remits 
effectively. First is by taking individual complaints, to consider, 
investigate those and to provide individual redress and to remedy the 
injustice that has happened. Secondly, to identify learning and 
improvement and increasingly … our role is focusing on that learning 
and improvement element. And thirdly, in Scotland, we have a duty to 
establish and monitor complaints handling procedures across the 
public sector (Chloe). 
 
All SPSO participants replied in similar terms, although there was less 
emphasis from some on the SPSO’s role in improving complaint handling. 
While all participants expressed a desire for own motion powers that would 
allow the SPSO to undertake systemic investigations similar to those 
undertaken by the OHOQ, in the absence of such powers, the focus is on 
using the outcomes of individual complaints to try to secure system 
improvement.  
 
The SPSO attempts to combine both the investigation of complaints and 
system improvement through the use of recommendations. However, 
combining complaint investigations with system improvement is seen as 
problematic by Carney et al. (2017, p.82) ‘both conceptually and in the 
overall governance system’. In support of this view, this research found that a 
strong accountability logic and coercive approach to administrative control 
adopted in the investigation phase by the SPSO adversely influenced the 
health boards’ perception of the SPSO’s investigations and 
recommendations. Often feeling bruised by the SPSO’s reports, 
implementation by health board staff was often due to a sense of capitulation 
rather than commitment and this is likely to be less effective in making 




7.5.1 Using recommendations from upheld complaints to improve the system 
 
The key approach to contributing towards system improvement from the 
SPSO is through the use of recommendations arising from its upheld 
investigations. However, as shall be seen, the SPSO’s approach to its 
recommendations is problematic in its construct and is likely to lead to an 
informational mode of organisational learning. 
 
Mary claimed that an upheld complaint indicated that something had gone 
wrong and there was an onus upon the health organisation to learn from the 
complaint. The use of recommendations is intended to ensure that future 
practice meets established best practice as defined by delivering care in line 
with recognised standards and guidelines. At the time of the interviews, a 
new approach to making recommendations had recently been introduced by 
the SPSO due to an awareness from caseworkers that they were seeing the 
same issues from the same bodies. This new approach is similar in some 
ways to that used by the OHOQ in its systemic investigations and the reason 
for adopting this approach is also similar to the reasons put forward by the 
OHOQ: an awareness that an SPSO caseworker may not appreciate the 
impact of a recommendation on the health organisation (Mary). The intention 
is to put the ‘onus’ back on the health board to ‘take ownership’ of errors 
identified in an SPSO investigation and for the health organisation to tell the 
SPSO how it would resolve the problem (Ellie). The approach requires the 
health board to determine if the problem is widespread and to decide what 
would be an appropriate response (Susan). Again, as with the OHOQ’s 
approach to systemic investigations, this is similar to the finding from Smith-
Merry et al (2014) and the ‘all roads lead to Rome approach’ used by the 




Three particular issues arise from using recommendations as the driver for 
improvement. The first, and biggest, issue is that, in making 
recommendations to improve healthcare services, the SPSO attempts to use 
normative standards to guide both their adjudication on complaints and the 
recommendations and responses from Health Boards. The outcomes 
required from recommendations tend to be that of meeting established best 
practice – as identified within policies and guidance produced by the Board 
concerned or national standards and guidelines. However, it is not clear that 
asking bodies to review their practices does result in significant normative 
improvement. Adler (2003, p.328) notes that as complaints received by 
bodies, let alone those considered by ombudsman, are only a fraction of the 
issues about which complaints could be raised, then the normative power is 
likely to be variable and of low magnitude.   
 
More significantly, this normative approach, which is also used by other UK 
health ombudsman, was strongly criticised by the United Kingdom’s Appeal 
Court in the case of Miller and Howarth v the Health Service Commissioner22, 
where Sir Ernest Ryder (Senior President of the Tribunals) described it as an, 
approach that permits of no nuances in clinical practice or opinion’ and 
‘if the ombudsman’s clinical advisors take one line of professional 
good practice as they did in this case, it matters not that there is 
another entirely valid good practice, it can be ignored (Miller and 
Howarth v the Health Service Commissioner, para.79).  
 
Ryder goes on to note that the General Medical Council’s standard is 
whether the actions of the doctor have ‘fallen seriously below the standard of 
a reasonably competent doctor in his or her specialist field (Miller and 
Howarth v the Health Service Commissioner, para. 81). Damningly, Ryder 
concludes, 
The [normative] standard chosen by the ombudsman is beguilingly 
simple but incoherent. It cannot provide clarity or consistency of 
                                            
22 The Health Service Commissioner is the health ombudsman in England 
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application to the facts of different cases. There is no yardstick of 
reasonable or responsible practice but rather a counsel of perfection 
that can be arbitrary. It runs the risk of being a lottery dependent upon 
the professional opinion of the advisor that is chosen. It is 
unreasonable and irrational and accordingly unlawful. (Miller and 
Howarth v the Health Service Commissioner, para.82). 
 
This normative approach is the approach utilised by the SPSO but, as was 
seen in the results section, many health board staff expressed concerns 
about the clinical advice upon which the SPSO relies to make decisions. 
Many Scottish health board participants argued that, firstly, there can be 
legitimate differences in clinical judgment as to the diagnosis and 
management of patients, and, secondly, the clinical advice did not take into 
account the local context for the delivery of healthcare. As the SPSO was not 
willing to discuss the clinical advice with health board staff, the staff affected 
were often left frustrated, especially when they felt that the clinical advice 
was ‘wildly wrong’ (Rhoda). 
 
Secondly, there also exists a more fundamental problem for SPSO in its use 
of a normative approach, created by the huge number of clinical guidelines 
that now exists and has been described as ‘both unmanageable and 
unfathomable’ (Greenhalgh et al. 2014, p.2). As an example, Greenhalgh et 
al. (2014, p.2) cite, ‘one 2005 audit of a 24 hour medical take in an acute 
hospital, for example, included 18 patients with 44 diagnoses and identified 
3679 pages of national guidelines (an estimated 122 hours of reading) 
relevant to their immediate care’. 
 
Such an example suggests two problems for the SPSO. Firstly, due to the 
volume of guidelines, it is not always reasonable for the SPSO to use clinical 
guidelines as the norm by which to judge clinical practice, a problem which is 
compounded by the reality of healthcare, where patients may present with 
multiple morbidities or medications, and which will impact upon the 
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usefulness of guidelines. Given the scale of guideline production, it is not 
possible for any clinician to be aware of them all and their use as an 
appropriate normative standard, therefore, becomes extremely problematic. 
Secondly, it is arguable that the solution to a single instance of a clinical 
failing in healthcare is an instruction to do more work on guideline 
implementation. There has been significant research on why clinicians fail to 
comply with guidelines with reasons including lack of applicability or 
evidence, environmental factors, unclear guideline recommendations and 
lack of awareness of the guideline (Lugtenberg et al. 2009, Cranney et al. 
2001). In addition, the use of clinical guidelines is not seen to be without 
risks. Woolf et al. (1999) pointed out the limitations of guidelines: the science 
upon which the guideline is based may be limited, the recommendations 
within guidelines are influenced by the membership of the guideline group 
and may reflect personal biases, and guidelines may consider factors other 
than solely patient benefit, such as resource constraints or the protection of 
special interests. As a result, Woolf et al. (1999) claim that there is the risk of 
harm arising: the limitations may result in suboptimal treatment for patients 
and that a standardised approach, which takes reduced account of individual 
patient need, becomes the dominant practice. 
 
The use of normative standards in recommendations is attractive yet 
problematic. Stating that a normative standard such as a guideline applies 
may not convince those who are faced with the nuances involved in the 
delivery of care, the context of which may not match the assumptions upon 
which the guideline is based. As health boards may be sceptical about the 
clinical advice upon which the decision relies, and, thus, the SPSO’s 
decision, it becomes a problem for the health board to implement change: 
‘So, there are occasions where they proceed to print things that our clinicians 
don’t agree with. Which gives us a challenge back from the board then, how 




The SPSO needs to put itself in the position of understanding the decisions 
that were made by the health professionals involved in the complaint yet, as 
a result of the sparse communication and refusal to discuss with health 
boards the clinical advice upon which it relies, the SPSO chooses not to do 
so. The result is minimal unsustained change which appears to comply with 
the SPSO’s requirements but which does not truly solve the problem leading 
to the recurrence of similar complaints.   
 
The issues identified above in using recommendations as the driver for 
system improvement make it likely that the ability of recommendations to 
deliver this desired system improvement will be limited. This is, however, not 
a given. The approach adopted by the SPSO is at the discretion of the 
ombudsman in post. The SPSO could, theoretically, adopt an approach more 
attuned to professional judgment, such as investigating complaints in a 
manner similar to that used to investigate significant adverse clinical 
events23. Such an approach may be appreciated by complainants. As Carney 
et al. (2017) stated, complainants are often interested in the quality of 
services, and that making simple binary decisions, such as upheld or not 
upheld, can be less than satisfactory to complainants, and may also 
oversimplify complex, multi-faceted issues. In addition, as both Bismark et al. 
(2011) and Friele et al. (2013) found, an important outcome sought by health 
complainants is for lessons to be learned. An approach similar to that used in 
investigating significant adverse clinical events is more likely to be able to 
secure these outcomes and also take into account the complex nature of 
health complaints.  
 
To do this, however, would require the SPSO to alter significantly its 
approach towards investigating health complaints and to move away from a 
bureaucratic approach to administrative justice towards a more dominant 
                                            
23 For details of this approach, see, for example, M Woloshynowych, S Rogers, S Taylor-
Adams and C Vincent (2005) 
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professional judgment model. Making this switch would not be simple. One of 
the strengths of ombudsman is that they are a form of alternative dispute 
resolution, which focus on correcting errors made by the state. Part of their 
legitimacy lies in their lay status and their independence from the sectors 
over which they have oversight. Adopting a professional judgment model, 
with greater emphasis on professional judgment and approaches risks 
undermining their perceived independence.  Complainants already criticise 
United Kingdom health ombudsman as being biased towards the NHS.24 
 
There is also the time lag inherent in the complaints process. For the SPSO 
to investigate a complaint, the body must have had an opportunity to attempt 
to resolve it. Thus, there is a delay before the complainant lodges the 
complaint to the body concerned. There is a second delay while the body 
attempts resolution and there is a third delay before the complainant then 
approaches the SPSO. There are no available statistics which measure how 
old complaints are before they reach the SPSO but it is likely to be several 
months. In addition, a complaint may take several months to be completed by 
the SPSO. The SPSO is silent about the average duration of the length of 
time it takes to investigate and report on a complaint but the 2018/19 Annual 
Report (SPSO 2019, p.13) does state that it completed 97% of complaints 
within 260 working days. Significant time lags run the risk that the 
recommendation is no longer relevant due to changes in the service or 
personnel or that it may have already been implemented. Such a finding was 
found by Smith-Merry et al. (2016) in their research on the responses of 
complaint managers to the outputs of their health complaint entity, where the 
complaint managers claimed that, on many occasions, the hospital had 
already implemented the changes prior to the outcome of the investigation. 
 
                                            
24 For an example, see PHSOTHETRUESTORY at https://phsothetruestory.com/ 
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7.6 Research Question 3: How do those in the healthcare system 
receive and respond to these approaches?  
 
The ability to understand how bodies in jurisdiction respond to the activities of 
their ombudsman is important for ombudsman, complainants, bodies in 
jurisdiction, and, the wider public. This section begins by discussing the 
awareness of the participants from Scottish health boards of the outputs from 
the SPSO before outlining a new conceptual model to aid the understanding 
of how Scottish health boards respond to these outputs.25 This new model 
builds upon, and seeks to integrate, previous academic research into 
ombudsman and supplements this foundation with ideas drawn from 
organisational learning and institutional logics.   
 
7.6.1 Participants awareness of the SPSO 
 
With the exception of the SPSO’s complaint handling activity, there was 
limited awareness by participants from the Scottish health boards of the other 
activities undertaken by the SPSO aimed at contributing to system 
improvement (Table 19). The SPSO will be disappointed that much of its 
work bypasses the attention of health board staff, with the greater majority of 
participants only able to recall between two to four of the seven areas of 
activity undertaken by the SPSO. Indeed, approximately three-quarters (15 
out of 21) of participants recalled less than half of the activities.  
 
There were some interesting results in the area of awareness. Only 11 out of 
the 21 participants mentioned that the SPSO published its investigation 
reports and decision summaries, which is lower than may be expected as 
many participants mentioned concerns about reputational risk from upheld 
                                            
25 It will be recalled that Queensland HHS did not agree to participate in this research 
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reports and of the fear of details of upheld complaints being published in 
newspapers. Nursing staff were more likely to mention the publication of 
reports with some stating that they actively looked at published reports to 
identify potential learning. Only one in three participants mentioned the 
SPSO’s role in improving complaint handling, with, ironically, staff involved in 
complaint teams less likely to mention that activity.  
 
Half of the health board participants recognised the SPSO’s role in 
contributing towards system improvement, although only half of those who 
did make this recognition identified recommendations as being the driver. 
Directors of health boards and complaints teams were more likely to identify 
the SPSO as contributing toward system improvement. Nursing staff, 
although having relatively higher awareness of published investigation 
reports and, of whom, some stated that they looked at these publicised 
reports as a source of learning, were noticeably less likely to mention the 
SPSO’s role in contributing towards system improvement. 
 
These results demonstrate the difficulties facing the SPSO as they attempt to 
‘cut through’ to the attention of health board staff. All health board staff talked 
of the pressure under which they worked which resulted in them focusing on 
activities of immediate relevance and importance. While this remains the 
situation, the SPSO is likely to continue to struggle with its system 
improvement work. The focus of health board staff will remain on the SPSO’s 
complaint handling and, as shall be discussed below, this is not always 
viewed positively by them. 
 
7.6.2 The conceptual model 
 
The outcome of this research, built, as it is, upon previous academic 
research in this area and the theoretical constructs of organisational learning 
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and institutional logics has allowed the researcher to develop a novel 
conceptual model to explain earlier research findings that there is limited and 
equivocal evidence that ombudsman contribute to system improvement. As 
shall be argued, the dominant institutional logic within an ombudsman office 
provides the mechanism that shapes the model of administrative control 
exerted by the ombudsman office upon bodies in jurisdiction. In turn, this 
model of administrative control sculpts the nature of the relationship between 
ombudsman and body in jurisdiction, and which will, again in turn, influence 
how bodies respond to their ombudsman. The model also explains earlier 
research findings through the recognition of the complexity of both healthcare 
organisations and the delivery of healthcare and the social structures in 
which the SPSO and health boards operate. The construction of this novel 
model is now explained by way of explaining its individual components. 
 
Health ombudsman will have, either as a strategic objective or as a statutory 
requirement, responsibility to contribute to the improvement of the system. In 
practice, an ombudsman will provide some output which is intended to 
prompt a response from a body in its jurisdiction, causing this body in 
jurisdiction to change some aspect of its activities leading to system 
improvements. This is shown diagrammatically in Figure 5 below: 
 
Figure 5 Basic diagram demonstrating how ombudsman contribute to system improvement 
 
Stuhmcke (2006), identified two types of output from ombudsman, those 
which are direct and are measurable, and those which are indirect and are 
immeasurable. In addition, Stuhmcke (2006), also identified thick and thin 
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changes resulting from ombudsman outputs. Thick changes are policy 
changes while thin changes are procedural type changes.  These can be 
incorporated into the model as illustrated below, Figure 6: 
 
Figure 6 Revised diagram incorporating the work of Stuhmcke (2006) 
 
This basic model can then be developed further though the addition of 
Hertogh’s (2001) work on cooperative control or cooperative control. In this 
work Hertogh argued that the impact of an ombudsman relates to the clarity 
of the decisions provided to bodies in jurisdiction, the degree of tension that 
exists between that message and extant organisational values and policies, 
before the body considers whether or not to implement the decision. For 
each of these stages there was a potential obstacle to change, a lack of 
clarity, a significant gap between the decision and current values and 
policies, and defensive behaviours. The relationship between the phases and 
barriers is shown diagrammatically in Figure 7 below. 
 




Hertogh’s model can be integrated into the proposed new model as indicated 
in Figure 8 below: 
 
Figure 8 Revised model incorporating the work of Hertogh (2001) 
 
As Hertogh (2001) suggested in his discussion on cooperative control and 
the barriers to implementation of ombudsman recommendations, 
organisations must decide how to respond when subject to recommendations 
from an external controller.  Work by Braithwaite (2014) and Smith-Merry et 
al. (2016) indicates that the responses by organisations will be strongly 
influenced by the motivational postures adopted by individuals within these 
organisations. Accordingly, it is suggested that the motivational postures 
adopted by individuals and organisations will impact upon the transformation 
and processing stages in Hertogh’s model. That is, the postures will affect 
how individuals and organisations interpret what the decision will means for 
them, how the recommendations relate to the goals and operations of the 
body, and how best should the body respond to the decision. The ideas of 
motivational postures are added to the model as indicated in Figure 9 below. 
 




This model is now developed further by incorporating the work of Gnyawali 
and Stewart (2003).  
 
Gnyawali and Stewart (2003) suggested that there are two types of learning, 
informational and interactional learning, which result in cognitive and 
behavioural change respectively (see 3.2.3). Informational learning ‘focuses 
on the acquisition, storage and distribution of information’ the intention of 
which is to provide detailed information to individuals within the organisation 
responsible for action while interactional learning is concerned with the 
sharing of knowledge between individuals in order to develop new processes 
or routines (Vos et al. 2008, p.11). The addition from and Gnyawali and 




Figure 10 Revised model of how ombudsman outputs can lead to service improvements 
 
Finally, earlier in the thesis there was consideration of the metatheory of 
institutional logics, in which it was noted that there were two conflicting 
institutional logics in the field of improving patient care: the logics of 
accountability and of learning. This conflict may have implications for health 
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ombudsman as they attempt to reconcile their twin roles of adjudicating on 
individual complaints, which is likely to involve the accountability logic, and 
contributing to the improvement of the system, which implies a learning logic. 
The dominant logic within an ombudsman office will affect the nature of the 
relationship between ombudsman and body in jurisdiction and this is 
indicated in Figure 11 below.  
 
Figure 11 Revised model highlighting the possible institutional logics dominant within health 
ombudsmanry 
 
Synthesising the academic research with theories of organisational learning 
and institutional logics has enabled the researcher to create a new 
conceptual model to explain how health boards respond to the outputs of 
their health ombudsman. This model suggests that the ability of health 
ombudsman to contribute towards system improvement is determined by the 
motivational postures adopted by persons within bodies in jurisdiction. These 
motivational postures then mediate the transformation and processing 
phases of the body’s response to the ombudsman, as well as the barriers to 
implementation integral to Hertogh’s model of administrative control. The 
result of this will be a number of changes which can be categorised as thick 
or thin dependent upon whether they are policy or procedural changes. 
Whether the body in jurisdiction uses on an interactive or informational model 
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of organisational learning will determine its approach to implementing 
changes and their sustainability. 
 
The motivational posture adopted by staff within a body in jurisdiction will be 
influenced by the nature of the relationship that exists between the 
ombudsman and that body. The nature of this relationship will be based upon 
the model of administrative control adopted by the ombudsman, being either 
the coercive or cooperative model of control and which will, in turn, be 
strongly influenced by the dominant institutional logic that exists within the 
ombudsman office. An accountability logic will result in a different model of 
control and relationship between ombudsman and body in jurisdiction and, 
thus, the motivational posture that is likely to be adopted by the body, 
compared to that which may be adopted where the dominant logic within the 
ombudsman is a learning logic. This relationship is shown diagrammatically 
in Figure 12 below.  
 
Figure 12 Relationship between the differing elements in the conceptual model 
 
7.6.3 Using the conceptual model 
 
The model provides a framework that explains how health ombudsman are 
able to work most effectively with health organisations and professionals 
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within their jurisdiction to secure meaningful improvements in the healthcare 
system. In using this model as a basis for the discussion, the discussion 
follows the model detailed in Figure 12. It begins with a consideration of the 
institutional logics that influence how the SPSO operates and is followed by 
the consideration of Hertogh’s models of administrative control and its effect 
on the nature of the relationship between the SPSO and health boards. The 
discussion continues with consideration of the dominant motivational 
postures adopted by health board participants before concluding with the 
types of changes that arise from SPSO investigations and examines the 
health boards’ dominant mode of organisational learning.  
 
7.6.4 Determining the dominant institutional logic within the SPSO 
 
Identifying the dominant institutional logic within the SPSO is challenging as 
the SPSO attempts to utilise both the accountability and learning logics. 
These two institutional logics make for uneasy bedfellows and, inevitably, 
one of these logics will become the dominant logic. This dominant logic will 
affect the nature of the relationship between SPSO and health boards. The 
research found that the dominant institutional logic within the SPSO is that of 
accountability with its focus on adjudication, error and prescriptive 
recommendations. 
 
The underpinning premise of the metatheory of institutional logics is that ‘the 
interests, identities, values and assumptions of individuals and organisations 
are embedded in dominant institutional logics’ (Thornton et al. 2011, p.6). 
Institutional logics act as a framework that influences the decisions and 
actions of individuals and organisations. In the field of healthcare quality 
there exists two dominant institutional logics – firstly, the accountability logic, 
predicated upon the allocation of responsibility where things go wrong. 
Healthcare professionals are accountable for their actions and ought to be 
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able to justify their actions by comparing their practice with that of their peers 
or normative standards. The second institutional logic, the learning logic, is 
predicated upon the importance of learning where things have gone wrong 
through ‘no-blame’ investigations aimed at maximising learning through 
interactional learning.  
 
In the investigation and adjudication of complaints the accountability logic is 
used by the SPSO. The language of the published investigation reports and 
decision summaries is full of words indicative of a dominant accountability 
logic: there is a focus on error, complaints are upheld or not upheld; health 
professionals and organisations ‘should’ have done something they did not 
do and many investigation reports contain examples where the actions of 
health professionals have been unreasonable. From these reports it appears 
that health professionals do not make errors but act unreasonably. In 
addition, the SPSO has a support and intervention policy which aims to 
reduce poor practice in complaint handling. While there is language indicative 
of a supportive orientation, the policy is backed up by a list of possible 
sanctions should bodies in jurisdiction fail to respond as the SPSO wishes. 
 
At the same time, the SPSO undertakes activities to support bodies in 
jurisdiction and, in its revised approach to recommendations, the SPSO is 
attempting to use a learning logic. The intention of this revised approach to 
recommendations is to provide organisations with the ability to identify their 
own ‘road to Rome’, which, again, could be indicative of a learning logic. 
However, this approach is more prescriptive than suggested. Organisations 
are instructed in broad terms what they should do to achieve a specified 
outcome by when and are told what evidence will be required by the SPSO to 
demonstrate compliance with the recommendations. In practice, this 




This dominant institutional logic within the SPSO will be determined by a 
number of reasons (see Kagan 2010). Three reasons contribute to the 
mechanism which creates the dominant accountability institutional logic 
within the SPSO, and, these are the corporate sole nature of the ombudsman 
post-holder, the SPSO’s underpinning legislation, and the organisation’s 
historical contingency. 
It was stated earlier that the post-holder of the SPSO has corporation sole 
status. As a result, the ombudsman office will reflect the attitudes, beliefs and 
decisions of the ombudsman. Many participants noted that there had been a 
recent change in the Ombudsman post-holder and stated that, following this 
change in personnel, they had noticed the beginning of changes in the 
approach from the SPSO with the SPSO becoming less aggressive. The 
change in approach to recommendations was seen by some health board 
participants as a sign of this more positive approach. This does confirm that 
the ombudsman does strongly influence how an ombudsman office operates 
but, while it would be easy to think that the attitudes, beliefs and decisions of 
the Ombudsman is the determinant of the approach adopted by the SPSO to 
its relationship with health boards, they are not the only influence.  
 
The SPSO’s underpinning legislation, the Scottish Public Services 
Ombudsman Act 2002, while permissive in allowing how the ombudsman 
conducts their role, is prescriptive about the ombudsman’s role. The 
legislation requires the ombudsman to investigate appropriate complaints 
and to publish reports of such investigations. There is no requirement to 
contribute to system improvement except in relation to its recent new powers 
to improve complaint handling. This legislation shapes the actions of the 
SPSO. As one of the duties of the SPSO is to hold bodies in jurisdiction to 
account for any maladministration, it is important for the SPSO’s reputation 
that it is not seen as maladministrative. Complying with its legislation will help 
protect the SPSO from such criticism and will contribute to a bureaucratic 
approach focused on holding bodies to account.  
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One of the underpinning principles intrinsic to institutional logics is that 
organisations are historically contingent, that is, the historical environment 
and situation of organisations will influence what will be the dominant logic. 
Earlier in this chapter, when considering which model of administrative justice 
was adopted by the SPSO, the historical contingency of the SPSO was 
noted, from its roots as the Parliamentary Commissioner for Administration, 
through its transformation into the PHSO, but with a focus on bureaucratic 
decisions of the NHS, before the PHSO was given powers to consider clinical 
issues. It was identified that this historical contingency was one influence on 
adoption by the SPSO bureaucratic rationality model of administrative justice. 
The bureaucratic rationality model focuses on accuracy and efficiency and 
compliance with established norms. Similarly, this historical contingency will 
influence the dominant institutional logic. Just as the bureaucratic rationality 
model of administrative justice focuses on efficiency and compliance with 
accepted norms, the focus of the accountability logic lies in holding the 
performance of health professionals to account by means of comparing their 
performance with normative standards.  
 
7.6.5 Hertogh’s models of control and the relationship between the SPSO 
and health boards 
 
Hertogh (2001) suggests that the model of administrative control used by 
ombudsman is the cooperative model. In contrast, this research found that 
the model of administrative control utilised by the SPSO was actually the 
coercive model of control. This demonstrates that the model of administrative 
control used by ombudsman is not restricted solely to the cooperative model. 
Rather, the model of administrative control will vary between ombudsman, 
and will be shaped by prior order mechanisms such as the ombudsman’s 




The SPSO would like to think it is developing an increasingly cooperative 
relationship with health boards but this was not the lived experience of most 
health board participants who cited a lack of communication between them 
and the SPSO, the inability to discuss the case and the clinical advice 
obtained by the SPSO which was often determinative of the decision, and 
issues surrounding the clarity of recommendations. Many participants 
commented on the lack of a cooperative approach adopted by the SPSO. ‘I 
think their view would be [that] it [the SPSO] is collaborative but from a 
services point of view I would say it’s pretty remote’ (Fiona), ‘collaboration 
involves discussion and explanation and negotiation. I don’t get a sense that 
happens a lot with the ombudsman’ (Yvonne), ‘there’s not an engagement 
and dialogue with us around that in any shape or form’ (Meg), ‘they tell us. 
And it’s not a communication, it’s not collaborative’ (Jackie), ‘I’m not sure the 
relationship between the SPSO and the health board is collaborative enough. 
They are very separate’ (Yvonne), and, ‘they’re not very approachable really, 
they’re sort of in their ivory tour almost’ (Jessica).  
 
This feeling that the SPSO is not cooperative and distant is due largely to the 
lack of interaction between SPSO and health boards during an investigation. 
Participants reported that communication between the SPSO and health 
boards was sparse and mainly conducted through email: ‘it feels like an 
administrative process … I think it’s bureaucratic’ (Rhoda), ‘it seems to be 
just black and white. You take everything from what’s written’ (Darcie), and, 
‘but that’s what I see as missing because they’re there and we’re here and 
only the twain shall meet in writing’ (Donna). 
 
Similar to the findings in Australia and the Netherlands, participants from 
health boards were keen to have conversations around the issues contained 
within the complaint but felt frustrated that these could not occur. Even when 
health boards were invited to comment, at the draft stage of the investigation 
report, or after the issuance of a decision letter, participants felt that they 
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could not challenge the SPSO or that doing so was of little value as it was 
unlikely to lead to change. There was a feeling among many participants that 
it was inappropriate to challenge the ombudsman: ‘I was always made to feel 
as if you shouldn’t question anything they ask you’ (Emma), ‘I think it’s almost 
a given that your starting point is that you don’t challenge the ombudsman 
(Tess), ‘I don’t think they like being challenged (Vicky), and, ‘I get the sense 
they’re [the SPSO are] quite directive and not really open to a challenge’. 
This last view was supported by Rhoda who stated that ‘we challenged once 
and the Ombudsman came back and chastised us for challenging it. … It felt 
quite punitive’. Many participants questioned the utility of challenging the 
ombudsman: ‘Generally speaking, in my experience, the ombudsman very, 
very, very, very rarely amends the report unless it’s factual accuracy’ 
(Phoebe) and ‘I don’t know that there’s been anything that they’ve [the health 
board has] ever challenged … that actually the Ombudsman’s said “Okay I 
agree with you. That actually we’ll change that”.’ (Emma). 
 
This was particularly the case when there were disagreements about the 
clinical advice. Firstly, there was concern about the clinical advice received 
by the SPSO and its role in determining the outcome of the complaint. It was 
not uncommon for clinicians within a health board to have a differing clinical 
view from that of the clinical advisor employed by the SPSO. Many 
participants picked up on the fact that there can be several legitimate yet 
differing clinical judgements, ‘there are lots of experts in the field [that] may 
have a different view’ (Fiona), ‘sometimes there’s no right or wrong answer’ 
(Emma), and, ‘they (the clinical advisor] are one person, they’re not sense 
testing with others’ (Meg). Relationships between clinicians and the SPSO 
‘become quite tense’ (Deirdre). 
 
Where health boards tried to challenge the clinical advice received by the 
SPSO it was felt by participants to be pointless: ‘We have challenged it [the 
clinical advice], and we’ve been told, this is the clinical advisor for the panel, 
247 
 
and this is the outcome, so, therefore, there you go’ (Rhoda) and, ‘You’ve not 
got much grounds if you’ve got, “I disagree with your clinical advisor”. They’ll 
[the SPSO] go “tough”’ (Jackie). This occurs even where a health board may 
respond to the SPSO citing clinical guidelines which it believes support their 
clinician and his or her actions, but felt that they ‘did not get anywhere’ 
(Isobel). One participant provided an interesting example where her health 
board obtained two independent reviews of their clinician’s actions, one of 
which was obtained from a clinician completely independent from the health 
board. Both independent reviews were supportive of the health board’s 
clinician, but the SPSO was unmoved: ‘we didn’t really get anywhere’ as the 
SPSO relied on their original, sole piece of clinical advice.  
 
To compound matters for health board staff, participants claimed that the 
SPSO lacked transparency, not only on the identity of the clinical advisor, but 
also on their expertise in the area about which they were providing advice. 
Clinicians, and health boards, were in the position of having to accept clinical 
judgements, with which they did not agree, without being able to assess 
whether the clinical advisor had the experience or status to provide such 
advice. This concern was exacerbated when the SPSO’s clinical advisor was 
critical of clinicians who were recognised as clinical leaders in the area 
concerned (Donna) but where it was unclear about the experience and status 
of the clinician providing the advice. Finally, it was reported that the SPSO 
would not allow health boards to discuss the clinical issues involved with the 
clinical advisor to aid better understanding by both parties, on why the 
clinician took the actions that they did, or why the advisor provided the advice 
that they had submitted (Fiona, Eleanor, Jessica and Jackie). The result was 
to leave clinicians feeling unheard and ‘undervalued’ (Isobel).  
 
A second issue raised by participants was their concern about whether the 
SPSO understood the complexities and context of delivering healthcare 
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which may affect both decisions and recommendations. Jessica was 
exercised as,  
… we’ve had some [reports] where medical staff have been really 
quite exercised about some of the things that have been said, 
because at the end of the day, we’re a district hospital and maybe the 
advisor – I don’t know where they came from.  
 
Meanwhile Trish was equally exercised, ‘you think, “You’re just not getting 
that. We don’t have whatever it is you say is on tap, as you say, because 
we’re not a tertiary hospital full of lots of different specialities”’. These are 
examples of the frustrations expressed by staff within district hospitals who 
felt that the advice provided to the SPSO did not make sufficient recognition 
of the realities in providing healthcare in a Scottish district hospital. They 
expressed concern that the clinical advisor had an unrealistic understanding 
of what was deliverable within such a setting.  
 
In their research on the response from hospital complaint managers to their 
Australian health complaint oversight bodies, Smith-Merry et al. (2016) found 
that complaint managers would welcome a collaborative approach between 
ombudsman and health organisation with more discussion and negotiation as 
they felt that this would enable the production of more feasible 
recommendations and realistic timescales. Hertogh (2001) found that staff 
from the Netherlands ombudsman also adopted a collaborative approach and 
had regular communications with bodies in jurisdiction about the investigation 
and recommendations as well as regular interactions out with investigations. 
During these discussions, Hertogh (2001, p.57) found that the bodies may 
make alternative suggestions to the ombudsman about proposed 
recommendations and cited one respondent as saying ‘there are many roads 
that lead to Rome’ and that the discussions with the ombudsman allowed the 
body to ‘select the road that is most efficient’. Hertogh (2001) suggests that, 
what was most effective about discussions between ombudsman and bodies 
in jurisdiction, was that such discussions could enable the ombudsman to 
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overcome the potential blocks to implementation that he had identified in his 
research. Hertogh (2001) suggests that a facilitative, collaborative approach 
used by ombudsman may allow the body to implement the recommendations 
in ways that are consistent with their reality, thus improving compliance and 
delivering greater improvement. 
 
At the time of the interviews with SPSO participants, the SPSO had relatively 
recently introduced a new approach to making recommendations with this 
drive for change coming from within the SPSO: ‘I think it came out of a 
concern from CRs26 a couple of years ago that we were making the same 
recommendation to the same body about the same thing and that, that didn’t 
seem to be being particularly effective …  Before, we kind of sat there, at our 
desks, and tried to think what has gone wrong and what can fix it’ (Ellie). In 
the revised approach it was ‘really up to the organisation to work out how 
they achieve that [the appropriate response to the upheld failing] … so, we 
are putting the onus back on the organisation and saying, you, we have 
noticed some mistakes but it is still your system, so you take ownership of it 
and fix it, and tell us how you fixed it’ (Ellie). In some ways this appears 
similar to the many ‘roads to Rome approach’ used by the Netherlands 
ombudsman. 
 
The rationale behind this change in approach was that ‘we [the SPSO] may 
not always be best placed to make a recommendation that is appropriate 
because we might not know fully the extent of the organisation’s structures 
and resources and so on. So, we might make a recommendation that we 
think is quite an appropriate and straightforward recommendation and, but it 
may have quite an impact on the organisation’ (Mary). This suggests that the 
SPSO is trying to adopt a more cooperative approach with health boards in 
the formulation of recommendations, moving from an approach where it, the 
                                            
26 CRs are complaint investigators – the SPSO calls them case reviewers 
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SPSO, detailed the recommendation, to an approach which provides for a 
greater role in the determination of an appropriate recommendation. 
However, as discussed earlier in the chapter, the new approach from the 
SPSO to recommendations remains fairly prescriptive and lacks genuine 
discussion.  
 
A commonly voiced concern related to appropriateness of SPSO 
recommendations. Donna expressed concern about their ‘lack of general 
understanding about how the system works these days’, while Isobel 
suggested that implementing recommendations across a health board area 
may be difficult due to differing local circumstances, ‘so, I think that some of 
the complexities of what we have to deal with is quite difficult’. In fact, Isobel 
was even blunter, describing some recommendations as ‘wild stuff’ to which 
she thought ‘Okay. Right. Move on’.  
 
The consequence of this lack of cooperation between the SPSO and health 
boards was the development of negative views about the SPSO from health 
board participants ‘I think they’re more dictatorial’ (Jackie), ‘they almost seem 
to be in a place where they’re untouchable’ (Jessica), ‘it actually feels quite 
aggressive … it feels really persecutory at times’ (Rhoda), and, ‘very much a 
kind of stick approach as opposed to engagement, working collaboratively’ 
(Fiona). This belief, that the SPSO is distant, uncooperative and potentially 
aggressive, combined with a need for health boards to be seen to comply 
with the SPSO for fear of adverse publicity or the laying of reports before the 
Scottish Parliament engenders a view from health board participants that 
there was little that appeared to be cooperative about the relationship 
between the SPSO and health boards, but, rather, a coercive relationship 
predicated upon the authority of the SPSO where the obligations on health 
boards to comply are explicit. This is interesting as it contrasts with Hertogh’s 
finding of a cooperative approach from the Netherlands Ombudsman and 
indicates that different ombudsman institutions may adopt differing models of 
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administrative control and that it would be wrong to assume that only the 
cooperative model of administrative control applies to ombudsman.  
 
This perceived lack of a cooperative approach from the SPSO led to 
comments about the SPSO as being ‘dictatorial’ (Jackie), ‘they almost seem 
to be in a place where they’re untouchable’ (Jessica), ‘it actually feels quite 
aggressive … it feels really persecutory at times’ (Rhoda), and, ‘very much a 
kind of stick approach as opposed to engagement, working collaboratively’ 
(Fiona). This belief that the SPSO is distant, uncooperative and potentially 
aggressive, combined with a need for health boards to be seen to comply 
with the SPSO for fear of adverse publicity or the laying of reports before the 
Scottish Parliament engenders the sense of powerlessness and obligation to 
comply that was demonstrated by many participants. The lack of a 
cooperative approach from the SPSO increases the three barriers to change 
identified by Hertogh (2001), those of lack of clarity, policy tension and 
defensive behaviours. 
 
7.6.5.1 Defensive behaviours 
 
Both the negative consequences to health professionals that arise from being 
subject to a complaint, and the manner by which the SPSO conducts its 
complaint investigations are likely to increase defensive behaviours from 
health professionals. When investigating and adjudicating on complaints, the 
focus of the SPSO is on errors. The SPSO uses the language of 
adjudication, upheld and not upheld, and also uses language such as 
‘failings’ and ‘unreasonable’, language which reinforces the idea of error. In 
addition, this research found that clinicians were left feeling frustrated, not 
only due to the fact that they were not able to discuss the clinical issue 
involved with the SPSO’s clinical advisor, but also because they felt that the 
clinical advisor did not take sufficient account of the nuance and complexities 
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of the situation central to the complaint. As several participants reported, the 
result of these factors, for many clinicians, is defensive behaviours. Hertogh 
(2001) argues that defensive behaviours from people in bodies in jurisdiction 
impedes the implementation of ombudsman recommendations.  
 
It was noted in the literature review that clinicians do not always respond 
positively when the subject of a complaint (Zengin et al. 2014), with 
Siyambalapitiya et al. (2007, p.108) stating that clinicians may experience a 
‘sense of indignation towards the patients, frustration, doubts about their 
competence and fear of litigation’. Many clinicians perceive complaints to be 
personal attacks which should be resolved by some other person (Douglas 
and Harrison 1996). Such attitudes by professionals were described as a 
matter of concern ‘representing ‘a fundamental breach of patient-centred 
care’ (Gallagher and Levinson 2013). Cunningham (2004, p.1) suggests that 
clinicians exhibit both short- and long-term adverse psychological responses. 
The psychological responses experienced by doctors appear to adversely 
affect their practise of medicine. Far from being a trigger to improve clinical 
practice, the receipt of a complaint may well have a negative impact upon 
clinical practice and defensive behaviours were likely to be enhanced by a 
focus on errors (Gray and Williams 2011). And, of course, a focus on errors 
is exactly what the SPSO does. In its investigation reports, the SPSO uses 
the language of adjudication, such as upheld and not upheld, and also uses 
language such as ‘failings’ and ‘unreasonable’, language which reinforces the 
idea of error.  
 
One factor that may worsen the experience for clinicians who receive a 
complaint and which may encourage defensive behaviours is the complaints 
process that is utilised. Nash et al claim that doctors wanted the complaints 
process to be transparent and for the complaints process to be overseen by 
competent staff (Nash et al. 2004). Bourne et al. (2016) found that 
particularly stressful for doctors was the uncertain duration of the 
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investigation, poor communication between clinician and complaint handler, 
the unpredictability of the complaints process and procedures, with many 
viewing the complaints process being biased in favour of the complainant. As 
a result, doctors ‘felt neglected and betrayed by complaints procedures’ 
(Bourne et al. 2016, p.2).  This reinforces the negative response from doctors 
and it is here that the SPSO performs badly. The SPSO does not set out in 
advance how long an investigation may take and its performance standard is 
to complete 85% of investigations in 12 months (SPSO 2020), during an 
investigation there is, generally, little in the way of communication between 
the SPSO and health board, that health boards are unaware of exactly what 
is happening during an investigation and there is this frustration, previously 
noted, at not being able to discuss the clinical aspects of the case. 
 
Defensive behaviours from clinicians and other staff was seen to be a 
potential problem by participants, ‘we can all be quite defensive when we’re 
responding to complaints’ (Eleanor), ‘I have witnessed other folk …getting 
quite defensive and feeling that some of the recommendations or 
commentary is personal’ (Deirdre), and, ‘nobody wants their care criticised at 
all, which is very difficult’ (Isobel). As several participants reported, the result 
of all these factors for many clinicians is defensive behaviours. 
 
7.6.5.2 Policy tension 
 
The acceptability of an ombudsman decision is determined by the difference 
between a decision and the existing organisational program and the level of 
commitment to that program by the body so that the greater the change the 
less likely it will be implemented. This is Hertogh’s (2001) policy tension.  
 
Concerns were raised by participants about the achievability of the 
recommendations proposed by the SPSO. Concerns ranged from, failures by 
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the SPSO to understand the implications of the recommendations in terms of 
the necessary work to see the recommendation implemented, which was 
memorably described as ‘industries around the SPSO’ (Darcie), the 
deliverability of the recommendations through a failure to understand the 
complexity of the modern healthcare system, nor the importance of local 
context, ‘a health service is a health service is a health service. It is to a 
certain degree but local context is important’ (Meg), allied to an unwillingness 
to listen to the service (Donna). In addition, as previously discussed, in many 
cases health professionals will be unconvinced by the clinical advice used by 
the SPSO and its subsequent decision. When this occurs, there will lesser 
acceptance of the need for change and commitment to make change. 
Organisations may implement changes for ‘symbolic’ rather than for 
‘instrumental’ purposes, that is, without making significant operational 
changes (Heimer 1999). Making symbolic changes is the result of 
organisations seeking to maintain legitimacy in the eyes of their oversight 
body while, in practice, making as little change as possible (Heimer 1999). 
 
These concerns reflect the policy tensions that can arise where health boards 
and people within them assess the implications arising from a 
recommendation made by the SPSO to what it means for the health board. 
Hertogh (2001) suggested that the greater the gap between the 
recommendation and the existing organisational approach the less likely will 
the recommendation be fully implemented. As participants clearly thought 
that, on occasions, recommendations were unrealistic and not rooted in their 
everyday reality, it is clear that policy tensions will, inevitably, arise. 
 
7.6.5.3 Clarity of recommendations 
 
The final barrier described by Hertogh (2001) was that proposed 
recommendations needed to be clear. It was evident from the results that 
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many participants did not always find recommendations to be clear in their 
intent, with over a quarter of participants, without prompting, describing 
SPSO recommendations as ‘woolly’. Other issues raised include: ‘some of 
them [recommendations] will be very, very generic. And the generic ones are 
the ones that are harder for us’ (Isobel), ‘some of these things you think, 
“Well we’ve sent them the policy, so what’s wrong with the policy? … If we’ve 
to review, what is it in the policy that you think needs reviewed? That’s not 
clear. It just maybe says, “Policy should be reviewed?”’ (Jill), and, ‘you’d love 
to see them in the boardroom to say “What do you mean by that? Explain 
what you actually want us to do, because again in black and white, I can read 
that and think “I don’t know how I can deliver that …?”’ (Darcie), 
 
This lack of clarity in the reports and recommendations can be a challenge 
for participants, ‘it’s very difficult to know, sometimes, what she’s expecting of 
us. It would be good to have a clearer picture of what he or she feels we 
should be doing differently’ (Jill). A lack of clarity from the SPSO about what 
is intended will clearly make it more difficult for health boards to deliver the 
intended changes. 
 
A lack of clarity from the SPSO about what is intended will clearly make it 
more difficult for health boards to deliver the intended changes. Hertogh 
(2001) suggest that reports and proposed recommendations from 
ombudsman need to be clear in order to facilitate their implementation. It is 
clear from the responses from health board participants that they did not find 
the SPSO’s recommendations to always be clear. 
 
The triad of obstacles identified by Hertogh (2001) is, therefore, exhibited. 
The purpose behind recommendations may be unclear, a significant policy 
tension may arise between what is proposed and what the health board may 
consider deliverable, and clinicians and managers may demonstrate 
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defensive behaviours. Any of these obstacles would be a significant block, 
but it is possible that all three will exist for any given SPSO report. If it is only 
the fear of sanction that may arise from non-compliance that drives action it 
would realistic to expect that the response from health boards will be 
diminished and that they may deliver little more than the minimum change. 
Therefore, the motivational postures that are adopted by health organisations 
and professionals will be important in understanding how they respond. 
 
7.6.6 Motivational postures 
 
The novel conceptual model identified in this research indicates that the 
motivational postures adopted by individuals and organisations will affect 
how individuals and organisations interpret and respond to an ombudsman’s 
report. Braithwaite (2014) describes five potential motivational postures: 
commitment, capitulation, disengagement, game playing and resistance and 
noted that they were applicable in a wide range of settings. Smith-Merry et al. 
(2014) investigating the motivational postures adopted by hospital complaint 
managers in response to their ombudsman found three motivational postures 
were demonstrated, those of commitment, disengagement and resistance. 
However, in this research, while three motivational postures were also 
identified from the responses made by participants, they represented a 
different grouping of motivational postures from those found by Smith-Merry 
et al. (2014). In this research, two of the motivational postures that were 
identified, those of commitment and capitulation, were the dominant 
motivational postures, while, in addition, there was a degree of 
disengagement that was voiced. But, as will be discussed, although 
participants voiced little in the interviews about disengagement, it will be 
suggested that disengagement is more widespread within health boards than 




Typical views supportive of the motivational posture of commitment were the 
need to take the ombudsman seriously and reflect on what they have said 
(Trish), the fact that an independent investigation has been undertaken by 
the ombudsman supporting their opinion (Fiona), and a thorough 
investigation has taken place highlighting a failure that needs to be 
addressed (Justine). Jessica noted that an upheld complaint, while a shock 
and upsetting for some staff was important for the health board as it enabled 
it to learn, a view shared by Trish, who described receiving an upheld report 
as ‘sore’ but also an important source of learning. Meg viewed investigation 
reports as ‘gifts’. Several participants saw the ombudsman’s role as 
important, as an external reviewer (Phoebe), in driving improvement (Tess), 
and, as an organisation from which to learn (Trish). The view was, perhaps, 
best summed up by Jackie, who said that the most important objective was 
‘to make the patient, the complainant, whoever it may be, feel better and feel 
that we’ve properly listened to the recommendations and are acting upon 
them’. 
 
The second dominant motivational posture described was that of capitulation. 
In this situation, participants talked of seeing the SPSO as a threat (Vicky), 
people being in fear (Vicky and Darcie), being told to comply with the SPSO 
by their managers (Darcie), taking action because of fear of sanction should 
they not do so, but lacking commitment to this action (Yvonne) and, ‘the 
minute you hear the ombudsman, you think “Ugh”’ (Isobel). In this situation, 
people complied with ombudsman reports for fear of sanction. The sanction 
of which most participants appeared to be concerned about relates to the 
health board’s reputational risk: ‘We have to deliver on the recommendations. 
And, if we don’t, they [the SPSO] don’t close the case, and they write to our 
Chief Executive, and that comes back to reputational issues’ (Jackie), ‘We 
probably risk assess it [the SPSO report]. What’s going to have the biggest 
impact for us, because you don’t want to end up on the front page of the 
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Daily Record’27 (Jill) and, ’I guess the thing is, there’s a pretty clear message 
around these kind of … there’s that whole bit around reputational risk’ (Tess). 
This feeling of fear led to some interesting characterisations of the SPSO: 
‘everyone says, “the Ombudsman”. It’s like the grim reaper’ (Darcie), ‘It’s like 
Big Brother watching you a wee bit’ (Trish), and ‘It’s keeping the wolf away 
from the door’ (Eleanor).  
 
A third motivational posture, that of disengagement, was identified, but to a 
lesser degree in terms of participants responses. While there were comments 
such as, ‘the SPSO? Who? I don’t really care what they [say], you know’ 
(Vicky), or, ‘other things we think, “Really?” It’s almost making 
recommendations for the sake of it rather than genuinely understanding what 
happens in the system’ (Donna), two issues were repeatedly highlighted by 
participants and detailed in the results chapter. These were concerns about 
the clinical advice obtained by the SPSO and the SPSO’s understanding of 
the complexity involved in the delivery of modern healthcare. 
 
Firstly, where health board staff disagreed with the SPSO’s clinical advice, 
they were not able to discuss this advice, leaving health board staff frustrated 
and unheard, and secondly, health board staff did not believe that SPSO staff 
always understood the complexities and nuances of the delivery of modern 
healthcare. This was considered earlier when the nature of the relationship 
between the SPSO and health boards was discussed. The consequence of 
these issues is that clinicians and managers may not be convinced by either 
the investigation decision or the subsequent recommendations and this 
creates problems for implementation: if the clinicians do not agree with report 
‘how do we deliver the action plan for improvement?’ (Meg). The risk is that 
clinicians, and perhaps some managers too, become disengaged from the 
process. As it is clinicians who are responsible for developing and 
                                            
27 The Daily Record is the largest circulation daily newspaper in Scotland. 
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implementing clinical guidelines, if they become disengaged from the process 
then there is a risk that changes that are made will be cosmetic, engineered 
to demonstrate apparent compliance with the recommendations rather than 
prompted by commitment. 
 
It is in this regard that Braithwaite’s (2014) five models of motivational 
postures becomes rather problematic as it might be considered that the 
boundaries between the five models are clear and absolute. In the above 
scenario, are disengaged clinicians, who appear to comply with 
recommendations they do not support, demonstrating disengagement, 
capitulation, as they are only taking action for fear of consequences should 
they not do so, or game-playing, where they appear to accept the 
ombudsman’s authority but are changing as little as possible? An argument 
can be made for both capitulation and game-playing.  
 
In this situation, the sense of the researcher is that the motivation that 
compels compliance is that of capitulation. The SPSO will normally identify 
the health board as the subject of its investigation and, as such, it is the 
health board and not individual healthcare professionals which has to decide 
whether or not to accept the SPSO’s adjudication. Participants were clear 
that health boards did not want to be on the wrong side of the SPSO and, 
while the SPSO has no direct powers over health boards and clinicians, the 
threat of adverse publicity and possible professional sanctions from referrals 
to regulators will be enough to secure apparent compliance. Complying, 
through a fear of sanctions of whatever type, rather than through a sense of 
commitment, is, however, liable to result in informational learning with the 
minimum possible actions undertaken to appear compliant. 
 
It also appears that the motivational posture that is demonstrated by any one 
individual is not absolute, either for health boards or for individuals within 
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health boards. This indicates that the motivational posture adopted by a 
person or body can be contextual, specific to the immediate situation, and, 
personal, where different people may adopt differing motivational postures 
when faced with the same situation. Individuals within the health board will 
review the SPSO investigation report and recommendation(s) and decide 
with how much they agree. If the findings of the investigation and associated 
recommendations are accepted then commitment to implementation of the 
recommendations is likely to be greater. If the SPSO findings and 
recommendations are not really accepted by health boards, a motivational 
posture of capitulation will be adopted and there will be a lesser commitment 
to implementation. Thus, the dominant motivational posture exhibited by 
individuals may well change dependent upon the result and implications of 
individual reports and recommendations. This is a significant finding. 
Previous research looking at the impact of ombudsman by examining the 
responses by bodies in jurisdiction to the output of their ombudsman tends to 
look at the issue at the level of the body and not at the level of individual 
cases. At this lower level, the situation is messier. The result of some 
ombudsman investigations will be fully accepted by health board staff and, 
potentially, deliver significant change while the outcomes of other 
investigations will not be really accepted and have little effect on service 
delivery and which is likely to be temporary.  
 
7.6.7 Types of change that result from SPSO recommendations 
 
Stuhmcke (2006) suggested that ombudsman can make recommendations 
for two types of change – large policy changes or smaller process changes. 
Participants indicated that, while the SPSO did make both type of 
recommendations, the smaller scale recommendations predominated (Fiona, 
Phoebe). In all three health boards, the greater majority of recommended 
changes were small-scale in nature, and sometimes just requires ‘the 
bash[ing] out of a memo (Rhoda), a tweak to a policy (Millie), changes which 
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focus on procedures rather than policies (Jessica), or, are specific to ‘local 
conditions … or client[s]’ (Phoebe). However, the fact that the majority of the 
proposed changes were seen to be small in character was viewed to be 
different from the potential impact of any change, ‘but [some] would actually 
make a huge impact’ (Yvonne), and, ‘the small changes can have a big effect 
on somebody and a big effect on what we do’ (Justine). 
The small changes were seen to be easier to implement although, 
sometimes, even policy changes may be fairly simple to make, ‘to some 
extent policy changes can be reasonably easy, providing it’s not, you know, a 
complete rewrite. It sometimes just requires a tweak’ (Millie). However, there 
were concerns when more significant changes to policies were required: 
such changes are likely to require consultation with partners and 
stakeholders (Fiona) and, this difficulty can be exacerbated when 
recommendations apply to regional services such as cancer treatments 
which involve multi- health board clinical networks (Donna). A need for 
consultation may cause delays or may even create a block should the partner 
organisations disagree with the proposed change. 
 
7.6.8 Organisational learning 
 
Many health board participants questioned the sustainability of the changes 
that arose from implementing SPSO recommendations. As Yvonne put it, 
‘why do we keep getting the same type of complaints, and with the same 
themes?’ The research found that the difficulty in securing sustained change 
within health boards lies in an approach to organisational learning that is 
principally based upon an informational learning mode, focused upon 
incremental change and the sharing of information to individuals within an 
organisation, and is compounded by the challenges health boards face in 
ensuring that the information is adequately shared and understood across 
their entire organisation.   
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The recurrence of similar complaints indicates a failing of organisational 
learning within health boards as the nature of the learning that takes place 
within health boards is a significant factor in the type and sustainability of 
organisational learning that occurs. Gnyawali and Stewart’s theory from the 
field of organisational learning helps us understand why health boards 
continue to receive complaints of a similar nature. Gnyawali and Stewart 
(2003) argue that there are two broad approaches to learning: informational 
learning which focuses on the provision of detailed information to individuals 
within the organisation, and interactional learning, which is directed at the 
development of new processes or routines. An informational learning mode is 
simpler for organisations to manage as interactional learning can create 
‘organizational upheaval and fundamental management paradoxes’ 
(Gnyawali and Stewart’s 2003, p.81). Vos et al. (2008) argue that the 
appropriate response to learning from complaints is interactional learning as 
this approach focuses on resolving the tension between current and required 
future practice.  
 
The initial response by health boards does suggest an interactional 
approach. The ombudsman’s report is sent to a lead manager within the 
ward or department which is the subject of the complaint. The lead manager 
is then responsible for pulling together a team to produce and implement an 
action plan that ensures compliance with the recommendations. The action 
plan will be signed off by management and by the relevant clinical 
governance committee. This group will then implement agreed changes.  
 
However, this work is undertaken by a small group of people, composed of 
people from an organisationally junior level, for example, at ward level, and 
focused on resolving the immediate, usually local, issue. As such the scope 
of the work is limited to the immediate resolution of the SPSO’s 
recommendation. A particular problem arises where the motivational posture 
adopted by the group is that of capitulation. In this circumstance, there is no 
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great commitment to make a change. Sujan and Furniss (2015) claimed that 
complaints often emphasise what has gone wrong which creates a set of 
negative implications and, from this, a negative learning culture. Gray and 
Williams (2011) argue that where there is a focus on error and failure the 
associated learning culture is affected by defensive behaviours which aim to 
pretend that learning has occurred and leads to superficial learning. As it is 
likely that the motivational posture adopted by the ad hoc working group will 
be that of capitulation, for the reasons set out above, there is every chance 
that this group will demonstrate defensive behaviours and, as a result, the 
organisational learning that arises be diminished.   
 
Most learning across the participating health boards is informational learning, 
in keeping with Gnyawali and Stewart’s (2003) claim that the most likely form 
of organisational learning within large hierarchical organisations is 
informational learning and a focus on the reduction in errors in current 
processes. Firstly, the ombudsman report is cascaded down the organisation 
to the ward or department concerned. At this level of management, it is likely 
to be emailed to the staff within that ward or department, due to the number 
of staff involved and the complications of shift and rota working. However, as 
Millie, Darcie, Donna and Jackie said, emailing reports does not mean that 
they are read, as staff are too busy to read all their emails (Jackie) or 
question their relevance (Fiona). Health boards do try to share information 
across the organisation and will use existing mechanisms such as inter-
speciality clinical governance meetings or quality and performance groups 
but, even then, the ombudsman report(s) will be just one agenda item among 
many. And, as Jessica noted, your learning ‘depends [upon] which meetings 
you go to’. 
 
The difficulties of sharing information across wards or departments is clear, 
but as all health boards have a wide range of units such as multiple hospitals, 
community services and mental health services this creates additional 
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challenges for sharing information. Even within a hospital it is not clear that 
information will be adequately shared across the differing departments: 
participants felt comfortable that information was shared across their own 
department but could not vouchsafe that it was shared across other 
departments within the hospital. Fiona admitted, ‘that’s where we fall short’ 
and noted that if it was directly relevant to you then you are more likely to 
take note than if it concerned other areas as ‘there’s hundreds of learning out 
there for us’. The difficulties in sharing information was identified by many 
participants with Millie, Deirdre and Emma specifically pointing out that they 
believed that their health boards had more to do in this area. 
 
Many participants also noted the limitations inherent within the sharing of 
information. Meg suggested that if only one team is aware of the information 
then no real learning will take place while Rhoda went further, ‘just telling 
someone to do something … doesn’t make a difference’, ‘we don’t use the 
information … to the level that we should’ (Fiona) and ‘you just do a wee bit 
of everything not very well (Deirdre) leading to a view that ‘looking at those 
SPSO letters that do come through and action plans, from the improvement 
side I see no improvement’ (Yvonne). This leads back to the lack of 
sustainable change identified by many participants with Fiona, Jackie, Meg 
and Rhoda all conceding that securing sustainable change was not 
successful. 
 
Huber (1991) described a four-stage process concerning organisational 
learning: the acquisition of knowledge, the distribution of knowledge, the 
interpretation of the information and the storage of this information in the 
organisational memory. For health boards responding to SPSO reports these 
can be a challenge. Where the motivational posture adopted by health 
professionals is that of capitulation there will be decreased commitment to 
acquire the necessary information to respond appropriately to the SPSO 
recommendation. The difficulties faced by health boards in sharing 
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information has previously been discussed. Health boards do attempt to 
provide a common interpretation of this information through clinical forums 
and clinical governance arrangements but the weaknesses of these 
approaches were recognised by health board participants. Health boards will 
also have problems in ensuring that this information is stored within its 
organisational memory. Huber (1991) states that this storage can be 
negatively affected by factors such as staff turnover, and the failure of staff to 
appreciate the importance of the information that they receive. Health board 
participants did comment on the high rate of staff turnover, particularly 
among junior doctors who are typically on rotation schemes as part of their 
training. In addition, health board participants made the point that many staff 
may receive an email containing the information but they may not appreciate 
its relevance to them and, thus, pay insufficient attention to the contents. 
 
7.6.9 Barriers to change 
 
The most significant barriers facing health boards with their compliance with 
SPSO recommendations were time and staff capacity. The pressures that 
participants suggested face the NHS in Scotland, means that compliance 
with SPSO recommendations was seen as an extra duty that needed to be 
fitted into exiting busy workloads. This helps explain the fact that in only 48% 
of cases were bodies able to comply with the timescale for implementation of 
recommendations set by the SPSO.   
 
Thomas (2015) provides further reasons why public bodies are not learning 
organisations. These included bureaucratic structures with complex 
subsystems, each of which may only be partially aware of issue or its 
resolution, that change in large organisations often necessitates substantial 
change programmes while the organisational capacity to manage is limited, 
together with ineffective resources and mechanisms to encourage learning. 
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This research found that these potential blocks exist within health boards. 
The difficulty in sharing information across health board structures has 
already been noted, as has the belief of some participants that many staff 
may not be fully aware of the messages that are being shared. Concern was 
raised by participants about industries being required to manage SPSO 
outputs and there was the issue about the lack of resources mentioned 
above. Taken together, these challenges indicate why organisational learning 





In the consideration of the approaches taken to administrative justice it was 
seen that the SPSO is a variegated ombudsman which takes a bureaucratic 
rationality approach to complaint investigations which are predominantly 
coercive in nature. The OHOQ, inevitably, takes a coercive, legal model 
approach to its regulatory activities because it is a statutorily based co-
regulator of the Queensland healthcare system, and a contrasting 
cooperative approach in which professional judgment dominates for its 
systemic investigation activities. It was found that the OHOQ is not an 
ombudsman but a health complaint entity. 
 
The SPSO and the OHOQ take different approaches towards their 
contribution to system improvement. The SPSO relied principally upon its use 
of recommendations arising from upheld complaints to contribute to system 
improvement, while the OHOQ focused on the prosecution of individual 
health professionals and, to a lesser extent, systemic investigations.  
 
A new conceptual model was presented to explain how health organisations 
and professionals respond to their health ombudsman. Key to implementing 
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change were the motivational postures adopted by individuals and health 
organisations which, in turn, were created by the nature of the relationship 
that exists between the health ombudsman and health bodies. The nature of 
this relationship was strongly influenced by the dominant institutional logic 
adopted by the health ombudsman.  
 
Three dominant motivational postures were identified for the SPSO, those of 
commitment, capitulation and disengagement, created by a relationship 
between SPSO and health boards that was more coercive than cooperative 
in nature, this relationship being influenced by a dominant accountability logic 

















Chapter 8 Conclusion  
 
The underpinning thesis that this research examines is that health 
ombudsman make an important contribution to the improvement of the 
healthcare system as a result of the roles and activities that they undertake 
together with the way that they work with bodies in jurisdiction. Previous 
research, much of which was equivocal, indicated that ombudsman had little 
impact on system improvement. The aim of this research was to describe the 
approaches used by health ombudsman that are intended to contribute to the 
improvement of the healthcare system and to understand how these 
approaches are received, and acted upon, by that system. One outcome 
from this research was the development of a novel conceptual model, built 
upon both previous academic research into ombudsmanry and the theoretical 
constructs of both organisational learning and institutional logics, and which 
provides a means by which the responses of health boards to the SPSO can 




The research found that by directing its activities on the prosecution of 
healthcare professionals, which it believes have committed serious 
professional misconduct, and referring almost all of its complaints back to the 
body concerned or to AHPRA or other external body, the OHOQ does not 
meet the accepted definition of an ombudsman but is a health complaints 
entity. The OHOQ utilises two main approaches in contributing to 
improvement of the healthcare system. Its dominant approach, the 
prosecution of healthcare professionals can be seen as a negative approach 
to system improvement. The focus is on reducing poor or dangerous 
behaviours by sanctioning healthcare professionals. The threat of sanctions 
is intended to act as an incentive to health professionals to act appropriately. 
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However, it was noted that this approach is not without its downside. There is 
a significant adverse psychological impact that arises through this approach 
which can lead to anxiety, depression and even suicide. Doctors are likely to 
adopt defensive medical behaviours which may, in themselves negatively 
impact on patient care.  
 
The second main approach adopted by the OHOQ in its system improvement 
work is its systemic investigation work. The ability to conduct systemic 
investigations is seen as important by both academics and ombudsman, 
enabling ombudsman to make significant contributions to system 
improvements. In this area of work, the OHOQ has developed collaborative 
models which move away from traditional investigations to approaches based 
on the highlighting of problems and facilitating work with bodies in jurisdiction 
to analyse the cause(s) of the problems and to create solutions. In addition, 
the OHOQ is active in ensuring compliance with agreed outcomes, visiting 
the health organisations concerned and talking with staff to assess 
compliance, rather than simply accept documentary updates from health 
organisations. 
 
The OHOQ also has two secondary approaches by which it attempts to 
contribute to system improvement, those of local resolution and conciliation. 
The research found it hard to assess how effective these approaches are at 
securing system improvement but, tentatively, concluded that they were likely 
to be of limited success. In local resolution over 20% of cases are closed as 
unresolved and, even where the case is resolved, the OHOQ is unaware of 
the resolution agreed or whether any agreed change is actually implemented. 
Only a small number of cases are resolved by conciliation and, again, the 





The dominant administrative justice model adopted by the OHOQ is the legal 
model. Although, as stated above, the OHOQ does undertake some systemic 
activity in a manner in keeping with the professional judgment model, this is a 
secondary activity. The model of administrative control is, necessarily, 
coercive. The OHOQ requires health organisations and health professionals 
to comply with their activities, particularly relating to prosecutions. Where it 
believes that professional misconduct has occurred, the OHOQ will seek to 
sanction the professional. One outcome of this coercive approach is that, in 
response, as Lydia explained, health professionals were uncooperative with 
the OHOQ. However, this combination of the OHOQ’s role to protect the 
Queensland public through taking disciplinary action against healthcare 
practitioners suspected of serious professional misconduct together with the 
healthcare practitioner’s desire to protect their professional reputation and 
livelihood perhaps make this lack of cooperation ineluctable and a feature 




The SPSO undertakes many activities which are aimed at contributing 
towards the improvement of the healthcare system. However, much of this 
work appears to bypass the attention of health board staff. Out of seven 
broad areas of SPSO activity, the greater majority of participants could only 
recall between two and four areas. Only half of participants recognised the 
SPSO’s role in contributing towards system improvement and, even then, 
only half of these participants identified recommendations as the driver for 
system improvement. These low indicators of awareness demonstrate the 
challenge to the SPSO of cutting through all the potential inputs and 
responsibilities faced by healthcare staff. Healthcare staff see the SPSO as a 
complaints body with the potential for damaging the reputation of healthcare 




It was noted in the literature review that multiple institutional logics are likely 
to coexist within a single organisation but that one will ultimately dominate. It 
was also noted within the literature review that attempts to combine 
accountability and learning logics has been attempted within the fields of 
alternative dispute resolution in the United States of America and in the field 
of healthcare quality and patient safety within the NHS in England. As was 
also noted, Dodds and Kodate (2011) concluded that the conflict that arises 
when using these two competing institutional logics in relation to patient 
safety was harmful to patients.  
 
The principal approach used by the SPSO to contribute to system 
improvement is through its complaint investigation reports and associated 
recommendations. In undertaking this activity, the SPSO attempts to utilise 
both the accountability and learning forms of institutional logics but where the 
accountability logic dominated. Both forms of institutional logic are legitimate 
choices for the SPSO. However, the dominant accountability logic utilised by 
the SPSO results in a dysfunctional relationship between the SPSO and 
health boards with a negative consequential impact upon the motivational 
postures adopted by health boards in response to the SPSO’s investigation 
reports and recommendations. But it need not be like this. It would be 
perfectly legitimate for the SPSO to adopt either an accountability logic or 
learning logic as its dominant institutional logic when investigating 
complaints. In doing so, with both institutional logics, the SPSO would need 
to change the way in which it conducts its investigations. 
 
Should the SPSO adopt a dominant accountability logic then it would need to 
review the manner in which it undertakes its investigations. In Miller and 
Howarth v the Health Service Commissioner, the Court of Appeal found 
problems with both the standard used by the PHSO when making its 
judgment and in the procedures used by the PHSO when conducting its 
investigations. This research found that similar criticisms could be applied to 
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the approach adopted by the SPSO when investigating complaints. And here 
lies the opportunity for the SPSO to improve its complaint handling if it 
models its complaint investigations upon best practice within the field of 
justice theory. Adopting an approach to investigations based upon best 
practice in the areas of distributive justice, the reaching of a decision, 
procedural justice, the procedures used when investigating complaints, and 
interactional justice, how the SPSO interacts with health boards and 
healthcare professionals during an investigation, would help improve the 
relationship between the SPSO and health boards and, the motivational 
posture adopted by health boards towards the SPSO and their subsequent 
commitment to implement SPSO recommendations. 
 
An alternative approach that is available to the SPSO is to adopt a dominant 
institutional logic consistent with a learning logic. In doing this the SPSO 
could adopt an approach similar to that used by the NHS to investigate 
significant adverse clinical events28. With this method, the focus would be on 
investigating complaints to maximise learning and would take into 
consideration the broader context in which healthcare practitioners operate. 
Such an approach may be appreciated by complainants. As Carney et al. 
(2017) stated, complainants are often interested in the quality of services, 
and that making simple binary decisions, such as upheld or not upheld, can 
be less than satisfactory to complainants, and may also oversimplify 
complex, multi-faceted issues. In addition, as both Bismark et al. (2011) and 
Friele et al. (2013) found, an important outcome sought by health 
complainants is for lessons to be learned. An approach similar to that used in 
investigating significant adverse clinical events is more likely to be able to 
secure these outcomes and also take into account the complex nature of 
health complaints.  
 
                                            
28 For details of this approach, see, for example, M Woloshynowych, S Rogers, S Taylor-
Adams and C Vincent (2005) 
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While health boards did undertake some interactional learning as a result of 
SPSO recommendations, the informational mode of organisational learning 
was the dominant mode of learning within health boards. The informational 
learning mode promotes incremental change, rather than a fundamental 
review of underlying problems together with a focus on the sharing of 
information. However, the complex structure of health boards and the 
delivery of healthcare act against this sharing of information with health board 
participants recognising that more work needed to be undertaken to improve 
the situation. Even then, as the primary focus of health boards is on 
informational rather than interactional learning, there is no guarantee that the 
solutions identified by health board staff to comply with SPSO 
recommendations will be adequate or sustainable. This explains why health 
boards and the SPSO repeatedly see similar complaints.  
 
The underpinning thesis that this research examined is that health 
ombudsman make an important contribution to the improvement of the 
healthcare system as a result of the roles and activities that they undertake 
together with the way that they work with bodies in jurisdiction. In summary, 
health ombudsman do contribute to system improvement although this is 
likely to be very limited in nature and, to a significant extent, case dependent. 
Together these factors help explain why health boards and the SPSO 
continue to receive complaints of a similar nature. 
 
8.3 Strengths and limitations of the research  
 
The research has the following strengths: 
 
1) The context in which both health ombudsman and bodies in 
jurisdiction operate is complex. Using a case study design allowed the 
researcher to take account of this complexity through an ability to 
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undertake a deeper investigation than would be possible using other 
methodologies. 
 
2) Recruiting participants from three different health boards and from 
different levels and departments within each health board allowed for 
a wide range of views to be collected. This, in turn, facilitated the 
research’s intention to understand the beliefs, attitudes and 
behaviours of health board personnel. 
 
3) The researcher’s insider-outsider status facilitated the collection of 
data. The ability of the researcher to show understanding and/or 
empathy encouraged trust from participants who then revealed some 
very honest views. The openness gained by the researcher from 
participants allowed for the collection of thick data. 
 
4) The researcher’s use of a critical realist research paradigm to identify 
underlying mechanisms to explain the observed phenomena and, 
which, facilitated the development of the new conceptual model that 
help explains the response of bodies in jurisdiction to their 
ombudsman. 
 
This research has the following limitations: 
 
1) It was disappointing that the researcher could not interview staff from 
bodies in jurisdiction in Queensland. It would have been of interest to 
understand how HHS in Queensland responded to the OHOQ.  
 
2) Although the researcher is very grateful to the participants from 
Scottish health boards, and for the fact that they were drawn from a 
number of disciplines and organisational levels, there was only one 
doctor that agreed to participate. Given the responses from 
participants about the unhappiness expressed by doctors about the 
SPSO’s clinical advice it would have been interesting to discuss this 
further with doctors, particularly, those doctors who have been 
involved in a complaint. This would help clarify the motivational 




3) The research focused on documentary evidence and interviews. There 
was an attempt at case analysis of published cases but this was not 
entirely successful. It would have been helpful to have been able to 
discuss published cases with the health professionals involved in the 
case and their responses to the reports. 
 
8.4 Scope for further research 
 
This thesis is descriptive research and one of the outcomes is the 
development of a new conceptual model to describe how bodies in 
jurisdiction respond to their ombudsman. The model needs to be tested 
further to ascertain its validity. In particular, this model looked at health 
ombudsman and health organisations, does this model work in non-health 
related areas? 
 
Given the role that doctors play in the delivery of healthcare and their 
centrality to many clinical complaints it would be helpful to establish whether 
the views of doctors are similar to those found in this research from other 
health board participants. 
 
It would be helpful to follow the path of an SPSO complaint investigation 
report upon its publication. This would include interviews with relevant SPSO 
staff involved in its production, such as the caseworker, relevant healthcare 
staff involved in the complaint, and staff involved in producing the health 
board response. In addition, observation of relevant committees and working 
groups may add important insights. 
 
Academics suggest that the dominant institutional logic in the field of 
healthcare quality are now the accountability and learning logics with the 
professional logic now diminished. Participants’ comments suggest that the 
professional logic maybe stronger than thought and it would be interesting to 
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research the relative strength of these three logics and whether there are any 
additional institutional logics to be identified, for example, relating to patient 
centredness. 
 
The SPSO utilises a dominant accountability institutional logic while, for 
health boards, the learning logic and perhaps the professional logics were 
more dominant. These logics would, in theory, be in competition for 
dominance. It would be interesting to research how competing institutional 
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Appendix 1 – Positionality statement of the researcher  
 
As an experienced medical practitioner, health service manager and a former 
senior member of staff at a health ombudsman I have a strong belief in the 
importance of the role of health ombudsmen in contributing to the 
improvement of health services. This belief is strengthened by the fact that 
health ombudsmen will have, either in the statute that underpins their 
existence, or their business strategy, the objective of contributing to the 
improvement of healthcare. The powers that health ombudsmen hold, the 
discretion awarded them by Parliament, and the insight that should be gained 
through their investigation of complaints should enable them to be a powerful 
stimulus for system improvement. The powers held by health ombudsmen 
should counteract the sizeable power imbalance that exists between 
healthcare users and healthcare providers. However, there is very limited 
research into ombudsmen generally, and health ombudsmen in particular, 
especially in relation to the means used by ombudsmen to improve the 
system. I am interested in the approaches adopted by health ombudsmen in 
their system improvement role. Are these approaches a considered proactive 
approach or a secondary benefit to be gained through complaint investigation 
and the remedying of any identified individual service failure? Is the 
undertaking of these activities by health ombudsmen and any concomitant 
publicity in themselves considered to be suitable evidence of delivery of 
system improvement or does the system actually react and respond to these 
activities? My background is both a strength and a weakness. Potential 
strengths include participants being more willing to be open to me during 
data collection as they see me as ‘one of their own’; I may understand when 
they are trying to pull wools over my eyes; and, I may be more able to 
challenge them accordingly. Potential weaknesses include the fact that 
potentially access may be more difficult because of my previous experience 
and I am at risk of introducing preconceptions or biases into the research 
process and of making assumptions during data collection and analysis. As 
Willig (2001, p.10) suggests, it will be impossible to remain external to the 
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research and it is inevitable that I am likely to ‘contribute to the construction 
of meanings throughout the research process’. These will need careful 
























Appendix 2 – Research memoire  
 
My research has explored the role of health ombudsman in system 
improvement and how bodies in jurisdiction respond to the outputs of their 
health ombudsman. Fieldwork took place in both Scotland and Queensland, 
Australia. The SPSO and the OHOQ both agreed to act as case studies and, 
while no health organisations in Queensland agreed to participate in the 
research, three health boards in Scotland did so agree. In this research 
memoire, I will consider my position as an insider-researcher and its 
influence on this research. My background as a medical practitioner, director 
in NHS organisations in both Scotland and England, as a director at the 
PHSO and previous research undertaken for my LLM, all influenced my 
interest in this research area, influencing my research questions, research 
design, data collection and analysis, and reporting of the research. See 





In my positionality statement, written at the outset of this research, see 
Appendix 1, I acknowledged my background as a medical practitioner, 
director of health organisations and as a director in the PHSO. Although none 
of these roles involved my employment by either the SPSO or the OHOQ, my 
position as an experienced and senior member of similar organisations to 
those being researched, with similar responsibilities and objectives, provides 
me with insider-‘lite’ status in terms of ombudsman organisations. Insider-
researcher status arises when a researcher has personal experience of being 
a member of the ‘group’ under investigation (Attia and Edge 2017). In 
addition, my medical and health service management backgrounds also 
provided me with insider-researcher status. Insider-outsider status is not a 
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binary division but is, rather, a continuum from total insider status to complete 
outsider (Adler and Adler 1994). 
 
‘The “insider” role is a powerful reflexive position used to gain deeper 
engagement and insight into participants’ understanding of lived experience’ 
(Cooper and Rogers 2014, para2.1). While this sounds positive, there are 
advantages and disadvantages that arise from being an insider-researcher. 
Advantages include greater awareness of the phenomenon being studied, a 
shared familiarity with participants that can aid the sharing of information and 
judging its veracity, and ease of access (Bonner and Tolhurst 2002, Greene 
2014). However, insider status may result in a loss of objectivity that arises 
from prior knowledge of the phenomenon, potentially leading to bias and the 
making of assumptions (Unluer 2012, Greene 2014).  
 
While the insider-researcher can helpfully take advantage of the positives 
arising from insider-researcher status, the researcher must be careful to be 
aware of, and acknowledge, the potential downsides. One approach to doing 
this is reflexivity. Where positionality refers to the researcher’s knowledge, 
reflexivity refers to what the researcher does with this knowledge 
(Educational Studies 2017). Reflexivity ‘is a critical ethos and set of 
dispositions which enable the researcher to reflect on the basis for their 
claims to know the social world’ (May and Perry 2017, p.150). Adopting a 
reflexive approach can help highlight the limitations of the data and how the 
researcher’s personal positions can be used, when interpreting the data, to 
justify those positions (May and Perry 2017, pp.160-161). Reflexivity has 
been described as an ongoing process ‘to continuously construct (and shift) 
our understanding and social realities as we interact with others and talk 
about experience’ (Barrett et al. 2020, p.10). It is, therefore, ‘important to tell 
your reader how interpretations were formed … that influenced the write-up 
and conclusions of your study (Barrett et al. 2020, p.11).  
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It is this that I now attempt to do and, in doing so, I will use a similar structure 
to that describing the methodology contained within the Methodology 
chapter. 
 
At the outset of this research, my view of what was an ombudsman, was 
rather old-fashioned in nature, with a view similar to that of the International 
Ombudsman Institute, based upon the classical interpretation of ombudsman 
and in keeping with the definition produced by the International Bar 
Association. In this definition, there is a focus on complaints against 
government agencies and where an independent ombudsman scheme is 
established by, and accountable to, parliament. My view was strongly 
influenced by my limited ombudsman experience working for the United 
Kingdom’s Parliamentary and Health Service Ombudsman (PHSO). 
 
However, during the period that this research was undertaken, but unrelated 
to this research, I was involved in reviews of three Australasian private sector 
ombudsman schemes. In doing so, my view of ombudsman schemes 
changed, driven, in large part, by the views of service users and bodies in 
jurisdiction of the Australasian ombudsman schemes. I realised that what 
was important was that the legitimacy of ombudsman schemes came from 
the consideration of complaints that they received, their independence from 
the parties involved, and that the ombudsman schemes enabled an 
equalisation in the balance of power between the parties involved, although I  
recognised that this last feature is always likely to be partial, given that 
bodies controls the information and sometimes expertise. These are similar 
to the essential characteristics of an ombudsman described by Gottehrer and 
Hostina (1998). 
 
This change in view brought me to a position more in line with the later 
definition produced by the American Bar Association, see p.24. This 
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definition allows for a broader consideration of what is an ombudsman and 
focuses upon the importance of complaints, the independence of 
ombudsman schemes when carrying out their functions, and allows for a 
plurality of approaches to complaint handling. This conclusion is contrary to 
what I believed at the start of the research. However, discussing with 
participants from the OHOQ, their views on the objectives of the OHOQ, and 
the emphasis from all participants on issues of professional misconduct with 
little emphasis on in-house complaint handling caused me to review my 
ideas. I had to move away from the name of the organisation and its headline 
activities to focus on what the OHOQ actually did in practice which was more 
restricted. 
 
Issues relating to research design 
 
I adopted a case study approach to this research allied to a critical realist 
research paradigm in this research and case studies lend themselves to this 
research approach (see Methodology chapter). In understanding how health 
ombudsman contribute to system improvement, and, how health 
organisations respond to their ombudsman, requires a detailed 
understanding of the motives, thoughts and behaviours of individuals within 
these organisations. It will be the agency of individuals that dictates what 
happens and why. Adopting a case study approach to this research, using a 
qualitative approach, provided me with the opportunity to secure a full 
understanding of participants thoughts and motivations and which could be 
supplemented and corroborated through documentary analysis. 
 
Determining the case 
 
I worked for many years at the PHSO. Within the PHSO, and public service 
ombudsman in the UK more generally, there is an assumption that 
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ombudsman contribute towards system improvement. At the PHSO it was 
seen through the recommendation for action plans in response to upheld 
complaints and in the thematic reports that the PHSO intermittently 
published. At a personal level, I was sceptical about the ability of action plans 
to bring about sustainable change due to my experience as a health service 
director. I was aware that the health service was capable of producing action 
plans that appeared to resolve the issue, yet did not actually result in the 
necessary change.  
 
I had more hope that change would arise from thematic reports. Thematic 
reports involved the compilation of similar cases looking for root causes. 
While it was true that thematic reports garnered the PHSO some high-profile 
publicity, it was less clear that they resulted in significant change as the 
PHSO continued to receive complaints about the same issue.  
 
I also undertook a Masters in Law where my thesis was on the role of the 
PHSO in the regulation of healthcare. My research found that the PHSO’s 
belief that it contributed towards system improvement was more aspirational 
than real. From this insight, I wanted to investigate how did health 
ombudsman contribute to system improvement and how did health 
organisations respond. It was clear that there was little empirical evidence to 
support the ombudsman’s claim of this ‘ombudsman dividend’ (Abraham 
2012). 
 
When I began this research, I did approach the PHSO to enquire whether 
they would be willing to for me to include the PHSO as a case study. 
However, this would have been potentially very problematic. Not only would it 
have entrenched more deeply my insider-researcher status, it may well have 
increased the possibility of subjective research. At that time, I was a director 
of the PHSO and being an employee would significantly complicate the 
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relationships with participants, not only within the PHSO but also with bodies 
in jurisdiction. In addition, should the research make findings with which the 
PHSO would be uncomfortable, I may subconsciously try to sugar coat the 
findings.  
 
In determinising the case I therefore used criteria sampling, using English 
language ombudsman, health ombudsman that considered a sizeable 
number of complaints, and, ombudsman which had an objective of 
contributing towards system improvement. For United Kingdom ombudsman, 
having ruled out the PHSO, it left me, effectively with the SPSO. In my 
ombudsman role, I had worked with the SPSO, not always with ease but a 
relationship enacted with respect and some friendliness. The relationship 
between the SPSO and Queen Margaret University was also helpful in 
securing the agreement of the SPSO to participate. In Australia there were 
two contenders. The NSW HCCC and the OHOQ.  I approached both but the 
NSW HCCC did not reply. The OHOQ did reply and, following a meeting with 
the then ombudsman, the OHOQ agreed to participate. 
 
Identifying the research questions 
 
Three research questions were identified to enable me to answer my 
research aim.  
1) What approaches do the OHOQ and the SPSO take to administrative        
justice? 
2) What approaches do the OHOQ and the SPSO, with their differing 
statutory functions, use as they seek to secure system improvement? 





In relation to question one, concerning ombudsman approaches to 
administrative justice, this was a concept that I acquired as a result of my 
Masters in Law thesis. I was interested in this idea, as it was unclear whether 
the PHSO adopted the model of bureaucratic rationality or professional 
judgment and the academic literature, suggests that the dominant model of 
administrative justice adopted by ombudsman would influence both their 
priorities and how they deliver their responsibilities.  
 
The intention was to discuss this with ombudsman participants to understand 
their thoughts about this aspect of ombudsmanry and also with participants 
form Scottish health boards. But neither this concept, and certainly not the 
associated models of administrative justice, had any resonance within the 
PHSO. This is not to downplay the importance of the models as they are 
helpful in understanding how ombudsman approach the delivery of their 
functions, but, rather, a recognition that the language and ideas of academia 
may not be in wider social usage. 
 
I did test this out when I trialled the semi-structured interview schedule. I 
found that I had to explain the concept and models and people needed to 
have time to reflect. I thought this line of questioning would not work in an 
actual research interview. Apart from the time issue, the question may make 
the participant feel ignorant or suggest that I was living in an ivory tower. I 
therefore decided not to include this line of questioning but focus on 
answering it through questioning participants on the role and objectives of 
their ombudsman office along with how they undertook and reported their 
work. This applies, particularly, with healthcare where models of 
administrative justice have no immediate resonance with participants.   
 
In relation to question two, I was aware that differing ombudsman offices had 
differing statutory responsibilities. This knowledge was of particular interest to 
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me as I wanted to know how these differing responsibilities affected their 
activities. To this extent, this was a question to which I did not know the 
answer.  
However, by the time of the interviews with participants from the SPSO I had 
undertaken desk research on the activities that the SPSO undertook which 
augmented my understanding from previous personal experience. As a 
result, I entered the interviews believing that I had a good understanding of 
the activities, such as complaint investigations, reports, newsletter and 
educational activities, that the SPSO undertook in pursuit of system 
improvement. This led to a challenge in formulating questions for the 
interview. I did not want the interview to feel as if it were a test but, rather, I 
wanted it to be an understanding of how different parts of the SPSO 
understood the role of the SPSO to system improvement and what they 
believed the SPSO did to succeed in that role. Dependent upon their 
organisational position within the SPSO, participants may have different 
understandings and responses to these questions. I therefore tried to have 
questions that were as open as possible and avoided any question that 
seemed to be suggestive of a list. This approach did run the risk that 
participants may provide only incomplete answers, where further prompting 
may have produced fuller answers. I felt that this was an acceptable trade off 
as, I thought that, if the participant needed prompting to answer the question, 
then this was indicative of prioritisation. Responses could be fleshed out by 
asking open questions about roles, objectives and processes and by 
triangulation with published material. 
 
This was less of an issue for the OHOQ as they provided less information 
about their activities on their website and was, to me, a new organisation. 




In relation to question three, a similar issue arose when asking participants 
about their awareness of ombudsman activities intended to contribute to 
system improvement. In practice, I adopted a similar approach as to 
questioning ombudsman participants about their activities aimed towards 
system improvement. That is, I asked open questions without prompting in 
order to identify those activities of which participants were immediately 
aware. Again, this ran the risk that incomplete answers would be provided, or 
that answers would focus on something that had only recently been brought 
to the participant’s attention but, again, it was felt that this approach would 
provide a more accurate answer of everyday awareness. 
 
In the end, I think that the approaches to questions worked effectively. While 
I accept that participants from both ombudsman and health boards may have 
been able to provide fuller answers if prompted, I do think that prompting 
would have maybe provided answers that were not an accurate reflection of 




Adopting a case study approach necessitates the collection of in-depth data. 
A variety of data sources are available (see Methodology chapter) and in this 
research the kay data collected was semi-structured interviews with 
participants from both health ombudsman offices and three Scottish health 
boards and documents published by the offices of the two participating health 
ombudsman. 
 
Being an insider-researcher brought some advantages to the interview 
process. With my background in ombudsmanry, clinical practice and health 
service management, I entered the interviews with a good knowledge of how 
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the systems broadly operated, the language used and was able to 
demonstrate this understanding with participants.  
 
However, being an insider-researcher also has disadvantages. Familiarity 
with the material may mean I overlook certain comments or not play sufficient 
attention to what was being said; I may make assumptions about what was 
said and, therefore, fail to ask clarifying questions, participants may assume I 
know certain facts about which I am unaware, and, my closeness to the data 
may prevent me from seeing the entirety of the picture (see Unluer 2012, p. 
6). To overcome these potential disadvantages, I undertook the following 
steps: I had a set interview schedule to which I adhered. I did not follow this 
slavishly but rather allowed the natural contours of the conversation to shape 
the discussion. However, before closing the interview I checked that all 
interview areas were covered. At the start of the interview I stressed to 
participants that there were no right or wrong questions but what was needed 
was full answers even if this was a ‘don’t know’. The interview schedule was 
prepared before the interviews with participants commenced, and was based 
upon the research questions, literature review and desk research. As the 
interview process progressed, it became clear that certain points were being 
raised about which I wanted to know more. The later interviews included 
these additional areas.  
 
During interviews, researchers often need to adopt positions which 
encourage appropriate replies, particularly if such replies are sensitive (Sim 
and wright 2002). As a result of my insider-researcher status, I was able to 
demonstrate empathy to participants about the issues that they faced and a 
shared understanding of issues by, perhaps, citing an example from my 
experience at the PHSO. Such approaches may encourage participants to be 
more open and feel confident about sharing their views. Doing so, ‘can 
increase the credibility of the research’ (Darawsheh 2014, p.562). For 
example, eliciting views of the SPSO such as the SPSO being the ‘grim 
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reaper’ or the other evocative views of the SPSO may have been harder to 
gain if I was not an insider-researcher. 
 
Attia and Edge (2017) discuss a four-stage iterative approach to data 
collection from participants. There is a need for the researcher to establish 
trust with participants, that encourages participants to collaborate with the 
researcher. Close collaboration between researcher and participant 
encourages the production of credible data, including the provision of ‘insider 
information’ which helps corroborate the data provided. Finally, the 
researcher demonstrates their trustworthiness by behaving ethically towards 
the participants. 
 
To facilitate trust, before the interviews, I sent each participant an information 
sheet explaining the purposes of the research, the role of the participant in 
the research, how their information may be used and that they can withdraw 
at any time up to the submission of the thesis. Before the interview 
commenced, I went through this again and, only then, was informed consent 
obtained. By providing details about the research and their role and powers, I 
attempted to develop a cooperative approach. This was emphasised by 
stressing that there were no right answers to any questions and that, a ‘don’t 
know’ response may be very helpful indeed. I tried to adopt an interview 
approach that was open and would not come across as a test. By using 
multiple participants and other sources of data corroboration of participant 
accounts was obtained. Finally, I tried to establish my trustworthiness by 
stating that participant statements used in the thesis would be anonymised 
and every effort made to ensure that the health boards could not be 
identified. No objections were raised. By doing so I wanted to ensure that I 
did not provide right accounts through inadvertently doing wrong to 




As well as obtaining ethical approval from Queen Margaret university, a 
health board in Scotland and also from a HHS in Queensland, I tried to 
behave ethically by being aware of the importance of the contribution made 
by participants and keeping to the commitments made by me to them. I did 
not share responses between participants, even anonymised. On several 
occasions, participants made comments after the tape recorder was switched 
off, and which would have been useful in the thesis. I have not used this data 
as this would breach the commitment made to the participants prior to the 
interview.  
 
The first set of interviews undertaken were with participants from the SPSO. I 
was actually quite nervous at the start of the first interviews. This was a new 
role for me in my relationship with the SPSO. How would my previous 
relationship play out in this new relationship? In the event, the interviews 
went very well. All participants answered readily and without hesitation. The 
flow to the interviews seemed unstilted. Participants appeared happy to talk 
about what they do and proud about it as well. I came away from the 
interviews very impressed with the SPSO and what they were trying to 
achieve. The impression was of an office committed to delivering the best 
service that they could to complainants while also trying to help health 
organisations be successful. My note at the time describing the SPSO was 
that they were less big brother and more big sister. 
 
During the interviews with participants from the SPSO, the researcher was 
struck by their determination to try to improve the healthcare system and 
recognised that their new approach to recommendations was an attempt to 
correct the challenges that he had identified from his experiences. This 
positivity very much impressed the researcher. As a result, at the end of the 
interviews with SPSO participants, the researcher was less sceptical and 
cynical about the ability of recommendations to bring about service 
improvements. However, the interviews with the SPSO participants predated 
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the interviews with health board participants and so the researcher was 
unaware of the less positive views expressed by health board participants.  
 
These thoughts, arising from the first set of interviews, reinforced my 
positionality statement of health ombudsman being able to contribute towards 
system improvement. 
 
My second set of interviews were with participants from the OHOQ and took 
place a few weeks after the interviews with SPSO participants. Prior to my 
arrival for the first interview I had been informed that the Ombudsman was no 
longer able to participate, but it was only explained to me upon my arrival for 
the first interview that the reason that the interview had been cancelled was 
that the Ombudsman had been recently suspended by the Minister for 
Health. Nevertheless, directors were willing to honour his commitment to 
participate and I remain very grateful to them for doing so. Participants were 
all very helpful. They were brave enough to discuss frankly some of the 
problems that had been experienced by the office since its establishment, 
such as inherited backlogs of cases, funding issues, difficulties with 
understanding the reach of its legislation. There was a sense obtained 
through the interviews of a commitment to delivery. The interviews went well 
but my reflection, post- interviews, was of discussions that I could have had 
with directors from any ombudsman office. The one thing that did surprise me 
post-interviews was my view that the ombudsman was not an ombudsman. 
Rather, I thought, it to be a health regulator. Which it is, but only in part.  
 
There was a gap of between six to eight months with my interviews with 
participants from the three health boards. There had been a restructuring of 
health services since my time as a health service director in Scotland and I 
had an initial misconception that a unitary health board was a unitary 
organisation. In reality, they were multi-unit organisations. Hospitals appear 
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to be run as independent units with their own management team within an 
overarching health board structure. There was replication of roles and 
structures within these semi-autonomous units. Participants were aware of 
my background, particularly at the PHSO, yet they answered readily and 
frankly. They were open about what they believed that they had done well 
and things they believed that had performed not so well. There was no 
attempt to portray themselves as without fault. They expressed mixed views 
about the SPSO although, overall, it was more negative than I anticipated 
prior to the interviews. Despite my lack of knowledge about health board 
structures, the delivery of care in Scotland faces the same issues as I 
experienced in England. This understanding of the pressures that they faced 
when undertaking their job enabled me to probe them in an informed and 
sensitive manner. Some of the language used by health board participants 
did surprise me, such as grim reaper and talk of being in fear. Their sense of 
the SPSO was at variance with what the SPSO informed me that it wanted to 
project. The concern about the lack of communication between the SPSO 
and health boards was not a surprise. It is typical of public service 




Due to my insider-researcher status there is a risk of bias affecting my 
analysis of the data. To overcome this potential bias, I have used multiple 
sources of data, using triangulation for corroboration, offered a detailed 
description of the research settings and participants, provided thick 
description in the results section and reflected on notes taken during the 
research process. 
 
A thematic analysis approach was adopted to analysing the data. In 
undertaking this analysis, a theoretical approach was utilised in order to test 
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out the conceptual model arising from the literature review and theoretical 
considerations. A list of potential themes derived from the model was 
developed and the data analysed at the semantic level. Adopting this 
approach was intended to provide a rigour to the data analysis by providing a 
framework which linked the data to the extant literature and to the developing 
theory. During the data analysis, it became evident, and as was suspected 
before the data analysis commenced, that not all data could be fitted into the 
pre-determined themes and additional themes were developed as the data 
demanded.  
 
During the subsequent analysis, some themes were collapsed into others 
where it was felt that the differences between themes was too small or where 
there was very little data contained within a theme. This was an iterative 




At the beginning of this memoire it was noted that the positionality adopted 
by the researcher can affect the entire research process from design to 
conclusions. But this effect is not unidirectional. The act of conducting the 
research, analysing the data and drawing conclusions will influence the 
positionality of the researcher. Positions can shift during the research 
process (May and Perry 2017). 
 
During this research, the positionality of the researcher has, indeed, shifted. 
In my original positionality statement, I stated, ‘I have a strong belief in the 
importance of the role of health ombudsmen in contributing to the 
improvement of health services’ and that their roles and powers ‘should 
enable them to be a powerful stimulus for system improvement’. However, I 
am less optimistic now than I was when I began the research. While health 
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ombudsman are able to contribute to system improvement, it is not as I 
thought. It is patchy, dependent upon the nature of the relationship between 
health ombudsman and health organisation. This relationship drives the 
motivational posture adopted by the health organisation. However, the 
relationship is, in turn, driven by the institutional logic adopted by the health 
ombudsman. As both the SPSO and the OHOQ are driven by an 
accountability logic, and not a learning logic, their ability to catalyse change is 
impeded.   
 
